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Reminiscing About Major General A.E. Abubakar’s Command of Operation Hadin Kai

Published

3 weeks ago

September 22, 2026

By Samuel Aruwan
The end of a military command is rarely marked by celebration alone. Behind the ceremonial handshakes, salutes, photographs and carefully chosen words are memories that cannot be fully captured in official statements. There are battles won, communities reclaimed, captives rescued and families reunited. There are also empty seats in officers’ messes, soldiers who did not return from operations and families whose loved ones paid the supreme price.
It was against this mixture of accomplishment, sacrifice and remembrance that Major General Abdulsalam Enesi Abubakar handed over the leadership of the Joint Task Force North-East, Operation Hadin Kai, to Major General I.A. Ajose on 15 September 2026. The handover brought to an end nearly 17 demanding months of service as the 15th Theatre Commander.
Abubakar assumed command from Major General Waidi Shaibu, now the Chief of Army Staff, on 29 April 2025 amid the familiar challenges of the counterinsurgency campaign. Although the terrorists had been considerably weakened over the years, they remained capable of launching attacks and inflicting casualties. They continued to take advantage of the region’s vast territory, the difficult terrain of the Lake Chad Basin and instability along Nigeria’s international borders within Operation Hadin Kai’s area of responsibility.
The increasing use of improvised explosive devices and armed drones, alongside attacks by small and highly mobile groups, presented fresh dangers to troops and vulnerable communities. The mandate before the new Theatre Commander was clear but enormously demanding: to degrade the terrorists, protect civilians, recover threatened areas and help create the conditions for normal life to return to the North-East.
Normalcy in such an environment could not be measured by military victories alone. It had to be seen in reopened markets, schools and farmlands; in the return of displaced families; and in the ability of citizens to travel, trade, worship and sleep without waiting for the sound of gunfire.
According to the official account presented at the end of Abubakar’s tenure, more than 7,000 displaced families returned to their ancestral communities, with returned or resettled communities in every local government area of Borno State. Behind those figures were families carrying what remained of disrupted lives back home: elderly people returning to compounds built by their fathers, women reopening rooms that had stood empty for years and children seeing villages they had known only through the stories of their parents.
The Theatre also recorded the voluntary, safe and dignified repatriation of more than 3,000 Nigerians from the Republic of Cameroon. The exercise was undertaken by the Borno State Government in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Poverty Reduction and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Other signs of returning life became visible. The National Youth Service Corps orientation exercise returned to Maiduguri after an absence of more than 13 years. West African Examinations Council and National Examinations Council examinations were conducted in Banki and Gwoza. Trade routes reopened, markets came back to life and farmers returned to lands that had been inaccessible.
These were not the accomplishments of the military alone. They resulted from cooperation among the Armed Forces, the Borno State Government, federal institutions, humanitarian organisations, traditional institutions and the communities themselves. The military’s role was to create and protect the environment in which civil life could resume.
Every reopened school, cultivated farm, restored market and returning family represented a rejection of the future the terrorists sought to impose upon the region. Terrorist organisations may occupy territory with weapons, but they sustain their influence by frightening people away from their homes and livelihoods.
The operational account presented at the handover stated that more than 1,106 Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad and Islamic State West Africa Province terrorists were neutralised during Abubakar’s tenure, including some commanders and other important figures within their structures.
The Theatre also reported the recovery of more than 475 assorted weapons and 24,409 rounds of ammunition. From April 2025, at least 295 improvised explosive devices were discovered and safely detonated. More than ₦300 million linked to terrorist financing was intercepted, while no fewer than 758 suspected logistics collaborators were arrested.
These aspects of the campaign were important because insurgencies do not survive on ideology alone. They require money, fuel, food, medicine, weapons, intelligence and networks capable of moving supplies. Targeting those networks weakened both the fighters and the concealed system that enabled them to survive, recruit and attack.
Sustained military pressure, combined with non-kinetic initiatives, contributed to further surrenders. According to the Theatre, 969 terrorists and members of their families surrendered within the final year of Abubakar’s command. The Theatre also recorded the rescue of 638 civilians from terrorist enclaves and all 46 students endangered during the attempted abduction at the Federal Government Girls College, Monguno.
