By: A G Abubakar

Democracy may well be the best form of political arrangement devised in modern history, yet it is far from a perfect system. It comes with inherent flaws, just as it offers the flexibility required for societies to function effectively. Democratic systems are ultimately guided more by their underlying values and philosophies than by rigid dogmas. Practitioners are therefore expected to adapt democratic principles to local realities. It is within this context that concepts such as zoning, rotation, and power-sharing have emerged as legitimate democratic tools to manage diversity and promote development. Democracy is not a mere game of numbers but a system designed to uphold inclusiveness at all levels.

Since the advent of the Fourth Republic, Nigeria has consciously re-engineered democratic practice to reflect its diversity and to address persistent concerns of equity, inclusion, and justice. Many sub-national entities—states, local governments, and even non-governmental organisations—have adopted this flexible approach to liberal democracy. After all, democracy exists for man, not man, for democracy. Even in advanced societies, democratic systems vary widely, ranging from parliamentary to presidential, unicameral to bicameral, and other hybrids. No society should be enslaved by rigid forms or doctrines. It is precisely this flexibility that has enabled minorities, immigrants, and historically marginalised groups to win elections in many parts of the world.

It is against this backdrop of workable and inclusive democracy that deliberate efforts should be made to zone the governorship of Borno State to the South in 2027, in the interest of equity and global democratic best practices. Any credible aspirant from the zone should be presented not as a deviation from tradition, but as a unity candidate—a symbol of balance in a state long perceived to be under the monopolistic grip of Borno North and Central senatorial districts. The Central zone has had a greater hold since the advent of the current Republic in 1999 to date. The lesson here is, if the leadership at the national level could be rotated between the North and South regions of the country, then it is only logical to shift power across the three senatorial zones in the states, in the name of equity.

Historically, the two zones have leveraged their comparatively larger voting strength to produce all civilian governors of the state. Under civilian rule, Borno State has been governed by Mohammed Goni (1979–1983), Asheik Jarma (1983), Maina Ma’aji Lawan (1992–1993), Mala Kachalla (1999–2003), Ali Modu Sheriff (2003–2011), Kashim Shettima (2011–2019), and Babagana Umara Zulum (2019–date). All, except Asheik Jarma—a Shuwa Arab—are of Kanuri extraction from either Borno North or Central. Attempts by prominent sons of Borno South, such as Muhammad Abba Gana, Ambassador Pindar, and Durkwa, were subtly resisted.

Unsurprisingly, this pattern has bred deep resentment among the people of Borno South, who believe—legitimately—that they deserve not just a chance, but the same level of political support they have consistently extended to others. The South is under no illusion about the realities of politics: power is not gifted; it is contested. Yet, political competition does not negate the place of equity. This is why arrangements such as zoning, balance, and “turn-by-turn” exist in party politics.

Democracy was never intended to be a zero-sum game, nor is equity a political crime. Inclusiveness, unity, and shared development remain its core objectives. A prosperous and united Borno is a collective gain for all its constituent parts, irrespective of ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences.

Any honest conversation on political equity must also confront certain hard realities. Relinquishing power is never easy—especially in a fragile democracy like Nigeria, where political office often implies unfettered access to public resources. The allure of patronage, dominance, and control remains a powerful deterrent to genuine power-sharing. The dominant groups are therefore ever ready to twist the meaning of democracy in a bid to maintain the status quo. In the process, they at times give the system a bad name.

Among dominant groups, particularly the Kanuri, fears—both real and imagined—persist about entrusting political destiny to others. These anxieties are amplified by the fact that much of the lower and middle manpower of the state originates from the South, which in turn influences recurrent expenditure patterns. Additionally, private artisanal and technical services—mechanics, craftsmen, and ICT professionals—are largely dominated by Southern Borno indigenes; though currently waning away.

While the Borno North and Central’s apprehensions are largely emotional, the democracy in the South has its fair share of surmountable challenges, too. They include organisational and resource constraints, less than desired political alliances across the state, and high sociocultural diversity. Somehow, the diversity has come to define part of the region’s strength. Be that as it may, the unequitable exclusion of the Zone from the state’s number one seat remains one of the disconcerting feelings the people have to contend with.

