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Reminiscing About Major General A.E. Abubakar’s Command of Operation Hadin Kai

Published

4 hours ago

September 22, 2026

By Samuel Aruwan
The end of a military command is rarely marked by celebration alone. Behind the ceremonial handshakes, salutes, photographs and carefully chosen words are memories that cannot be fully captured in official statements. There are battles won, communities reclaimed, captives rescued and families reunited. There are also empty seats in officers’ messes, soldiers who did not return from operations and families whose loved ones paid the supreme price.
It was against this mixture of accomplishment, sacrifice and remembrance that Major General Abdulsalam Enesi Abubakar handed over the leadership of the Joint Task Force North-East, Operation Hadin Kai, to Major General I.A. Ajose on 15 September 2026. The handover brought to an end nearly 17 demanding months of service as the 15th Theatre Commander.
Abubakar assumed command from Major General Waidi Shaibu, now the Chief of Army Staff, on 29 April 2025 amid the familiar challenges of the counterinsurgency campaign. Although the terrorists had been considerably weakened over the years, they remained capable of launching attacks and inflicting casualties. They continued to take advantage of the region’s vast territory, the difficult terrain of the Lake Chad Basin and instability along Nigeria’s international borders within Operation Hadin Kai’s area of responsibility.
The increasing use of improvised explosive devices and armed drones, alongside attacks by small and highly mobile groups, presented fresh dangers to troops and vulnerable communities. The mandate before the new Theatre Commander was clear but enormously demanding: to degrade the terrorists, protect civilians, recover threatened areas and help create the conditions for normal life to return to the North-East.
Normalcy in such an environment could not be measured by military victories alone. It had to be seen in reopened markets, schools and farmlands; in the return of displaced families; and in the ability of citizens to travel, trade, worship and sleep without waiting for the sound of gunfire.
According to the official account presented at the end of Abubakar’s tenure, more than 7,000 displaced families returned to their ancestral communities, with returned or resettled communities in every local government area of Borno State. Behind those figures were families carrying what remained of disrupted lives back home: elderly people returning to compounds built by their fathers, women reopening rooms that had stood empty for years and children seeing villages they had known only through the stories of their parents.
The Theatre also recorded the voluntary, safe and dignified repatriation of more than 3,000 Nigerians from the Republic of Cameroon. The exercise was undertaken by the Borno State Government in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Reduction and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Other signs of returning life became visible. The National Youth Service Corps orientation exercise returned to Maiduguri after an absence of more than 13 years. West African Examinations Council and National Examinations Council examinations were conducted in Banki and Gwoza. Trade routes reopened, markets came back to life and farmers returned to lands that had been inaccessible.
These were not the accomplishments of the military alone. They resulted from cooperation among the Armed Forces, the Borno State Government, federal institutions, humanitarian organisations, traditional institutions and the communities themselves. The military’s role was to create and protect the environment in which civil life could resume.
Every reopened school, cultivated farm, restored market and returning family represented a rejection of the future the terrorists sought to impose upon the region. Terrorist organisations may occupy territory with weapons, but they sustain their influence by frightening people away from their homes and livelihoods.
The operational account presented at the handover stated that more than 1,106 Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad and Islamic State West Africa Province terrorists were neutralised during Abubakar’s tenure, including some commanders and other important figures within their structures.
The Theatre also reported the recovery of more than 475 assorted weapons and 24,409 rounds of ammunition. From April 2025, at least 295 improvised explosive devices were discovered and safely detonated. More than ₦300 million linked to terrorist financing was intercepted, while no fewer than 758 suspected logistics collaborators were arrested.
These aspects of the campaign were important because insurgencies do not survive on ideology alone. They require money, fuel, food, medicine, weapons, intelligence and networks capable of moving supplies. Targeting those networks weakened both the fighters and the concealed system that enabled them to survive, recruit and attack.
Sustained military pressure, combined with non-kinetic initiatives, contributed to further surrenders. According to the Theatre, 969 terrorists and members of their families surrendered within the final year of Abubakar’s command. The Theatre also recorded the rescue of 638 civilians from terrorist enclaves and all 46 students endangered during the attempted abduction at the Federal Government Girls College, Monguno.