For the families involved, these were not abstract operational successes. They represented the difference between a lifetime of grief and the indescribable relief of seeing a missing child or relative return alive.
One of the most consequential campaigns of the period was Operation Desert Sanity V in the Timbuktu Triangle. Beginning on 21 January 2026, the operation combined sustained ground action with coordinated air support against terrorist positions in an area that had long served as a sanctuary, detention centre and logistics base.
Military accounts stated that troops uncovered and demolished three ISWAP detention facilities with an estimated combined capacity of about 300 captives. At least 32 terrorists, including two Qaids and three Munzirs, were reported neutralised. The pressure exerted by the advancing troops also enabled more than 70 captives to escape and emerge in Goniri, Buratai and Mandaragirau.
Among the escapees was Malam Jidda Ba Jidda, a farmer from Kufi village reportedly abducted in December 2025. His experience placed a human face on the importance of the operation. For those held in such facilities, escape meant release from hunger, coercion, forced labour, violence and the constant fear of execution.
The destruction of the detention facilities denied the terrorists places they had used to imprison, punish and terrorise civilians. It also challenged the aura of invincibility that terrorist organisations seek to create around their enclaves.
At Mallam Fatori on 18 March 2026, troops repelled a coordinated ground and drone attack on a military position. The military reported that at least 80 terrorists, including three senior commanders, were killed. Four soldiers were wounded, while weapons, ammunition, explosives and armed-drone components were recovered.
The engagement reflected the changing nature of the threat. Terrorists who once depended mainly on rifles, motorcycles and suicide bombers had begun incorporating drones into their attacks. The response also demonstrated the value of regional cooperation, with Nigerian and Nigerien air assets supporting troops and striking retreating elements.
The Theatre was strengthened structurally and technologically during the period. Sector 4 became operational to close the security gap between Southern Borno and Northern Adamawa. Nigerian Army Aviation helicopters were inducted, while the Nigerian Army Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Regiment added surveillance and precision capabilities. The Military Command and Control Centre also linked frontline surveillance cameras, improving situational awareness and the flow of information from operational locations.
The strategic partnership operating under the Team Hadin Kai framework further strengthened intelligence sharing, precision targeting, non-kinetic operations and capacity building. A major demonstration of that collaboration came at Metele on 15 May 2026 during the joint Nigerian and United States operation that resulted in the death of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, also known as Abu Mainok. Nigerian and United States authorities described him as the global second-in-command of ISIS.
Yet no honest remembrance of the period should dwell only on victories. The command also passed through moments of profound grief. Among those who paid the supreme price was Brigadier General Musa Uba, Commander of 25 Task Force Brigade, who died in November 2025 following an encounter with terrorists around the Wajiroko axis.
The Theatre suffered another painful loss on 9 April 2026 when Brigadier General Oseni Omoh Braimah, Commander of 29 Task Force Brigade, and other soldiers fell during a terrorist attack on the military position in Benisheikh.
Their names belong within the account of the Theatre’s accomplishments, not as evidence against those accomplishments, but as reminders of the courage and sacrifice upon which they rested. They were commanders who led from the front and shared the dangers faced by the troops entrusted to them. Their deaths, and those of the soldiers who fell with them, left pain within their formations, their families and the nation.
For Abubakar, they were not merely names in casualty returns. They were officers serving under his command and entrusted with troops and difficult operational responsibilities. Their loss formed part of the burden he carried as Theatre Commander: honouring the fallen, supporting those left behind and sustaining the campaign despite the grief within the Theatre.
The experience of achieving operational objectives while losing brave officers and men is not peculiar to Nigeria. In Sri Lanka, General Sarath Fonseka commanded the army during the final campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, widely known as the Tamil Tigers. The campaign ended the group’s territorial control in May 2009, but government figures indicated that more than 6,000 military personnel were killed and nearly 30,000 wounded from the resumption of major hostilities in 2006 to the end of the war.
