BY: A G Abubakar

Before examining the complex debate surrounding the Fulani and the farmer-herder conflict, it is important to establish the demographic context. Nigeria, with a population estimated at about 230 million people, is home to four major ethnic formations that account for a substantial proportion of its population: the Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulani. While estimates differ across sources, they collectively underscore the demographic significance of these groups. According to the Open Factbook/World Factbook, the Hausa constitute about 30 percent of Nigeria’s population, the Yoruba 15.5 percent, and the Igbo 15.2 percent.

The Fulani are estimated to constitute about 6 percent of the population, or roughly 14.5 million people. Other demographic sources, such as the Joshua Project, place the Yoruba at 23 percent, the Igbo at 18 percent, and the Fulani population at approximately 21 million. Although the exact figures remain contested—the dearth of reliable demographic data remains a major challenge in Nigeria—there is little dispute that the Fulani, at about 10 percent of the population, constitute one of Nigeria’s significant ethnic groups. These statistics provide a useful sense of proportion for social and sociological discussions.

Nigeria’s Fulani population should also be understood within the wider context of the global Fulani community. According to the American Journal of Human Genetics (2025), there are approximately 40 million Fulani spread across 17 countries in the Sahel and West Africa, making them one of the continent’s largest transnational ethnic groups. Of this population, an estimated seven million still practise nomadic pastoralism. Within Nigeria itself, the Fulani are broadly divided into two categories: the sedentary Fulani, who reside permanently in towns and villages and engage in diverse occupations, and the nomadic pastoralists, whose livelihoods depend on seasonal cattle migration. The latter are estimated to number about four million.

This distinction is crucial because, despite constituting only a relatively small segment of both Nigeria’s population and the global Fulani community, the nomadic pastoralist group has, over the years, become the focal point of recurring farmer-herder conflicts and, later, kidnappings, mass abductions, and the ransacking of settlements. Yet, hardly any other group of such relatively small size has generated as much emotand 2and sentiment as the Fulani herdsmen, even when part of them bear arms and terrorise fellow citizens.

On July 30, 2026, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) convened a workshop in Abuja to deliberate on grazing and the perennial farmer-herder conflict that has claimed thousands of lives, displaced countless communities, and deepened ethnic distrust across Nigeria. Given the gravity of the crisis, many Nigerians expected the gathering to produce frank reflections on the role of all stakeholders and practical pathways towards restoring peace.

Instead, public attention shifted to the remarks of the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammadu Sa’ad Abubakar III, who criticised those he said were unfairly linking the Fulani32 ethnic group with terrorism and violent crime. His intervention was undoubtedly intended to caution against ethnic stereotyping—a principle that every fair-minded person should uphold. Indeed, no ethnic group should be criminalised because of the actions of a few, and no responsible society should embrace collective guilt as a basis for justice.

Yet, moral clarity demands more than a rejection of stereotypes. It also requires the courage to confront uncomfortable realities. Across large swathes of the North-West and North-Central, the criminal networks responsible for kidnappings, mass abductions, violent banditry, and many of the deadly farmer-herder conflicts have repeatedly been linked to armed groups operating largely within Fulani pastoral communities. To hold a brief for the perpetrators on account of identity creates a problem in understanding the dynamics of the crisis.

This is where the Sultan’s intervention falls short. Whether intended or not, such a posture may provide criminal actors with a sense of accommodation while diminishing public confidence and trust in leadership.

The persistence of the crisis cannot be explained by a single factor. It is rooted in the collision between a centuries-old pastoral tradition and rapidly changing demographic, economic, and environmental realities. It has also been sustained by weak law enforcement, the proliferation of sophisticated weapons, the collapse of traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, and, in some instances, the silence or reluctance of respected community leaders to confront criminality with the clarity and consistency it deserves. Until these realities are honestly acknowledged, Nigeria will continue to treat the symptoms of insecurity while deflecting attention from its deeper causes. Leadership carries with it not only the privilege of representation but also the burden of accountability.