For the families involved, these were not abstract operational successes. They represented the difference between a lifetime of grief and the indescribable relief of seeing a missing child or relative return alive.
One of the most consequential campaigns of the period was Operation Desert Sanity V in the Timbuktu Triangle. Beginning on 21 January 2026, the operation combined sustained ground action with coordinated air support against terrorist positions in an area that had long served as a sanctuary, detention centre and logistics base.
Military accounts stated that troops uncovered and demolished three ISWAP detention facilities with an estimated combined capacity of about 300 captives. At least 32 terrorists, including two Qaids and three Munzirs, were reported neutralised. The pressure exerted by the advancing troops also enabled more than 70 captives to escape and emerge in Goniri, Buratai and Mandaragirau.
Among the escapees was Malam Jidda Ba Jidda, a farmer from Kufi village reportedly abducted in December 2025. His experience placed a human face on the importance of the operation. For those held in such facilities, escape meant release from hunger, coercion, forced labour, violence and the constant fear of execution.
The destruction of the detention facilities denied the terrorists places they had used to imprison, punish and terrorise civilians. It also challenged the aura of invincibility that terrorist organisations seek to create around their enclaves.
At Mallam Fatori on 18 March 2026, troops repelled a coordinated ground and drone attack on a military position. The military reported that at least 80 terrorists, including three senior commanders, were killed. Four soldiers were wounded, while weapons, ammunition, explosives and armed-drone components were recovered.
The engagement reflected the changing nature of the threat. Terrorists who once depended mainly on rifles, motorcycles and suicide bombers had begun incorporating drones into their attacks. The response also demonstrated the value of regional cooperation, with Nigerian and Nigerien air assets supporting troops and striking retreating elements.
The Theatre was strengthened structurally and technologically during the period. Sector 4 became operational to close the security gap between Southern Borno and Northern Adamawa. Nigerian Army Aviation helicopters were inducted, while the Nigerian Army Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Regiment added surveillance and precision capabilities. The Military Command and Control Centre also linked frontline surveillance cameras, improving situational awareness and the flow of information from operational locations.
The strategic partnership operating under the Team Hadin Kai framework further strengthened intelligence sharing, precision targeting, non-kinetic operations and capacity building. A major demonstration of that collaboration came at Metele on 15 May 2026 during the joint Nigerian and United States operation that resulted in the death of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, also known as Abu Mainok. Nigerian and United States authorities described him as the global second-in-command of ISIS.
Yet no honest remembrance of the period should dwell only on victories. The command also passed through moments of profound grief. Among those who paid the supreme price was Brigadier General Musa Uba, Commander of 25 Task Force Brigade, who died in November 2025 following an encounter with terrorists around the Wajiroko axis.
The Theatre suffered another painful loss on 9 April 2026 when Brigadier General Oseni Omoh Braimah, Commander of 29 Task Force Brigade, and other soldiers fell during a terrorist attack on the military position in Benisheikh.
Their names belong within the account of the Theatre’s accomplishments, not as evidence against those accomplishments, but as reminders of the courage and sacrifice upon which they rested. They were commanders who led from the front and shared the dangers faced by the troops entrusted to them. Their deaths, and those of the soldiers who fell with them, left pain within their formations, their families and the nation.
For Abubakar, they were not merely names in casualty returns. They were officers serving under his command and entrusted with troops and difficult operational responsibilities. Their loss formed part of the burden he carried as Theatre Commander: honouring the fallen, supporting those left behind and sustaining the campaign despite the grief within the Theatre.
The experience of achieving operational objectives while losing brave officers and men is not peculiar to Nigeria. In Sri Lanka, General Sarath Fonseka commanded the army during the final campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, widely known as the Tamil Tigers. The campaign ended the group’s territorial control in May 2009, but government figures indicated that more than 6,000 military personnel were killed and nearly 30,000 wounded from the resumption of major hostilities in 2006 to the end of the war.