The final stage of the Sri Lankan conflict remains the subject of serious controversy, particularly over civilian casualties and allegations concerning the conduct of the parties. That controversy cannot be overlooked. The narrower military lesson is simply that even a campaign which achieved its stated objective left thousands of service families grieving.
In the Philippines, General Carlito Galvez Jr., then Commander of Western Mindanao Command, exercised senior regional responsibility during the 2017 campaign against Islamic State-linked militants who occupied parts of Marawi. Government forces regained control after five months of intense urban fighting, but 168 members of the security forces were killed and more than 1,000 wounded.
In Iraq, General Raymond Odierno commanded Multi-National Force–Iraq from September 2008 to September 2010. He oversaw the consolidation of security gains, the expansion of Iraqi security forces and the transition towards greater Iraqi control. Violence declined and United States troop levels were reduced during his tenure, but American, coalition and Iraqi personnel continued to lose their lives.
These conflicts differed from the insurgency in Nigeria’s North-East and should not be equated with it. They nevertheless demonstrate that operational progress and painful loss can exist within the same command. Success does not spare a commander the grief of losing brave officers and men; it often requires him to continue leading while mourning the fallen, caring for the wounded and learning from setbacks.
Before assuming command of Operation Hadin Kai, Abubakar had served as Commander Sector 3 of the operation and the Multinational Joint Task Force in Monguno. He later became General Officer Commanding 7 Division and Commander Sector 1 in Maiduguri. These appointments gave him direct knowledge of the terrain, the formations deployed across the Theatre and the changing methods of the terrorists.
It was, however, during his tenure as General Officer Commanding 3 Division and Commander Operation Safe Haven that I came to know him more closely. Our official responsibilities brought us together, and I saw beyond the uniform and authority of command.
I encountered an officer who understood that lasting peace could not be secured by force of arms alone. He was firm in the pursuit of armed groups and criminal elements, but equally prepared to meet traditional rulers, religious leaders, community representatives and young people in search of understanding.
He appreciated that communal violence is sustained not only by weapons but also by fear, historical grievances, misinformation, suspicion and failures of justice. Under his command, Operation Safe Haven intensified efforts to recover illegal weapons, restrict the movement of criminal groups and protect communities. Stakeholder engagements were also held in troubled areas, including Mangu, where security operations had to be accompanied by difficult conversations about recurring violence.
Working with him allowed me to appreciate the balance required of a commander in an environment of communal suspicion. Every operation had to be firm enough to protect innocent people but carefully managed to avoid deepening existing divisions. He emphasised training, combat readiness, discipline, civil-military relations and cooperation among security agencies. He also believed in command presence—visiting troops in operational locations and meeting communities rather than relying entirely on reports.
Those experiences prepared him for the responsibility he later carried in the North-East. By the time he assumed command of the Theatre, he understood that security was ultimately about human beings: the soldier keeping watch through the night, the farmer longing to return to his field, the displaced woman carrying what remained of her family’s possessions and the frightened child waiting for school to reopen.
His tenure did not bring terrorism in the North-East to an end, and no serious account should make such a claim. The terrorist groups remain dangerous, adaptive and capable of exploiting operational gaps, difficult terrain and instability across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. The incoming Theatre Commander, Major General I.A. Ajose, therefore inherits both the gains recorded and the threats that remain.
Ajose is not a stranger to the Theatre. A seasoned infantry officer of the 43rd Regular Course, he previously commanded 5 Brigade in Borno State and served as Chief of Staff, 4 Special Forces Command. He also commanded 17 Brigade, served as Force Commander Operation Hadarin Daji and later became General Officer Commanding 8 Division and Commander Sector 2 of the Joint Task Force North West, Operation Fansan Yamma.
My knowledge of Ajose is not based entirely on his official profile. I met him at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, on 28 July 2026 during a seminar on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. I presented a paper titled, “The Role of Communities in Strengthening Intelligence-Driven CTCOIN Operations,” and he served as the moderator.
His moderation provided an effective link between my presentation, the contributions of the two discussants and the questions from the students. He demonstrated an impressive command of the subject and directed the discussion towards the practical role of communities in strengthening intelligence-driven operations.

