A Benue born Philanthropist Dr Mike Achadu has call for an inclusive and equitable society devoid of tribalism, ethnicity and religious extremism to foster collective unity of purpose for national development

This is contained in an open letter to the Sultan of Sokoto his Eminence,
Alhaji Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar III and it reads in parts; “Have written this open letter to His Eminence, I believe conversations of this magnitude
should not be confined to private rooms believing that our future must be built on equal citizenship, mutual respect for each other;

“This is not an attempt to diminish the historical importance of Sultanate to bring any religious arguments but a letter of public interest with no strings attached;

“Nigerian is characterized by great minds of extreme civilizations with political institutions which emerged as a modern sovereign state with a well defined constitution that governs us with the sokoto Caliphate which represents the important chapters;

“Your eminence, Nigeria’s constitution does not establish either Islam or Christianity, your Eminence i believe your answer is No, because in the history of the territories that eventually became Nigeria does historical political authority confer permanent political ownership;?

Section 10 of the constitution provides that in 1903 the Northern and Southern Protectorates were subsequently amalgamated into religion, ethnic group and kingdom so, Nigeria has existed over decades with the conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate culminating in that history that deserves recognition and respect;

The Government of the Federation or State shall not adopt any religion as state, They establish principles of religious neutrality, freedom and equal citizenship, Your Eminence, this is where i believe our national conversation requires greater attention so that citizens may interpret exactly the same symbolically;

“This distinction became particularly visible in Nigeria’s debate over the Muslim-Muslim region.And therefore, defending constitutional religious neutrality is not an attack on Islam neither Christianity

“A political arrangement can have two realities simultaneously: That principle protects Muslims from Christians majoritaranism just as it protects Christians from Muslims and represent an important national compact of religion among others;

“Your eminence, Strategically politicians may see a particular political ticket as an effective coalition, an may ask if political cohesion belongs to right to religion and not also an attack on Christianity based on past pricidence;

“Who is to be represented when every Nigerian fundamental human rights cannot legitimately be protected and this provisions are not merely legal technicalities but strategic reality and symbolic reality;

His eminence, another question is the inclusive and exclusive presidential ticket and what does this say about the distribution of power?

“Electoral calculation , mechanism for consolidating support or means of improving Section 42 further provides constitutional protection against discrimination; Political parties rise and fall and the strength of one faith should not require the weakness of another.The security of one community should not depend upon the insecurity of another;

“Who controls the Legislature? eventually, citizens stop asking the most important question, When a politician speaks about religion, Nigerians may suspect political calculation and each community begins to measure it’s security by amount of power;This is why i believe the Sultanate has an extraordinary opportunity;

“There is a dangerous psychological temptation in deeply divided societies that gives your words a different weight as politics has become a permanent struggle for religious arithmetic that community posseses;

“When a respected religious leader speaks about peaceful co-existence the message carries a moral authority that politics often can not achieve and equally Christianity in Nigeria does not not require the political humiliation of another Nigerian simply because of religion;

“Nigerian can not become great by producing a permanent contest between Christian and Muslim and should not need each other’s permission to belong to any institutions;

,It can become great when both religion or communities began demanding something larger by the quality of governance, protection of all citizens,

“Your eminence, I believe Nigeria’s deepest problem is not simply that Muslims distrust religious suspicion which is often the language through which that distrust expresses itself through competent political power excercised for the common good of all citizens.The ultimate measure of political leadership should not be the religion of the person;

Your eminence, the future must be therefore bigger than both Christian and Muslim been the both argument whether been Hausa,Yoruba,Igbo,Tiv,Fulani or any other ethnic nationality.May Nigeria we leave our children be a country build solid foundation upon which a truly united Nigeria with profound respect for one another irrespective of religion, ethnicity, tribe among others