The final stage of the Sri Lankan conflict remains the subject of serious controversy, particularly over civilian casualties and allegations concerning the conduct of the parties. That controversy cannot be overlooked. The narrower military lesson is simply that even a campaign which achieved its stated objective left thousands of service families grieving.
In the Philippines, General Carlito Galvez Jr., then Commander of Western Mindanao Command, exercised senior regional responsibility during the 2017 campaign against Islamic State-linked militants who occupied parts of Marawi. Government forces regained control after five months of intense urban fighting, but 168 members of the security forces were killed and more than 1,000 wounded.
In Iraq, General Raymond Odierno commanded Multi-National Force–Iraq from September 2008 to September 2010. He oversaw the consolidation of security gains, the expansion of Iraqi security forces and the transition towards greater Iraqi control. Violence declined and United States troop levels were reduced during his tenure, but American, coalition and Iraqi personnel continued to lose their lives.
These conflicts differed from the insurgency in Nigeria’s North-East and should not be equated with it. They nevertheless demonstrate that operational progress and painful loss can exist within the same command. Success does not spare a commander the grief of losing brave officers and men; it often requires him to continue leading while mourning the fallen, caring for the wounded and learning from setbacks.
Before assuming command of Operation Hadin Kai, Abubakar had served as Commander Sector 3 of the operation and the Multinational Joint Task Force in Monguno. He later became General Officer Commanding 7 Division and Commander Sector 1 in Maiduguri. These appointments gave him direct knowledge of the terrain, the formations deployed across the Theatre and the changing methods of the terrorists.
It was, however, during his tenure as General Officer Commanding 3 Division and Commander Operation Safe Haven that I came to know him more closely. Our official responsibilities brought us together, and I saw beyond the uniform and authority of command.
I encountered an officer who understood that lasting peace could not be secured by force of arms alone. He was firm in the pursuit of armed groups and criminal elements, but equally prepared to meet traditional rulers, religious leaders, community representatives and young people in search of understanding.
He appreciated that communal violence is sustained not only by weapons but also by fear, historical grievances, misinformation, suspicion and failures of justice. Under his command, Operation Safe Haven intensified efforts to recover illegal weapons, restrict the movement of criminal groups and protect communities. Stakeholder engagements were also held in troubled areas, including Mangu, where security operations had to be accompanied by difficult conversations about recurring violence.
Working with him allowed me to appreciate the balance required of a commander in an environment of communal suspicion. Every operation had to be firm enough to protect innocent people but carefully managed to avoid deepening existing divisions. He emphasised training, combat readiness, discipline, civil-military relations and cooperation among security agencies. He also believed in command presence—visiting troops in operational locations and meeting communities rather than relying entirely on reports.
Those experiences prepared him for the responsibility he later carried in the North-East. By the time he assumed command of the Theatre, he understood that security was ultimately about human beings: the soldier keeping watch through the night, the farmer longing to return to his field, the displaced woman carrying what remained of her family’s possessions and the frightened child waiting for school to reopen.
His tenure did not bring terrorism in the North-East to an end, and no serious account should make such a claim. The terrorist groups remain dangerous, adaptive and capable of exploiting operational gaps, difficult terrain and instability across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. The incoming Theatre Commander, Major General I.A. Ajose, therefore inherits both the gains recorded and the threats that remain.
Ajose is not a stranger to the Theatre. A seasoned infantry officer of the 43rd Regular Course, he previously commanded 5 Brigade in Borno State and served as Chief of Staff, 4 Special Forces Command. He also commanded 17 Brigade, served as Force Commander Operation Hadarin Daji and later became General Officer Commanding 8 Division and Commander Sector 2 of the Joint Task Force North West, Operation Fansan Yamma.
My knowledge of Ajose is not based entirely on his official profile. I met him at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, on 28 July 2026 during a seminar on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. I presented a paper titled, “The Role of Communities in Strengthening Intelligence-Driven CTCOIN Operations,” and he served as the moderator.
His moderation provided an effective link between my presentation, the contributions of the two discussants and the questions from the students. He demonstrated an impressive command of the subject and directed the discussion towards the practical role of communities in strengthening intelligence-driven operations.