He broadened our understanding by drawing on both his knowledge and extensive operational experience. His insights and the different perspectives he brought to the discussion enriched the conversation. At the end of the session, he challenged me to examine another dimension of the subject through further research. I took careful note and promised to pursue it as part of the wider discussion.

I came to know Abubakar through our work together during his command of 3 Division and Operation Safe Haven, while I encountered Ajose within the intellectual environment of the Armed Forces Command and Staff College. In both men, I saw an understanding that contemporary security challenges cannot be addressed by force alone. Intelligence, research, community confidence, civil-military cooperation and continuous learning must form part of the response.
In introducing his successor, Abubakar expressed confidence in Ajose and asked stakeholders to extend to him the same openness, cooperation and goodwill he had received. It was the request of a departing commander who understood that military leadership is a relay in which one officer carries responsibility for a period before entrusting it to another.
After handing over command, Abubakar proceeded to the memorial area at the Maimalari Cantonment Military Cemetery. He stood before the monument honouring the officers and soldiers who had paid the supreme price, laid a wreath and rendered a solemn salute to the fallen. He also remembered in prayer those wounded in the course of operations.
It was more than a ceremonial obligation. It was a final act of remembrance by a commander standing before the memory of men who had served under the same flag but could not be present at the handover. The battles, statistics and operational reports had been written in their blood as much as in the decisions taken at headquarters.
The salute was for Brigadier Generals Musa Uba and Oseni Omoh Braimah, for the officers and soldiers whose names were known to the nation and for the many others remembered most intimately by their families and comrades. By praying for the wounded, Abubakar also acknowledged those who returned from battle carrying injuries that may remain with them for life.
As he departed Maimalari Cantonment, another farewell unfolded beyond the formalities of the handover. In the video of his departure, women and children from the barracks came out in large numbers to bid him farewell. They stood along the route and waved as he made his way out of the cantonment.
It was a simple but deeply moving scene. These were members of the military community who had lived with the anxieties and uncertainties of the campaign: wives who had waited through long periods of silence while their husbands were deployed and children accustomed to watching their fathers leave without knowing exactly when they would return.
Such affection cannot be captured in operational reports. Their presence suggested that Abubakar’s leadership had reached beyond the command headquarters and battlefield statistics. He had left an impression upon the wider military community whose quiet sacrifices are too often overlooked when the history of a campaign is written.
The two scenes belonged together. At the monument were the memories of the fallen and prayers for the wounded. Along the road were the women and children whose lives were inseparable from the service and sacrifices of the troops. Between them stood the departing commander, taking his final leave of a community with which he had shared nearly 17 months of victories, anxieties, losses and hope.
Commands come and go, but the mission remains. Medals, citations and ceremonies matter, but the most enduring legacy of a commander is found in the communities that returned home, the captives who regained their freedom, the children who returned to school, the markets that reopened, the troops better prepared to confront the enemy and the memory of those who did not return.
The North-East will remember the victories. Returned families will remember the roads that led them home. Rescued captives will remember the day the walls of their prisons fell. Soldiers will remember the comrades who stood beside them but did not survive the journey. The women and children of Maimalari Cantonment will remember the commander whose departure brought them out of their homes to wave him goodbye.
For Major General Abdulsalam Enesi Abubakar, the command may have ended, but the human consequences of those nearly 17 months will endure. His tenure belongs not only to the institutional history of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, but also to the quiet stories of people who were able to return, rebuild and hope again. Perhaps that is the most meaningful legacy any commander can leave behind.

Aruwan served as Kaduna State Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs from 2019 to 2024 and is presently a postgraduate student at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

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2027: OPCI President Cautions Against Fake Prophesies

Published

2 hours ago

October 12, 2026

Our Reporter

Says Nigerians should not allow themselves to be hoodwinked

Stephen Olufemi Oni, Ilorin

The National President of the Oodua Progressive Care Initiative (OPCI),
Alhaji Chief Dr Maruff Olarewaju, has decried recurring engagements of some acclaimed Nigerian men of God in what he described as fake, baseless and politically-motivated prophecies ahead of the 2027 general elections, thereby demeaning and questioning their sacred callings.

In a statement issued on Monday in Ilorin, the Kwara State capital, the OPCI President wondered where these acclaimed men of God are getting their revelations from, going by the fake prophesies of majority of them ahead of the 2023 general elections that Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu would not win the presidential election, which he eventually won massively.

He said: “One cannot help but wonder where these self-acclaimed prophets get their revelations from. During the build-up to the 2023 General Election, over 90% of them came out at different times claiming that God told them that Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu would never win the presidential election. Some of them even went as far as saying that if Asiwaju won, then there is no God. Today, history has spoken — Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu is the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

“This raises critical questions begging for answers: Why are we in Nigeria mixing religion with politics?
Why have these individuals refused to learn from the past? Are they truly hearing from God at all?