END

What the evidence says about hardship, recovery and the road ahead
By Tanimu Yakubu, Director-General, Budget Office of the Federation
The argument should begin where Nigerians live
Any serious discussion of the reforms must begin with what Nigerians can see and feel. Food is expensive. Transport takes a larger share of income. Electricity, rent and school bills press harder on household budgets. For many families, the question is not whether an economic indicator has improved. The question is whether their money can still carry them through the month.
That hardship is real, and we should say so without hesitation. But hardship by itself does not tell us what caused it, nor does it tell us whether reversing the reforms would make the country better off. Those are separate questions, and they require evidence rather than anger or reassurance.
The PUNCH report of 16 July 2026 presents poverty as persisting ‘despite reforms’. The phrase is striking, but it compresses several different issues into one. The World Bank and IMF material cited around the same debate records both a deeply vulnerable population and an economy that has returned to stronger real growth, built larger external buffers and moved away from some of the distortions that had accumulated before 2023.[1][2][3][4] The fair reading is therefore not that hardship has vanished, nor that reform has achieved nothing. It is that economic repair has begun while household relief has lagged behind.
A poverty crisis that did not begin in 2023
Nigeria did not enter May 2023 from a position of broad prosperity. Growth per person had been weak for years. Foreign exchange was scarce. Multiple exchange rates encouraged arbitrage. Fuel subsidy costs absorbed public resources. Insecurity kept farmers away from parts of the land. Electricity remained unreliable, transport was costly and too few Nigerians held secure formal jobs.[2] Poverty and vulnerability were already widespread before the present reform programme began.
That history is important because causation matters. A poverty problem built over many years cannot reasonably be attributed in full to policies introduced three years ago. But history cannot become an alibi. The exchange-rate adjustment and fuel-subsidy removal imposed immediate costs on people who had little room to absorb them. Imported goods and inputs became more expensive. Transport costs rose. Inflation eroded wages and savings. Those consequences belong in any honest account of the reforms.
We do not strengthen our case by appearing to argue that suffering is merely inherited. We strengthen it by acknowledging that necessary reforms have had painful consequences and then showing, with evidence, how our policies are reducing those consequences.
What the 79 per cent figure does — and does not — mean
The widely quoted figure that 79 per cent of Nigerians are poor or vulnerable is serious, but it needs to be read correctly. The World Bank’s Streamlined Country Diagnostic distinguishes those already below the poverty line from those who are near-poor or vulnerable to falling below it.[1][2] The number therefore describes a broad zone of insecurity, not a single poverty headcount in which every person is in the same condition.
The distinction does not soften the warning. A household only slightly above a poverty line can be pushed below it by a failed harvest, a medical bill, the loss of a job or another rise in food prices. What the figure shows is how narrow the margin of safety is for millions of Nigerians. It should not, however, be turned into proof that the reforms created a poverty stock that plainly predates them.
The economy has not collapsed, but households are still waiting
World Bank data show real GDP growth of about 4.0 per cent in 2025. The IMF estimated the same rate for 2025 and projected about 4.1 per cent for 2026. Gross international reserves were around US$46 billion at the end of 2025, up from about US$40 billion a year earlier, while net reserves also improved.[3][4] These figures are not a substitute for household welfare, but they are evidence against the claim that the economy has simply collapsed under reform.
The fall in GDP measured in current United States dollars also needs care. A sharp depreciation of the naira reduces the dollar value of naira output even when the volume of goods and services produced is rising. World Bank data can therefore show positive real growth alongside a lower current-dollar GDP.[3] The depreciation has real costs: imported inputs become more expensive and the external value of domestic incomes falls. But it is analytically wrong to treat a translation effect as if it were an equal fall in physical production.
None of this should be presented triumphantly. Nigerians do not eat reserves. A better fiscal balance does not put rice on a table by itself. The value of stabilisation lies in what it permits next: investment, production, employment, lower inflation and better public services.
Relief will come from making more things and moving them more cheaply
The most convincing answer to hardship will not come from another speech about macroeconomic stability. It will come when the supply of food, energy, transport and industrial inputs improves enough to lower costs in everyday life. That is where several large projects now approaching important stages become relevant.
The Kano-Jigawa-Katsina-Maradi railway is one example. We reported in May 2026 that the project was about 60 per cent complete, with delivery targeted for the end of 2027.[5] Its relevance is practical. Northern farmers and traders move large volumes over long distances on roads that are expensive to maintain and slow to use. A working freight corridor can lower haulage costs, widen markets for agricultural produce and improve trade through the northern border. The benefit of the railway will not be the number of kilometres of track. It will be the saving that eventually appears in the cost of moving grain, livestock, fertiliser and manufactured goods.
Lagos shows the same principle in urban transport. The first phases of the Blue and Red Lines are already carrying passengers while extensions continue.[6] For a commuter, the value of mass transit is measured in time, predictability and the share of income spent getting to work. For business, it is measured in a city that moves people with less dependence on road congestion and fuel-intensive transport. That is how infrastructure becomes an alleviative measure rather than a monument.
The Ajaokuta-Kaduna-Kano gas pipeline can have an even wider industrial effect. NNPC’s May 2026 report placed the mainline in advanced construction, installation and pre-commissioning, with early gas delivery to Abuja targeted in 2026.[7] Northern industry has long paid heavily for unreliable energy. Gas delivered into the corridor can support power generation and manufacturing, reduce dependence on expensive self-generation and make new investment more viable. The public will judge the pipeline not by its diameter, but by the factories it helps to run, the jobs it supports and the costs it helps to bring down.
Fertiliser shows what supply reform can mean on the farm
The fertiliser story is closer to the next harvest. Under the Presidential Fertiliser Initiative, more than 449,000 metric tonnes of inputs had been secured by May 2026, and we were on course for a 1.1 million metric tonne programme – roughly 22 million bags – supported by more than 90 operational blending plants.[8]