He broadened our understanding by drawing on both his knowledge and extensive operational experience. His insights and the different perspectives he brought to the discussion enriched the conversation. At the end of the session, he challenged me to examine another dimension of the subject through further research. I took careful note and promised to pursue it as part of the wider discussion.

I came to know Abubakar through our work together during his command of 3 Division and Operation Safe Haven, while I encountered Ajose within the intellectual environment of the Armed Forces Command and Staff College. In both men, I saw an understanding that contemporary security challenges cannot be addressed by force alone. Intelligence, research, community confidence, civil-military cooperation and continuous learning must form part of the response.
In introducing his successor, Abubakar expressed confidence in Ajose and asked stakeholders to extend to him the same openness, cooperation and goodwill he had received. It was the request of a departing commander who understood that military leadership is a relay in which one officer carries responsibility for a period before entrusting it to another.
After handing over command, Abubakar proceeded to the memorial area at the Maimalari Cantonment Military Cemetery. He stood before the monument honouring the officers and soldiers who had paid the supreme price, laid a wreath and rendered a solemn salute to the fallen. He also remembered in prayer those wounded in the course of operations.
It was more than a ceremonial obligation. It was a final act of remembrance by a commander standing before the memory of men who had served under the same flag but could not be present at the handover. The battles, statistics and operational reports had been written in their blood as much as in the decisions taken at headquarters.
The salute was for Brigadier Generals Musa Uba and Oseni Omoh Braimah, for the officers and soldiers whose names were known to the nation and for the many others remembered most intimately by their families and comrades. By praying for the wounded, Abubakar also acknowledged those who returned from battle carrying injuries that may remain with them for life.
As he departed Maimalari Cantonment, another farewell unfolded beyond the formalities of the handover. In the video of his departure, women and children from the barracks came out in large numbers to bid him farewell. They stood along the route and waved as he made his way out of the cantonment.
It was a simple but deeply moving scene. These were members of the military community who had lived with the anxieties and uncertainties of the campaign: wives who had waited through long periods of silence while their husbands were deployed and children accustomed to watching their fathers leave without knowing exactly when they would return.
Such affection cannot be captured in operational reports. Their presence suggested that Abubakar’s leadership had reached beyond the command headquarters and battlefield statistics. He had left an impression upon the wider military community whose quiet sacrifices are too often overlooked when the history of a campaign is written.
The two scenes belonged together. At the monument were the memories of the fallen and prayers for the wounded. Along the road were the women and children whose lives were inseparable from the service and sacrifices of the troops. Between them stood the departing commander, taking his final leave of a community with which he had shared nearly 17 months of victories, anxieties, losses and hope.
Commands come and go, but the mission remains. Medals, citations and ceremonies matter, but the most enduring legacy of a commander is found in the communities that returned home, the captives who regained their freedom, the children who returned to school, the markets that reopened, the troops better prepared to confront the enemy and the memory of those who did not return.
The North-East will remember the victories. Returned families will remember the roads that led them home. Rescued captives will remember the day the walls of their prisons fell. Soldiers will remember the comrades who stood beside them but did not survive the journey. The women and children of Maimalari Cantonment will remember the commander whose departure brought them out of their homes to wave him goodbye.
For Major General Abdulsalam Enesi Abubakar, the command may have ended, but the human consequences of those nearly 17 months will endure. His tenure belongs not only to the institutional history of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, but also to the quiet stories of people who were able to return, rebuild and hope again. Perhaps that is the most meaningful legacy any commander can leave behind.

Aruwan served as Kaduna State Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs from 2019 to 2024 and is presently a postgraduate student at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

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Kwara Sets Up Joint Committee For KWASUED, CoEd

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4 hours ago

September 22, 2026

Our Reporter

Stephen Olufemi Oni, Ilorin

The Kwara State Government has inaugurated a Joint Management Committee to oversee the coexistence of the duo of the Kwara State University of Education (KWASUED), Ilorin, and the Kwara State College of Education, Ilorin.

The committee was inaugurated at the Ministry of Tertiary Education, Ilorin, with a charge to ensure harmonious relations and effective management and utilisation of resources and facilities shared by the two institutions.

The committee comprises three representatives each from KWASUED and the College of Education, as well as one representative of the Ministry of Tertiary Education.

Representing KWASUED are Prof. Ganiyu Bello, Dr. Bello Okanla Fatai and Dr. (Mrs.) Beatrice Yetunde Olanrewaju, while the College of Education is represented by Mr. Akanbi O. Ayodele, Mr. Lawal L.O. and Mr. Jiyah S.J. The ministry is represented by Mallam Aliyu Abdulsalam.

Inaugurating the committee, the Supervising Commissioner for the Ministry of Tertiary Education and Commissioner for Education and Human Capital, Dr. Lawal Olohungbebe, charged members to ensure that the coexistence arrangement produces tangible results and does not become a mere administrative exercise.

He urged the committee to maintain a harmonious relationship between the two institutions, particularly in the management and utilisation of resources and facilities within the premises of the College of Education.

Dr. Olohungbebe said the government expected impact from the committee rather than just its inauguration, noting that every institution had to start from somewhere before eventually moving to its permanent location.

He reminded members that they understood their respective institutions better than anyone else and were therefore well positioned to develop workable solutions to challenges that might arise in the course of the coexistence arrangement.

According to him, the establishment of KWASUED was not intended to take jobs away from workers at the College of Education but to create additional employment opportunities in the state.