The prolonged confinement to secondary roles has also weakened the South’s political reach. The experience required to mount and sustain statewide campaigns—strategy, alliances, structure, and resources—remains limited. Notable aspirants such as Ambassador Saidu, Engineer Muhammad Abba Gana, Durkwa, Captain Kadafir Mshelia, and Paul Bassi of the UPN in the 80s, could only go so far. Without access to the patronage and material advantages of incumbency, their campaigns lacked the necessary political “fertiliser” to thrive statewide.

The time has come for political actors in the South to start doing the needful in earnest. Early bridge-building and alliance formation are essential and should as such be embarked upon now. Political spaces in Borno South — deputy governorships, senatorial seats, and other strategic positions—must also be democratised and equitably distributed and rotated across the various sections of the zone. For, what is good for the goose must also be good for the gander.

The North and Central Borno political elite, for once, must rise to the responsibility of being their brother’s keeper. Excluding an entire zone from the highest office for decades undermines unity and development. A tripod stands firmer on three legs than on two, no matter how strong the pair. Moreover, fears of domination are unfounded: Borno North and Central control 19 of the 28 seats in the State Assembly, plus the Speaker, ensuring institutional balance and also effective checks on the Executive, regardless of background.

As a state emerging from years of insurgency, Borno can not afford exclusionary politics. Rebuilding peace and development demands collective ownership of power. Allowing the governorship to rotate across zones would be a powerful gesture of goodwill and reconciliation.

Globally, democratic flexibility offers compelling lessons. London and New York—cities with over 80% white Christian majorities—elected Muslim mayors: Sadiq Khan and Zohran Mamdani. Sadiq is a Muslim of Pakistani extraction who has been a mayor of London since 2016. Mamdani is of Indian-Ugandan background, aged 34, who got sworn in as New York’s mayor recently.

Barack Obama and Rishi Sunak rose to leadership in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively; two of the most powerful nations on the planet Earth. Sunak is Hindu-practicing British politician of Indian descent, while Obama is a Blackman of African extraction. Therefore, democracy, when practised well, is not only “colour blind” but provides space for all to participate in nation building, even in the most unlikely places like Palestine and Iraq. Hanan Ashrawi has been a strong pillar of Palestinian politics, just as Tariq Aziz (1936-2015) was in Iraq. It’s all been about inclusiveness at the highest levels. Paradoxically, the successive ruling parties in Borno would not facilitate the choice of a state governor, from any of the nine (9) local government areas, in the South.

At home, some of Borno state’s most effective military administrators—Musa Usman, Abdulmumin Aminu, Buba Marwa, among others—were not indigenes of the states they governed. There is no empirical evidence that any ethno-religious leadership combination has produced superior development outcomes in Nigeria. Beyond psychological comfort and ego massage, such pairings have made little difference, be it a Muslim-Muslim, Muslim-Christian, Christian-Christian, or Christian-Muslim leadership combination.

If Borno South is good enough to supply votes, manpower, and loyalty, then it is good enough to supply a governor. Anything short of zoning the 2027 ticket to the South is not “democracy” but ethnic iniquity. For decades, power has circulated within a narrow corridor under the excuse of numbers, while an entire zone is condemned to perpetual deputy status. That is not leadership; it is political hoarding. Borno can not claim moral authority on justice, inclusion, or even post-insurgency healing if fair play is thrown overboard in state affairs. Power hoarded breeds resentment; power shared builds states.

Let 2027, be remembered as the year Borno chose justice over fear/prejudice, equity over dominace, and unity over habit, by letting the ticket move South. Democracy is not religion. As such, its way of practice is never sacrosanct. It is just a secular political art form. Be that as it may, it has moral foundations —justice and equity—values that are God-ordained and which are central to all faiths. This moral justice justice should be extended to Borno South; a zone that equally boasts of a rich pool of seasoned politicians, retired generals, technocrats, and entrepreneurs that fit the political bill and are also capable of delivering. Giving them the ticket in 2027 shall signify a new dawn of democracy in Borno in action, form, and essence.
A.G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com