Currently, no day passes in Nigeria without screaming newspaper headlines or viral social media clips alleging fresh atrocities by what has come to be known as killer herdsmen—a phrase often used as a subtle euphemism for armed nomadic Fulani. The motives ascribed to them vary widely depending on which side of Nigeria’s ethno-religious divide one stands. In predominantly Muslim areas of the North-West, they are seen largely as bandits exploiting a weak security architecture to terrorise, kidnap, and kill for ransom—or simply being trigger-happy.

In the minority communities of the Middle Belt, they are viewed as agents of ethnic or religious domination. Others see them as marauding land grabbers seeking to take over ancestral lands. Some interpret their actions as part of a plot to Islamise the country. Others even alleged genocide motives. Whatever the lens, the perception reflects long-standing, deeply rooted tensions among the region’s diverse groups; including placing a strain on the popular hybrid Hausa-Fulani identity, as Hausa and Fulani increasingly come to see each other in terms of “them and us.”

Though reliable data are scarce, estimates suggest that so-called killer herdsmen have been responsible for over 70% of deaths and kidnappings in the North-West and 4 Alongside Boko Haram/ISWAP and other armed groups, they have contributed to over 50,000 deaths and displaced more than three million people—figures that some sources place even higher.

The evidence against the armed Fulani is obvious, judging by the number and/or incidence of:

i. Those arrested by security agents.

ii. Those who have attended town hall meetings for peace agreements in Katsina, Kebbi, Zamfara, Kaduna, etc.

iii. Sheikh Gumi’s self-ascribed interlocutor role has been almost exclusively within the Fulani domain.

iv. The self-proclaimed leaders of the bandit groups have largely been persons of Fulani extraction. They include individuals such as Dogo Gide, Bello Turji, Kachalla Altii, Kachalla Maha, Sububu, Ado Aliero, Buhari Halidu, and Kachalla Damina, among others. They have been largely responsible for the banditry and kidnapping crisis in the North, outside the Boko Haram/ISWAP enclaves, and in parts of the South-West. Governor Soludo has exonerated them from the violence in Anambra, just as Governor Alia of Benue has acknowledged that some of the crises are perpetrated by indigenous armed militias such as Tsekaa Kyann and Felix Agbako.

Historically, herders and farmers—and the Fulani as a whole—coexisted peacefully for centuries. So, when did things fall apart? The friction began to intensify roughly four decades ago, escalating from low-level skirmishes into open warfare over the last two decades. Today, pastoralists have become ubiquitous across rural communities in Nigeria and much of West Africa, turning one of mankind’s oldest occupations into a subject of global concern as “modernity” threatened to bring the curtain down on a way of life that has endured for millennia.

The nomadic Fulani remain one of the world’s few surviving pastoralist groups, though now in increasingly precarious circumstances. To properly situate the current crisis by the group, it is important to revisit key sociological concepts such as nomadism, shepherdism, pastoralism, transhumance, ethnicity, and clan systems. These shape both the worldview of pastoralists and their interaction with wider communities.

Nomadism is a lifestyle defined by continual movement in search of water and pasture. It shapes social organisation, settlement patterns, and environmental adaptation. Pastoralism and shepherdism focus on the economic dimension—raising livestock for food, clothing, and income. These activities are structured by ethnic and clan (Bororoji, Deneji, Woɗaɓe, Dambazawa, Sulluɓawa, Genawa,etc) identities that guide seasonal migration routes and patterns of behaviour.

Globally, the Fulani are among the few remaining nomadic peoples, alongside the Sami (Scandinavia/Russia), the Romany, the Pokot (Kenya/Tanzania), the Nenets, the Karelians, the Bedouins, and the Maasai. All face the pressures of a rapidly changing world marked by environmental stress, population growth, expanding economic activities, and new technologies.

Sociologically, nomadism shapes culture, behaviour, and value systems, filtered through universal human values and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Just as farming sociologically cultivates patience and attention to detail, and commerce nurtures negotiation and sociability, nomadism builds resourcefulness, bravery, cohesion, and mental toughness. The defence and protection of herds and territory have thus become intrinsic to nomadic identity.

At the same time, pastoralists cherish universal values of respect, kindness, honesty, and reliability. Like everyone else, they seek belonging, esteem, and self-actualisation. Their struggle to reconcile their occupational worldview with the demands of a rapidly changing society has fuelled much of the present conflict. As their traditional world shrinks and income streams collapse—without viable alternatives—confusion and aggression have grown.