“Now, as we approach another election cycle, they are out again, saying what God did not say and claiming messages God never sent them.”

In view of these ugly experiences, Olarewaju urged the Federal Government to consider placing a ban on election-related prophecies, as it’s done in some other countries, in order to prevent the dragging of religion into the mud and to stop the confusion of innocent citizens in the name of religion, saying freedom of speech, though guaranteed, has its own limitations and must be exercised with responsibility.

He added: “Only God Almighty knows what will happen tomorrow. The confidence of many Nigerians in these fake prophets has been completely eroded. They should look for something more meaningful to do.

“Today, Nigeria is facing serious security challenges. None of these prophets saw it coming. Many churches and mosques have been deserted, many worshippers have been kidnapped or killed — they never prophesied it, their God never revealed it to them. But when it comes to elections, their God suddenly becomes very active.

“Nigerians must be wise and not be deceived again.”

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THE SLOW DEATH OF DEMOCRACY

Published

2 hours ago

October 12, 2026

Our Reporter

Democracy has been hailed as the best system of governance devised by mankind to date. It is a process driven by periodic elections, as has been the case in Nigeria since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Similar electoral exercises took place during the First Republic (1960–1966) and the Second Republic (1979–1983). It should, however, be emphasised that elections by themselves do not necessarily imply democratic practice.

Democracy and elections are closely related, but they are not synonymous. An election is a mechanism through which citizens exercise their political sovereignty and choose those who govern them. Democracy, however, is the broader system of government founded on popular sovereignty, political equality, participation, accountability, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the protection of fundamental freedoms.

Without these accompanying elements, a country can hold elections without necessarily being genuinely democratic. Free, fair, credible, and competitive elections are essential to democracy, but they are only one component of it. Democracy must also exist between elections—in the institutions, laws, rights, freedoms, and accountability mechanisms that govern the exercise of political power. Thus, elections are the mechanism through which citizens choose their representatives, but democracy extends far beyond the periodic casting of ballots. Without political freedom, genuine competition, the rule of law, institutional accountability, civil liberties, and respect for the will of the electorate, elections can become little more than a ritual for legitimising authoritarian rule. In short, an election is an instrument of democracy; it is not democracy itself.

There is a strong correlation between a country’s population size, demographic structure, and electoral participation (voter turnout). Under normal circumstances, the larger the population, the larger the number of potential registered voters and, potentially, the higher the absolute turnout. The relationship among these variables—population size, registered voters, and voter turnout—can serve as a barometer of the health of democracy in a given environment. Nigerian electoral trends and history seem to defy this thesis. For some obvious reasons, voter participation in Nigerian elections has been on a dangerous decline since 1999, signifying a steady growth in citizens’ apathy. This development poses serious consequences for democratic growth and governance.

The declining appeal of democracy in Nigeria becomes more apparent when viewed against the falling voter participation rate from one electoral cycle to another. This is even more disturbing in light of the nation’s estimated population of 230 million, which could ordinarily provide a strong foundation for robust political participation and activities.

Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Records of Nigeria’s general elections from 1999 to 2023, in terms of registered voters, voter turnout, and approximate turnout percentages, are as follows:

1999: 57.9 million registered; 52% voted.

2003: 60.8 million registered; 69% voted.

2007: 61.6 million registered; 58% voted.

2011: 73.5 million registered; 54% voted.

2015: 68.8 million registered; 44% voted.

2019: 84.0 million registered; only 35% voted.

2023: 93.5 million registered; only 27% voted.

For the forthcoming 2027 elections, INEC has registered about 103 million eligible voters. It is hoped that the decline in voter turnout from 69% in 2003 to just 27% in 2023 will be stemmed—a task that may not be easy if the gubernatorial elections in states such as Ekiti, Osun, and Kogi are factored in.

During the last gubernatorial election in Ekiti, only 36% of the one million registered voters in the state turned out.

In Osun, about 43% of the 2.3 million registered voters turned out.

In Kogi, only 33% of the 1.6 million registered voters cast their ballots. The three states are among the eight that hold off-cycle elections, during which they enjoyed greater security and logistical support. In addition, the contestants live among the electorate.

Most strikingly, in Lagos, with a staggering seven million registered voters, fewer than 20% turned out to vote in the 2023 general elections. This was despite the fact that a son of the soil, Tinubu, was on the ballot. The dismal participation underscores the depth of voter apathy in Nigeria compared with other democracies in both developed and developing countries, as indicated below:

India: 2024 Lok Sabha election — 65.79%.