He added that the government was working towards developing KWASUED’s permanent site, after which the university would relocate to the permanent location.

Dr. Olohungbebe also reassured both institutions that KWASUED had come to stay, while the College of Education would equally continue to operate, stressing that the government was committed to ensuring the smooth running of both institutions.

He urged members of the committee to work together and produce practical and implementable recommendations that would guide the ministry in managing the relationship between the two institutions.

Earlier, in his welcome speech, the Director of Continuing Education, Dr. Sunday Akanbi, said the inauguration represented an important step towards establishing a structured relationship between the two institutions and ensuring that the presence of KWASUED and the College of Education within the same environment did not become a source of unnecessary friction.

He stressed the importance of cooperation, mutual understanding and effective communication between the managements of both institutions, particularly in the areas of facility use and day-to-day operations.

The director expressed confidence that the committee, comprising representatives of the two institutions and the ministry, would provide a platform for addressing issues as they arise and developing solutions that would be beneficial to both institutions.

Speaking on behalf of the newly inaugurated committee, Prof. Ganiyu Bello expressed the members’ readiness to take up the responsibility and ensure that the coexistence arrangement succeeds.

Prof. Bello said the committee had accepted the assignment and would do everything possible to achieve its objectives.

He noted that teacher education had recorded progressive growth in Kwara State, adding that the state had established a strong reputation for the training of teachers.

He assured that the committee would work to ensure continued progress in education and teacher training in the state.

The inauguration followed the recommendation of the Committee on the Blueprint for the Coexistence of the Kwara State University of Education and the Kwara State College of Education, Ilorin.

The earlier committee was constituted by the Kwara State Government to develop a framework for the peaceful and effective coexistence of the two institutions, particularly during the transitional period before the development of KWASUED’s permanent site.

Among its recommendations was the establishment of a Joint Management Committee to coordinate the coexistence of the institutions, facilitate the sharing and utilisation of facilities, address transitional challenges and promote harmonious relations.

The inauguration of the new committee therefore marks the commencement of a formal mechanism for managing the relationship between KWASUED and the College of Education as both institutions continue to pursue their respective mandates.

The committee is expected to submit workable recommendations to the Ministry of Tertiary Education to guide the implementation of the coexistence arrangement and ensure that both institutions continue to contribute to the development of teacher education in Kwara State.

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Why I gave Gov AbdulRazaq Sardauna title: Emir

Published

4 hours ago

September 22, 2026

Our Reporter

As AbdulRazaq’s family pays thank you visit to monarch

Stephen Olufemi Oni, Ilorin

Kwara State Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq’s delegation, comprising family members, top government officials and APC chieftains, has paid a ‘thank you’ visit to the Palace of the Emir of Ilorin, Dr Ibrahim Sulu-Gambari (CFR) on Tuesday over his recent turbaning as the Sardauna of Ilorin.

Led by the Mutawali of Ilorin, Dr Alimi AbdulRazaq, the Governor’s elder brother, the delegation was peopled by Alangua Adewole, Alhaji Yusuf Yakubu, elder sister to the Governor, Senator Khairat AbdulRazaq Gwadabe, former First Lady of Kwara State and younger sister to the Governor, Hajia Aisha Mohammed Lawal, Dr Funsho AbdulRazaq, members of the State House of Assembly, led by the House Leader, Barr. Oba Magaji, Special Adviser to the Governor on Special Duties, Alhaji Abdulrazaq Jiddah, and some elders of the party.

Speaking at the Palace, the Emir, Dr Sulu-Gambari, who was excited by the large turnout, said the choice of Governor AbdulRazaq as another title-holder in the same family rather reflects his depth of gratitude to their parents, who he explained played important roles in his life.

He said both the titles of Mutawali and Sardauna that he graciously conferred on the two brothers, Dr Alimi and Gov AbdulRazaq, are a payback for the good deeds of their parents and their own individual goodwill.

Describing the Governor’s father, late AGF AbdulRazaq (SAN), as one of his only two father-figures, the revered monarch said the Abdulrazaqs share a long standing ties and goodwill with the royal family that he cannot forget in a hurry.

“One of my two father figures is late Mutawali of Ilorin (the Governor’s father). He stood by the family after the death of our father and his friend. Talking about Mamaa, the Governor’s mother, she was the one who chaired the organising committee for my Coronation as Ciroma of Ilorin and my wedding ceremony which we held in 1984. For this and other reasons, I am the one who is indebted to show your family a gratitude,” the Emir said.