Livestock accounts for up to 5% of agriculture’s 24.64% contribution to Nigeria’s GDP (NBS, 2024). The sub-sector provides over 40% of the nation’s dairy needs and about 80% of its meat supply. Yet, nomadism has prevented livestock production from reaching its full potential. Under ranching, for instance, a cow can produce 40–60 litres of milk per day; under nomadic conditions, it produces only 1–1.3 litres. Meat yield differs similarly: about 350 kg under ranching versus 150 kg under nomadic conditions. This huge productivity gap adds pressure to pastoral livelihoods and heightens frustrations.

The shrinking world of nomads has triggered violent clashes with farmers and host communities from Senegal to Cameroon. In Nigeria, the last decade has witnessed thousands of deaths and the devastation of local economies, driving poverty and widespread rural insecurity.

Across West and Central Africa, herder-farmer conflicts follow a similar pattern: in Chad between the Gambi and herders; in Mali between the Dogon and pastoral groups; in Burkina Faso between the Mossi and Fulani; in Ghana involving the Konkomba and Dagomba; in Senegal involving the Wolof, Serer, and Tukulor; and in Niger between the Buduma and pastoralists. Many of these conflicts have resulted in mass killings, reprisals, and displacement.

The deeper roots of the crisis lie in both local and global forces: the historic decline of nomadism due to technological change, industrial agriculture, climate change, and the disappearance of grazing routes within host communities. While ranching and improved animal health have addressed these challenges in many parts of the world, the story has been different in countries such as Nigeria. Here, transhumance has simply collapsed without viable alternatives. While successive governments failed to provide the change infrastructure, the pastoralists’ cultural resistance didn’t help matters. change has not helped matters either.

The way forward must, by necessity, be multi-pronged, encompassing reorientation, modernisation, institutionalisation, engagement, and justice.

ECOWAS has developed several frameworks to modernise pastoralism, such as PRAPS, free-movement protocols, and FAO-supported programmes. However, their impact has remained limited because of weak stakeholder engagement and poor enforcement.

The federal ranching initiative must be pursued vigorously, particularly in states willing to participate. The necessary institutional frameworks already exist: the Federal Ministry of Livestock Development, the National Livestock Transformation Plan, the National Cattle Ranching Programme, and the Office of the Special Adviser on Livestock Reform. What is missing is sustained sensitisation and genuine buy-in from herders, without which the entire vision will fail. Countries with far larger cattle populations—Brazil (238 million), Ethiopia (70.9 million), Pakistan (55.5 million), and Tanzania (37.9 million)—manage pastoralism with minimal conflict. Nigeria has no excuse.

The sedentary Fulani population must play its part by openly denouncing violence. Every group has its deviants; shared ethnicity is not an endorsement of wrongdoing. The reluctance of Fulani elites and ruling houses to confront the violent fringe mirrors the early complacency that allowed Boko Haram and IPOB to grow. The leadership of the more than 14 Fulani ruling dynasties in the North, should speak with one voice against criminal elements within their own ranks—and, indeed, against all forms of violence that threaten the nation. The Emir of Muri (Jalingo) did just that in the recent past, and his example should be emulated. Playing the victim or claiming victimhood should not be a licence to kill. Those who have been killed have suffered no less.

The narrative that herder violence is driven primarily by neglect or a lack of infrastructure is simplistic and dishonest. Many nomadic communities have historically resisted settlement and formal schooling, even though government enlightenment campaigns and infrastructure provision have also been inadequate. All the same, blaming the whole crisis on them entirely is to misses the point. Just like blaming a child’s performance at school solely on the teachers. It does not encourage change.

What is needed is a workable roadmap to modernise pastoralism—anchored on ranching and regulated transhumance. Nomadic education (not lip service), along with ranching are good starting points. Hypocrisy on the part of both proponents and opponents has undermined progress.

Beyond domestic reforms, Nigeria should consider a global engagement framework for the nomadic Fulani—similar to the Arab League, but focused on pastoral cultures. A colloquium or international conference for genuine nomadic communities could help accelerate a peaceful transition. The United Nations could even be lobbied to declare a World Nomadic Day.
A.G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.comv