Brazil: 2026 general election — 78.92%.

United States: 2024 presidential election — 63.9%.

Kenya: 2022 general election — 64.77%.

The question is: What is wrong with the Nigerian system? Could it be that the population figures are inaccurate? Could it be INEC’s ineptitude? Or is it that Nigerians are no longer in love with democratic governance? The answers could lie in all or a combination of these factors.

There is every likelihood that the 2006 population census, from which the nation’s estimated population of 230 million is projected, remains suspect. This is because Nigerians tend to view population censuses and figures more as instruments of competition for political power and resources than as tools for national planning. Consequently, electoral data derived from such figures may distort the political process.

Violence has also been a major feature of Nigerian politics. According to the General Abdulsalami Abubakar-led National Peace Committee, between 2015 and 2025, about 870 people are believed to have been killed during various electoral episodes. Many more have been wounded or incapacitated in the course of an exercise intended to improve their well-being and guarantee the security of their lives and property.

Compounding the violence is a primitive level of political intolerance. In many states, ruling parties monopolise and abuse the political space, shamelessly denying their opponents the freedom to campaign, put up posters, and access state-owned facilities and media outlets. Such conduct reinforces the belief that society is incapable of practising democracy. What a shameful mentality and display of political backwardness!

Another serious challenge is the perceived electoral manipulation by two major democratic institutions—INEC and the judiciary—which has allowed successive ruling parties and power brokers to frustrate political opponents and parties with impunity. Classic cases include the confusing registration and deregistration of political associations; the factionalisation of some; the upholding and overturning of decisions involving political parties; and the numerous cheap and self-serving exercises (substitutions, sackings, awards, etc.) in the name of judicial prerogative. These developments have contributed to the emergence of the current off-cycle gubernatorial elections in states including Anambra, Bayelsa, Edo, Ekiti, Kogi, Ondo, Osun, and Imo.

The circumstances and judicial verdicts surrounding these developments are varied. While some of the political actors are culpable, some of the decisions lack consistency. At best, they are self-serving. The dizzying judicial abracadabra unfolded as follows:

i) In Imo State, there was the “Fourth to First” verdict. Following the March 2019 election, INEC declared Emeka Ihedioha (PDP) the winner. Hope Uzodinma (APC), who officially finished fourth in the initial tally, challenged the result. On January 14, 2020, the Supreme Court ruled that votes from 388 polling units had been unlawfully excluded from Uzodinma’s score. Once those votes were factored in, Uzodinma’s tally surpassed Ihedioha’s. The Court awarded the seat to Uzodinma.

ii) In Zamfara State, the APC won the 2019 gubernatorial election, and Muktar Idris was set to become governor. However, an internal party faction led by Senator Kabiru Marafa challenged the legality of the party’s primary elections. On May 24, 2019, just days before the inauguration, the Supreme Court ruled that the APC had failed to conduct valid primary elections in Zamfara. Consequently, the court declared all votes cast for the APC invalid and “wasted”. It awarded the seat to Bello Matawalle of the PDP.

iii) Earlier, in 2007, in Rivers State, Rotimi Amaechi won the PDP governorship primary, but the party substituted his name with Celestine Omehia. Omehia went on to win the general election. In October 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that Amaechi’s substitution was illegal. Crucially, the court established the legal principle that votes belong to the political party, not the candidate. Since the PDP won the election, Amaechi was declared the rightful governor despite not appearing on the ballot.

Still in Rivers State, in 2019, due to intractable internal leadership disputes and legal battles, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that barred the Rivers APC from fielding any candidates in the 2019 general elections. This cleared the path for Nyesom Wike (PDP) to secure an easy victory without major opposition.

iv) In the run-up to the 2015 governorship election in Kogi State, the APC candidate, Abubakar Audu, was leading comfortably in the polls but died suddenly before the results were fully collated and declared. Audu’s running mate, James Faleke, argued that he should automatically inherit the ticket and votes. The APC bypassed Faleke and substituted Audu with Yahaya Bello, who had finished second in the primaries. The case went to the Supreme Court, which upheld Bello’s election. Reaffirming the Rivers precedent, the court held that votes are cast for the political party, not the individual candidate, thereby authorising the APC to nominate Bello to conclude the election.

v) The 2019 Bayelsa gubernatorial election produced David Lyon of the APC as the winner. However, the PDP filed a lawsuit alleging that Lyon’s deputy governorship running mate, Biobarakuma Degi-Eremienyo, had submitted forged certificates and false information regarding his names and credentials to INEC.