For years, the problem was not merely the existence of blending plants. A plant without raw materials is an idle factory. Information available to us indicates that, under the previous administration, some plants could secure enough raw materials for only about three months of production. We have moved to secure raw materials on a basis intended to sustain blending through the year. That change is important because it turns installed capacity into actual supply.
The difference is easy to understand. A plant that works for three months produces little and carries high unit costs. A plant supplied through the year can produce more, spread its costs over a larger volume and compete in a market with less scarcity. As availability rises, scarcity pricing becomes harder to sustain. Farmers gain better access to fertiliser when they need it, yields can improve, and the resulting increase in food supply should place downward pressure on prices in 2027.
The effect will not occur by proclamation. Fertiliser must reach farmers, crops must be planted, fields must be secured, harvests must be moved and markets must remain competitive. But this is a visible chain of cause and effect, and it is a stronger basis for expecting lower food prices than administrative price controls.
Rice mills: feed the mills, not the import market
The same supply argument applies to rice. About 300 rice mills are struggling, not because Nigeria lacks milling capacity, but because too many of them cannot obtain enough paddy to run steadily. When a mill operates below capacity, workers lose shifts, fixed costs are spread over fewer tonnes, farmers lose a dependable buyer and the price advantage of domestic processing is weakened. Importing finished parboiled rice may appear to close a supply gap quickly, but it also transfers the milling, transport, handling and much of the value added to producers outside Nigeria.
Our intervention should therefore address the shortage at its source. We need to stimulate local paddy production while permitting the importation of the raw-material shortfall where domestic supply is temporarily inadequate. The purpose of such imports would be to keep Nigerian mills running, not to displace them. As local output rises, the imported component should fall. That approach protects consumers from scarcity while preserving demand for Nigerian paddy and creating a stronger incentive for farmers to expand production.
For rural households, this distinction is consequential. A bag of finished rice imported into Nigeria creates little income for a farmer in Kebbi, Kano, Jigawa, Niger, Taraba or Ebonyi. Paddy supplied to a Nigerian mill does. It supports cultivation, aggregation, haulage, milling, packaging and distribution before the rice reaches the market. Keeping the roughly 300 mills supplied therefore attacks food scarcity and rural poverty at the same time. It raises domestic value added, strengthens the market available to farmers and retains more of every naira spent on rice within the Nigerian economy.
The objective is not permanent dependence on imported paddy. It is to prevent idle domestic capacity while we close the production gap. The durable answer remains higher yields, more irrigated cultivation, improved seed, fertiliser, extension services, secure farming communities and reliable links between growers and mills. But where a temporary shortfall exists, importing the missing raw material is economically preferable to importing the finished product and leaving Nigerian factories underused.
Security is also an economic policy
A farmer who cannot enter his field does not produce. A trader who fears the road moves less produce and charges more for risk. In this sense, the campaign against banditry is also a campaign against food inflation.
Security operations in 2026 restored access to a number of communities and allowed economic activity to resume in areas that had been badly disrupted.[10] It would be inaccurate to claim that banditry has disappeared from every affected area. The economic test is narrower and measurable: are more farmers returning to their land, are more hectares being cultivated, and is more produce reaching markets with fewer losses and delays?
Where the answer is yes, the effect should combine with better fertiliser availability. More cultivated land, higher input use and safer distribution can produce a larger harvest. If those gains hold through the 2026 farming cycle, consumers should begin to see more relief in food markets in 2027.
Why the alternative also has a cost
It is easy to compare the pain of reform with an imagined version of the old system in which prices stayed low and no one paid the difference. That system did not exist. The difference appeared elsewhere: in subsidy bills, foreign-exchange shortages, parallel-market premiums, arrears, inflation and public resources that could not be spent on other needs.
The real choice is not between painful reform and painless continuity. It is between completing a difficult correction and returning to arrangements that had become increasingly expensive to finance and easier to exploit. That does not excuse poor implementation. It means that the answer to hardship is to improve the reform, protect vulnerable households and accelerate the supply response, not to rebuild the distortions that made correction unavoidable.
The test now is whether Nigerians can feel the change
We should not ask Nigerians to celebrate numbers they cannot yet feel. Our better argument is to show where the numbers lead. Stronger public finances must produce roads, power, schools, health care and productive investment. Better reserves and a more orderly foreign-exchange market must support confidence, investment and a more stable supply of essential goods. The reforms will be vindicated in the lives of Nigerians, not in the vocabulary used to describe them.
These are not slogans. They are outcomes that can be checked. If fertiliser remains scarce despite year-round input supply, then our policy has not worked as intended. If rice mills remain idle for lack of paddy while finished parboiled rice is imported, we will have missed an opportunity to reduce scarcity through Nigerian production and rural incomes. If secured communities do not return to cultivation, the economic benefit has not been realised. If new rail and gas infrastructure do not reduce costs or expand productive activity, completion alone will not be enough. We must therefore measure success by what these interventions do to production, prices, jobs and household welfare.
Nigeria’s poverty crisis is older than the present reforms. Our reforms have nevertheless imposed real costs on households that were already under strain. Both facts can be true at the same time. The evidence also shows that real output has grown, external buffers have improved and important constraints on production are being addressed. Our responsibility now is to convert those gains into relief that is visible in markets, incomes and public services.
That is where the debate should end and our work should begin: not with a claim that hardship has disappeared, and not with the claim that reform has failed because hardship persists, but with a clear test. Are we producing more? Are we keeping our fertiliser plants and rice mills working? Are we moving goods more cheaply? Are farmers returning to their fields? Are factories operating for longer? Are families beginning to see prices ease and opportunities expand? Those are the questions by which Nigerians will judge us, and rightly so.
References