“Governor AbdulRazaq is a lucky and befitting leader. His coming on board has answered our earnest prayers for good fortune. He has turned around Ilorin and indeed the entire Kwara. This is an indisputable fact.”

Dr Sulu-Gambari, who praised the Governor for his leadership qualities and for being a good ambassador of the Emirate, prayed to Allah to continue to give him the needed strength and wisdom to succeed in office, including as Chairman of the Nigerian Governors’ Forum.

Addressing reporters on the sideline of the visit, Dr AbdulRazaq said they are overwhelmed by the honour bestowed on their brother, for which he thanked the Emir, promising that both the recipent and indeed the family will not “shirk the responsibility to deliver the expectations of the honour”.

“The essence of this visit today is to thank his royal highness, Dr. Ibrahim Sulu-Gambari, CFR, for the honour (Sardauna of Ilorin) bestowed upon his Excellency, AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq, the Governor of Kwara State. We, the entire family, along with the entire Ilorin community, have come to pay our respects to him, to express our sincere gratitude for the honour bestowed upon us,” he said.

Hajia Aisha Lawal, who appreciated the royal father, said the Governor merits the title he was conferred with, given his outstanding contributions to the development of Ilorin Emirate and beyond.

“The comment made by the Emir on Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq shows that the Emir has seen the great things that His Excellency has done in Ilorin and in Kwara, and in the whole of Nigeria,” she said.

“As the Chairman of the Nigeria Governors’ Forum, he has done tremendously well and represented Ilorin community and Kwara very well. What he has done in Ilorin is amazing.”

Senior Adviser and Counsellor to the Governor and Chairman Central Planning and Coordination Committee for the Turbaning Ceremony, Alhaji Saadu Salau, said the Emir is always proud of the footprint of the administration, calling Governor AbdulRazaq a role model.

“The message is simple, that you must learn from the example of those who are role models. A lot has been said about Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq as a role model in leadership. It is for the younger generation to learn from his simplicity, his patrotism, his love for the commoners, and his selfless service,” he said.

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Reforms and Why Sustainable Relief Would Elude Nigerians in the Foreseeable Future

Published

4 hours ago

September 22, 2026

Our Reporter

Good governance is often discussed as though it were primarily a question of political will, leadership competence or administrative efficiency. Those things matter enormously. But governance also has a material foundation: resources. The capacity of any government to deliver public goods and services is ultimately constrained by the resources available to it, the efficiency with which those resources are deployed, the security environment in which they are deployed, and the degree of public trust that sustains the relationship between the state and its citizens. On these fronts, Nigeria faces a particularly difficult equation.

Successive governments have had to operate within an environment characterised by a relatively small economic base, weak domestic revenue mobilisation, substantial debt obligations, insecurity, institutional inefficiency, corruption, poor expenditure choices and a widening trust deficit. Some of these problems have been consciously perpetuated; others have resulted from institutional weaknesses, political incentives or sheer neglect. Whatever the explanation, the cumulative effect is the same: the Nigerian state is continually expected to deliver more than its resources and institutional capacity can reasonably support.

This reality is often obscured by a popular and understandable argument: Nigeria is a rich country; the problem is corruption. There is considerable truth in that argument. Nigeria has enormous natural, human and economic potential, and the leakage of public resources through corruption, waste and poor management undeniably reduces what citizens receive from government.

Another argument is that Nigeria’s problem is not simply corruption but misplaced priorities. This, too, is valid. Governments can spend enormous sums and still achieve little if expenditure is directed towards projects that have limited developmental value, are poorly conceived or are driven more by political considerations than by measurable public need.

There is also a third argument: that governments have simply not done enough for Nigerians. That criticism is equally legitimate when measured against the country’s enormous developmental deficits.

But beneath all three arguments lies a more fundamental problem that is often overlooked: the Nigerian government, even under the best of circumstances, does not control a sufficiently large pool of resources, relative to the size and needs of the population, to perform many of the functions citizens expect of it. The situation becomes more dire where corruption has become a way of life, literally. That is the uncomfortable Nigerian governance truth: a small economic base for a huge population.

Statistically, Nigeria remains Africa’s most populous country, with a population estimated at well over 230 million people, but with a small available wealth—nominal GDP—and, invariably, a small GDP per capita. This translates into heavy economic burdens on its citizens. Recent international and national estimates (IMF, WB, NBS) have placed Nigeria’s nominal GDP below or around the $300 billion range, depending on the reference year, exchange-rate assumptions and statistical revisions.