On account of this, on February 13, 2020—less than 24 hours before Lyon was scheduled to be sworn in—the Supreme Court nullified the APC ticket. Because a governorship ticket is legally a “joint ticket”, the disqualification of the deputy automatically disqualified the governor-elect. The court awarded victory to the candidate with the next-highest number of valid votes. Consequently, Douye Diri of the PDP was sworn in as governor.

vi) In Osun State, Oyinlola (PDP) was declared the winner and assumed office as governor in 2007. Rauf Aregbesola of the Action Congress (AC) challenged the results, alleging widespread rigging, violence, and non-compliance with the Electoral Act in several local government areas. The court subsequently sacked Oyinlola and awarded the seat to Aregbesola, ordering his immediate swearing-in.

vii) A similar development took place in Ondo State, where Olusegun Agagu (PDP) was declared the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election. Olusegun Mimiko, contesting under the Labour Party (LP), filed a petition maintaining that he was the rightful winner based on the lawful votes cast. On February 23, 2009, the court agreed with Mimiko and removed Agagu. Mimiko was subsequently sworn in.

viii) Anambra provides a different variation of judicial intervention, focusing on the theft of mandates and the constitutional definition of tenure. Chris Ngige (PDP) was declared the winner in 2003. Peter Obi of APGA challenged the result. After nearly three years of litigation, the Court of Appeal, in March 2006, ruled that Ngige had not won the election and awarded the governorship to Obi.

In 2007, INEC conducted a fresh governorship election while Obi was still serving his term, and Andy Uba (PDP) was declared the winner and sworn in. Obi went to court, and Uba was sacked after just 17 days in office. The court ordered Obi to return and complete his constitutionally mandated term.

The active participants in this electoral mayhem are usually the contestants, INEC functionaries (including ad hoc staff and university dons serving as returning officers), security agents, and, later, the judiciary. Unfortunately, some university dons have actually been convicted of election-related corruption. The ordinary voter should be excused because voters are often used as pawns whose mindsets are shaped by their material conditions—an observation consistent with Karl Marx’s perspective.

The monetisation of politics has also remained a major challenge. It has made entry into politics prohibitive for ordinary people and has also fertilised the growth of the phenomenon of godfatherism. The godfathers usually fund campaign expenses, buy the loyalty of security agents, influence judicial officers, fund thugs, and facilitate the outright purchase of votes at polling stations. Their protégés, in return, are expected to pledge unalloyed loyalty and grant them unfettered access to public resources.

Unfortunately, the strategy often backfires. A few classic godfather-godson crises include Wike/Fubara, El-Rufai/Uba, Kwankwaso/Ganduje, Kwankwaso/Abba, Goje/Dankwambo, Goje/Yahaya, Bafarawa/Wamakko, Aliero/Nasamu, Tinubu/Aregbesola, etc. The phenomenon of godfatherism has not helped the parties involved. If anything, it has only succeeded in weakening democracy in the country.

Perhaps the most disturbing feature of Nigerian democracy is the growing disconnect between elected representatives and the people who elect them. The lifestyles, privileges, and access to public resources enjoyed by many politicians stand in stark contrast to the lives of socioeconomic deprivation experienced by their constituents. Ironically, some of the dramatis personae in the alleged democratic misfortunes of the nation since 1999 are the ones calling the shots today.

The overall effect of electoral rigmarole, violence, corruption, and godfatherism is the development of apathy among the electorate towards the very system intended to serve them. This erosion of interest may not be unconnected with the following feelings and perceptions:

Elections without meaningful choice.
Institutions without genuine independence.
Citizens without confidence or participation.
Political power without sufficient accountability.

Nigeria’s problem is no longer merely flawed elections; it is the slow erosion of democracy itself. Falling voter turnout is a warning that citizens are losing faith in a system where votes are bought, institutions are compromised, mandates are manipulated, and leaders often serve political patrons rather than the people. A democracy that cannot command the confidence of its citizens is already in serious danger.