1. Sami Tunji, “Poverty threatens 79% of Nigerians despite reforms – World Bank,” PUNCH, 16 July 2026.
2. World Bank, Nigeria Country Partnership Framework FY2026–FY2032 and accompanying Streamlined Country Diagnostic, 2026.
3. World Bank, World Development Indicators, Nigeria country data, including 2025 current-dollar GDP and real GDP growth; accessed August 2026.
4. International Monetary Fund, Nigeria: 2026 Article IV Consultation — Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Nigeria, IMF Country Report No. 26/125, June 2026.
5. State House, Abuja, “FG: Kano-Jigawa-Katsina to Maradi Railway Project 60 Percent Completed; Set for Delivery End of 2027,” 3 May 2026.
6. Lagos State Government, official updates on Lagos Rail Mass Transit Blue and Red Lines, including operational Phase I services; 2024–2025.
7. NNPC Limited, Monthly Report Summary, May 2026: AKK mainline construction, installation and pre-commissioning activities, with early gas delivery to Abuja targeted in 2026.
8. State House, Abuja, “President Tinubu Hails MOFI, NADF for Strengthening Nigeria’s Fertiliser Value Chain, Supporting Food Security,” 18 June 2026.
9. Ministry of Finance Incorporated / PFI-NPK reporting on early 2026 procurement and distribution of fertiliser raw materials to registered blending plants, June 2026.
10. Official security reporting on continuing operations against banditry and kidnapping and the restoration of access to affected communities, 2025–2026.