The GDP relative to the population gives a nominal GDP per capita of only about $1,556, which places Nigeria at number 162 out of the 190 nations of the world surveyed (IMF, 2025). This is one of the lowest around the world. Worse still, Nigeria arguably has one of the highest disparities in terms of wealth distribution, going by its latest available Gini coefficient score. The IMF and WB gave Nigeria 33%, while World Economics determined Nigeria’s score to be around 57%. Though the former is low, signifying modest income inequality, the figure represents a paradox given the nation’s poverty level and the related range of socioeconomic deprivations.

It should, however, be noted that GDP per capita is not the same thing as household income, disposable income or living standards. Nevertheless, it provides a useful indication of the economic resources available per person. A country with a large population and a comparatively modest economic output per person will inevitably struggle to provide the same level of infrastructure, healthcare, education, social protection and public services as a country with a much larger economic base.

Nigeria therefore faces a basic structural contradiction: the expectations placed on the Nigerian state resemble those of a much richer country, while the economic resources available to finance those expectations remain comparatively limited. A disposition that even some highly placed government functionaries tend to gloss over, even though it has far-reaching consequences for reform outcomes, efficacy and sustainability.

For a fact, the government does not have access to the whole GDP, as small as it is. This is against the common misunderstanding in public discussions of Nigeria’s finances that tends to treat GDP as though it were money belonging to the government. It is not. As a measure of the total value of goods and services produced in the economy over a given period, the government can only access a portion of it through some statutory mechanisms. They include taxation, royalties, dividends, fees, borrowing and other forms of revenue. How much is accrued is a function of both the size of the economy and the effectiveness, and even efficiency, of existing economic policies.

Unfortunately, Nigeria’s capacity to mobilise public revenue remains weak and corruption-ridden. This severely limits what the state can spend on development, even before the government begins dealing with debt servicing, salaries, pensions, security and other recurrent obligations.

The unforgiving arithmetic becomes clear when we consider that the Nigerian government accesses and/or mobilises only between 11% and 13% of its GDP for “governance”, which loosely represents its revenue-to-GDP ratio. This figure is a far cry from the global average of around 36%. Simple arithmetic based on the Nigerian figure indicates how difficult it is for the government to launch the economy onto the path of rapid transformation for a nation of over 230 million people. Take the nation’s 2025 budget, for instance: it was about $36 billion at a time when GDP was around $300 billion. From the budget figure, account has to be made for debt servicing, statutory transfers and deficits.

As is customary, and for political reasons, the government can announce a huge nominal budget, but the reality on the ground remains a different story: an abysmally small pool of developmental resources. It requires an honest government to face such a reality. And this is one of Nigeria’s central governance problems: the revenue problem and government evasiveness; a culture of denial that gives rise to policy reform and outcome interpretations that fuel a vicious cycle of developmental failures.

The government should come to terms with the fact that a low revenue base limits government capacity. Limited capacity produces poor services. Poor services reduce citizens’ willingness to comply with taxes. Low compliance further reduces revenue. The country requires a much deeper fiscal relationship between citizens, businesses and the state, based on trust and transparency, to break the cycle. Unfortunately, the government hasn’t enjoyed much trust from the public because, while they remain economically challenged, they see public wealth expended lavishly on the elites.

This public trust deficit, along with corruption, has had direct economic consequences. This is because a naira lost to corruption is one less naira available for a school, hospital, road, water project, electricity infrastructure, or security operation.

It is also sad that political, rather than economic, considerations tend to largely underline project/programme conception and distribution in Nigeria. Roads, buildings, airports, flyovers, monuments and other physical projects that are more glamorous often command more attention than investments in human capital development in areas such as teachers, healthcare workers, agric extension, water systems, maintenance, research or institutional reforms, etc. This is despite the fact that physical infrastructure and human capital development remain the silver bullet for sustainable development.

Another constraint is the cost of maintaining government itself. Nigeria has a large public bureaucracy spread across federal, state and local institutions. The federal government alone has over 2 million on its nominal payroll. The wage bill, pensions, overheads and administrative costs consume a significant portion of available public resources, as the government remains a major employer of labour in the absence of vibrant industrial and agricultural sectors.

The problem is not that Nigeria has too many public servants in every category. Indeed, several sectors—particularly education, healthcare and security—continue to experience personnel shortages. The deeper problem is how public-sector personnel and institutions are structured and deployed. Nigeria needs to distinguish between an oversized administrative apparatus and genuine human-capital requirements. The objective should therefore not simply be indiscriminate cuts to government employment, but rather productivity and professionalism.