Democracy rarely dies in a single dramatic event. It dies slowly—when elections become rituals, institutions become instruments of power, citizens become spectators, and accountability becomes an illusion. Nigeria may still hold elections, but the real question is whether it is preserving democracy or merely preserving the appearance of it.

The path forward should begin with education. More appropriate education. Then justice and a genuine war against systemic corruption. Democracy must be rescued
A. G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com

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ODU Hails Gov AbdulRazaq For Their Monarch’s Elevation To First Class Status

Published

5 hours ago

October 12, 2026

Our Reporter

Stephen Olufemi Oni, Ilorin

The people of Oro-Ago Kingdom in the Ifelodun local government area of Kwara State have applauded Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq for the elevation of their monarch, the Oloro of Oro-Ago Kingdom, His Royal Majesty Oba Johnson Olarewaju Dada Adekilutoro 1, to the First Class status.

While also commending the Deputy Governor, Mr Kayode Alabi, who is an indigene of Oro-Ago, the people described the elevation and unparalleled recognition as a major historical milestone for them, adding that both the Governor and his deputy have etched their names in the sand of history.

In a statement issued and jointly signed by the National President and National Secretary of the Oro-Ago Development Union (ODU), Geol. Joseph Ayoku Foluso Olawole, and the National Secretary, Dr. Alfred Olatayo Awoyemi, respectively, the Union was full of praises to Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq for this huge honour accorded the people of Oro-Ago Kingdom through this elevation of their highly revered Monarch.

According to the Union, the elevation is a historic milestone in the history of Oro-Ago Kingdom, noting that the recognition represents an important moment of pride, honour and renewed hope for the traditional institution and the entire Oro-Ago community.

It added: “The elevation is a significant development that will further strengthen the traditional institution, promote cultural heritage and encourage unity, peace and sustainable development across Oro-Ago Kingdom and its neighbouring communities.

“In fact, this elevation and unparalleled recognition of our Monarch, His Royal Majesty, the Oloro of Oro-Ago Kingdom, Oba Evangelist Johnson Olarewaju Dada Adekilutoro 1, reflects the importance of traditional institutions in preserving cultural identity, promoting peaceful coexistence and supporting grassroots development.

“The Union expresses confidence that the elevation would further inspire collective efforts towards the social, economic and infrastructural advancement of Oro-Ago Kingdom.”

The Union specifically lauded their illustrious son, the Deputy Governor of Kwara State, Mr Kayode Alabi, for his commitment to the progress and development of Oro-Ago Kingdom, while acknowledging his goodwill towards the community, especially his support and contributions to matters concerning the dignity, recognition and advancement of Oro-Ago Kingdom.

Describing Alabi’s good relationship with the people as a source of encouragement, the Union reiterated that the development of any community requires constructive engagement, mutual understanding and the support of well-meaning leaders.

The ODU further called on all sons and daughters of Oro-Ago Kingdom, both at home and in the diaspora, to regard the elevation as a collective achievement and an opportunity to strengthen unity, deepen cooperation and pursue a common vision for the development of the kingdom, emphasising that the new status of the traditional ruler should serve as a catalyst for greater community participation, investment, youth empowerment, improved security and the provision of essential social amenities.

ODU also acknowledged the contributions of traditional chiefs, community leaders, religious leaders, elders, youths, women and other stakeholders whose prayers, efforts and commitment have continued to support the growth and development of Oro-Ago Kingdom.

The Union urged all stakeholders to sustain the spirit of cooperation that has accompanied the Monarch’s recognition and work together towards building a peaceful, prosperous and progressive community for present and future generations.

Reaffirming its commitment to the development of Oro-Ago, the Union said the elevation is a historic moment for Oro-Ago Kingdom and congratulated His Royal Majesty, Oba Johnson Olarewaju Dada Adekilutoro I, on his elevation to First-Class status and prayed for divine wisdom, sound health and a successful reign for him.

ODU also prayed for continued peace, progress and prosperity in Kwara State under the leadership of Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq, urging the people to continue to support the administration to ensure more dividends of democracy for the citizenry.

The Union expressing optimism that the elevation would open up new opportunities for Oro-Ago Kingdom, strengthen its traditional institution and inspire renewed commitment to community development.