By Charles Abakpa

‎There are times when the choice of a leader matters as much as the institution itself. This is particularly true in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, where decisions taken by regulators can affect production, investment, government revenue and the wider economy. Oritsemeyiwa Eyesan’s leadership of the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) is beginning to show what years of experience within the industry can bring to a critical national institution.
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‎Her emergence as the Chief Executive Officer of NUPRC can aptly be described as the return of the natives. This is because Eyesan has spent more than three decades working within Nigeria’s petroleum industry. She understands the system, its history, its challenges and, importantly, the expectations of operators and investors. She is therefore not learning the industry from the outside; she has been part of its growth and transformation for years.
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‎Eyesan studied Economics at the University of Benin and joined the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1992. From her early days as a material traffic officer, she moved through planning, commercial and executive responsibilities before becoming Executive Vice President, Upstream, at NNPC Limited. Her rise through the system is a reflection of experience gained over many years.
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‎That experience is now being brought to bear at the NUPRC, which has a major responsibility for regulating upstream petroleum operations in Nigeria. The commission oversees licensing, field development, technical compliance and other activities that determine how the country’s oil and gas resources are developed.
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‎One of the clearest indications of her approach is the transparent conduct of the 2025 oil and gas licensing round, where 31 companies have emerged successful for 37 oil and gas blocks, following the submission of 200 bids by 143 companies.
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‎The spread of interest in the blocks was equally significant. Bids were received for assets in established petroleum producing areas as well as frontier basins such as the Benue Trough, Chad Basin, Anambra Basin and Benin Basin. It showed that there is still considerable interest in Nigeria’s petroleum resources when investors have confidence in the rules and the process for allocating assets.
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‎Eyesan’s insistence on financial discipline is another important aspect of the licensing exercise. Winning a block, under the new approach, should not be the end of the process. Successful companies are expected to meet their financial obligations and demonstrate the capacity to develop the assets. The application of the “drill or drop” principle also discourages the practice of sitting on acreage without meaningful activity.
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‎Again, her experience in commercial negotiations has also prepared her for the responsibilities of the NUPRC. Before her present position, Eyesan was involved in major industry transactions, including Nigeria’s first natural gas liquids commercialisation and the renewal of deepwater production-sharing contracts. These were complex arrangements with significant implications for investment and production in the country.
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‎What appears to be driving her current agenda is straightforward: increase production, reduce losses and make the regulatory process work faster. Eyesan has identified shut-in production, declining output and delays in bringing projects on stream as areas that require urgent attention. Rather than waiting only for new discoveries, her strategy includes bringing economically viable existing assets back into production.
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‎She is also placing considerable emphasis on making regulation more predictable. The planned publication of service level agreements for major approvals, digital workflows for permits and reporting, and clearer timelines for regulatory decisions are aimed at reducing unnecessary delays. In an industry where delays can cost companies millions of dollars, faster and more predictable regulation can make a significant difference.
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‎Her engagement with industry operators is another part of the strategy. Through the CCE–Operators Leadership Forum, the commission is creating a regular channel for discussing production restoration, approval timelines, infrastructure integrity, gas development and other pressing issues. Eyesan has also stressed the importance of proper hydrocarbon accounting, with a clear message that every barrel produced should be properly accounted for.
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‎The 90-day programme introduced by the NUPRC under her watch is particularly important because it focuses on opportunities that can deliver results without unnecessary delay. Under the program, Field development plans that are near completion, well interventions, rig mobilisation and other quick win projects are being given attention. For a country working towards higher production levels, getting such projects moving can provide immediate gains.
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‎Most importantly, Eyesan’s agenda is not limited to crude oil. She has always spoken about safety, host community benefits, governance, data integrity and responsible operations. Her approach suggests that increasing production must go hand in hand with improving the systems through which the industry operates.
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‎There is also something significant about the emergence of Eyesan, another Nigerian woman at the centre of such an important national assignment. For decades, Nigerian women have shown that they can lead complex institutions and deliver results at home and internationally. Eyesan belongs to that tradition. Her performance inevitably brings to mind women such as Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, whose career has demonstrated the capacity of Nigerian women to compete and excel at the highest levels.
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‎Of course, Eyesan has inherited an industry facing serious problems. Production has been constrained by insecurity, pipeline vandalism, ageing infrastructure, underinvestment and other longstanding challenges. But having someone with extensive institutional knowledge, commercial experience and a clear understanding of the upstream business gives the NUPRC a stronger hand in tackling these problems. Her presence has already been felt.
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‎Her performance so far suggests that the return of the natives may indeed be good news for Nigeria’s oil and gas industry.

Abakpa wrote this piece from Owukpa, Benue State.