Insecurity is also a fiscal problem. Nigeria’s security crisis adds another layer to the problem. Insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence and other forms of insecurity do not only threaten lives and property. They impose enormous economic costs on individuals, businesses and governments.

A farmer who cannot safely cultivate his land represents lost economic output.
A business that closes because of insecurity represents lost employment and taxation.
A road that cannot be safely constructed or maintained represents wasted investment.
These and similar challenges call for closer cooperation among the three levels of governance in the country. While there is a constitutional provision to that effect, the reality on the ground seems different. The country needs stronger intergovernmental cooperation to tackle them.

The synergy should also be able to address Nigeria’s twin problems of resource constraints and resource management simultaneously. This is critical because more revenue without institutional reform can simply produce more opportunities for waste. Just as more borrowing without stronger productivity can produce a larger debt burden, more projects without better planning can produce more abandoned infrastructure. Also, an attempt to raise taxation without better public accountability can deepen public resistance.

The solution, therefore, cannot be one-dimensional. The current approach must change. First, the government must communicate more honestly with citizens. Nigerians should be given a clearer picture of what the government earns, what it spends, what it owes and what remains available for development. Public expectations must be managed through facts rather than political rhetoric.

Second, Nigeria must broaden its revenue base without crushing productive economic activity. A modern tax system should capture more economic activity while remaining fair, predictable and administratively efficient.

Third, the country must attack corruption through systems, not slogans. Procurement, payments, project monitoring, public-sector payrolls and government contracting should be subjected to stronger transparency and accountability mechanisms.

Fourth, budgeting must become strategic, intentional, rational and professional. Government should evaluate projects according to economic and social returns rather than political visibility.

Fifth, insecurity must be treated as an economic emergency as well as a security emergency. Restoring productive activity in farming communities, transport corridors, commercial centres and vulnerable regions is essential to rebuilding the country’s economic base.

The more meaningful measure is what happens to the ordinary citizen, against the backdrop of whatever resource constraints it faces. The questions and KPIs that reform outcomes should answer honestly must include improved socioeconomic well-being and security of the people. So far, the results have not been apparent despite the government’s view to the contrary. This is because the key challenges, as outlined below, have not received the needed interventions:

It is a non-starter to drive national development on barely 5,000 MW of accessible electricity for a population of more than 230 million people.

It is a non-starter to prosecute wars against the country’s multiple security threats—secessionists, bandits, insurgents, kidnappers, armed herders and other criminal groups—while relying overwhelmingly on imported weapons, ammunition and other critical defence equipment.

It is unacceptable to stand by and watch the nation’s industrial base being continuously eroded, taking with it jobs, productive capacity and the ability to meet even the most basic needs of the population.

It is equally unacceptable to perpetuate an education system that rewards memorisation at the expense of critical thinking, creativity, problem-solving and innovation—an education system that produces people trained largely to take instructions rather than to question, invent, build and lead.

And it is unacceptable to tolerate a legislature and a judiciary that, instead of being among the strongest institutional bulwarks against corruption, are themselves increasingly perceived as part of the institutional environment in which corruption thrives.

It is yet unacceptable that the nation imports about 70% of its raw materials, while its exports remain largely driven by hydrocarbons (oil and gas). Of the approximately N27 trillion in exports recorded during the first half of 2026, non-oil exports accounted for only about N3.7 trillion (NBS, UNCTAD). The country’s import bill for the same period reached N18 trillion. This structural dependence remains deeply troubling.

A country cannot build a productive economy on inadequate power, defend itself indefinitely with imported military hardware, industrialise while its productive base is being dismantled, compete globally with an education system designed for rote learning, or defeat corruption when the institutions entrusted with checking it are themselves compromised.

These are not peripheral weaknesses. They are structural failures that preceded the current administration. And until they are confronted as such, development will remain more of an aspiration than a reality. This is because the information made available to the public regarding the reforms (forex, subsidy, tax, etc) does not seem to address the deep-rooted challenges adequately, strategically and honestly, either.

It is in view of this that, whatever economic reform hit song the government sings about more economic output, more public revenue, better spending, stronger institutions, greater security, etc., citizens’ well-being still remains desperate and may remain so into the foreseeable future. The realities on the ground say so.
A. G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com