Democracy has been hailed as the best system of governance devised by mankind to date. It is a process driven by periodic elections, as has been the case in Nigeria since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Similar electoral exercises took place during the First Republic (1960–1966) and the Second Republic (1979–1983). It should, however, be emphasised that elections by themselves do not necessarily imply democratic practice.

Democracy and elections are closely related, but they are not synonymous. An election is a mechanism through which citizens exercise their political sovereignty and choose those who govern them. Democracy, however, is the broader system of government founded on popular sovereignty, political equality, participation, accountability, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the protection of fundamental freedoms.

Without these accompanying elements, a country can hold elections without necessarily being genuinely democratic. Free, fair, credible, and competitive elections are essential to democracy, but they are only one component of it. Democracy must also exist between elections—in the institutions, laws, rights, freedoms, and accountability mechanisms that govern the exercise of political power. Thus, elections are the mechanism through which citizens choose their representatives, but democracy extends far beyond the periodic casting of ballots. Without political freedom, genuine competition, the rule of law, institutional accountability, civil liberties, and respect for the will of the electorate, elections can become little more than a ritual for legitimising authoritarian rule. In short, an election is an instrument of democracy; it is not democracy itself.

There is a strong correlation between a country’s population size, demographic structure, and electoral participation (voter turnout). Under normal circumstances, the larger the population, the larger the number of potential registered voters and, potentially, the higher the absolute turnout. The relationship among these variables—population size, registered voters, and voter turnout—can serve as a barometer of the health of democracy in a given environment. Nigerian electoral trends and history seem to defy this thesis. For some obvious reasons, voter participation in Nigerian elections has been on a dangerous decline since 1999, signifying a steady growth in citizens’ apathy. This development poses serious consequences for democratic growth and governance.

The declining appeal of democracy in Nigeria becomes more apparent when viewed against the falling voter participation rate from one electoral cycle to another. This is even more disturbing in light of the nation’s estimated population of 230 million, which could ordinarily provide a strong foundation for robust political participation and activities.

Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Records of Nigeria’s general elections from 1999 to 2023, in terms of registered voters, voter turnout, and approximate turnout percentages, are as follows:

1999: 57.9 million registered; 52% voted.

2003: 60.8 million registered; 69% voted.

2007: 61.6 million registered; 58% voted.

2011: 73.5 million registered; 54% voted.

2015: 68.8 million registered; 44% voted.

2019: 84.0 million registered; only 35% voted.

2023: 93.5 million registered; only 27% voted.

For the forthcoming 2027 elections, INEC has registered about 103 million eligible voters. It is hoped that the decline in voter turnout from 69% in 2003 to just 27% in 2023 will be stemmed—a task that may not be easy if the gubernatorial elections in states such as Ekiti, Osun, and Kogi are factored in.

During the last gubernatorial election in Ekiti, only 36% of the one million registered voters in the state turned out.

In Osun, about 43% of the 2.3 million registered voters turned out.

In Kogi, only 33% of the 1.6 million registered voters cast their ballots. The three states are among the eight that hold off-cycle elections, during which they enjoyed greater security and logistical support. In addition, the contestants live among the electorate.

Most strikingly, in Lagos, with a staggering seven million registered voters, fewer than 20% turned out to vote in the 2023 general elections. This was despite the fact that a son of the soil, Tinubu, was on the ballot. The dismal participation underscores the depth of voter apathy in Nigeria compared with other democracies in both developed and developing countries, as indicated below:

India: 2024 Lok Sabha election — 65.79%.

Brazil: 2026 general election — 78.92%.

United States: 2024 presidential election — 63.9%.

Kenya: 2022 general election — 64.77%.

The question is: What is wrong with the Nigerian system? Could it be that the population figures are inaccurate? Could it be INEC’s ineptitude? Or is it that Nigerians are no longer in love with democratic governance? The answers could lie in all or a combination of these factors.

There is every likelihood that the 2006 population census, from which the nation’s estimated population of 230 million is projected, remains suspect. This is because Nigerians tend to view population censuses and figures more as instruments of competition for political power and resources than as tools for national planning. Consequently, electoral data derived from such figures may distort the political process.

Violence has also been a major feature of Nigerian politics. According to the General Abdulsalami Abubakar-led National Peace Committee, between 2015 and 2025, about 870 people are believed to have been killed during various electoral episodes. Many more have been wounded or incapacitated in the course of an exercise intended to improve their well-being and guarantee the security of their lives and property.

Compounding the violence is a primitive level of political intolerance. In many states, ruling parties monopolise and abuse the political space, shamelessly denying their opponents the freedom to campaign, put up posters, and access state-owned facilities and media outlets. Such conduct reinforces the belief that society is incapable of practising democracy. What a shameful mentality and display of political backwardness!

Another serious challenge is the perceived electoral manipulation by two major democratic institutions—INEC and the judiciary—which has allowed successive ruling parties and power brokers to frustrate political opponents and parties with impunity. Classic cases include the confusing registration and deregistration of political associations; the factionalisation of some; the upholding and overturning of decisions involving political parties; and the numerous cheap and self-serving exercises (substitutions, sackings, awards, etc.) in the name of judicial prerogative. These developments have contributed to the emergence of the current off-cycle gubernatorial elections in states including Anambra, Bayelsa, Edo, Ekiti, Kogi, Ondo, Osun, and Imo.

The circumstances and judicial verdicts surrounding these developments are varied. While some of the political actors are culpable, some of the decisions lack consistency. At best, they are self-serving. The dizzying judicial abracadabra unfolded as follows:

i) In Imo State, there was the “Fourth to First” verdict. Following the March 2019 election, INEC declared Emeka Ihedioha (PDP) the winner. Hope Uzodinma (APC), who officially finished fourth in the initial tally, challenged the result. On January 14, 2020, the Supreme Court ruled that votes from 388 polling units had been unlawfully excluded from Uzodinma’s score. Once those votes were factored in, Uzodinma’s tally surpassed Ihedioha’s. The Court awarded the seat to Uzodinma.

ii) In Zamfara State, the APC won the 2019 gubernatorial election, and Muktar Idris was set to become governor. However, an internal party faction led by Senator Kabiru Marafa challenged the legality of the party’s primary elections. On May 24, 2019, just days before the inauguration, the Supreme Court ruled that the APC had failed to conduct valid primary elections in Zamfara. Consequently, the court declared all votes cast for the APC invalid and “wasted”. It awarded the seat to Bello Matawalle of the PDP.

iii) Earlier, in 2007, in Rivers State, Rotimi Amaechi won the PDP governorship primary, but the party substituted his name with Celestine Omehia. Omehia went on to win the general election. In October 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that Amaechi’s substitution was illegal. Crucially, the court established the legal principle that votes belong to the political party, not the candidate. Since the PDP won the election, Amaechi was declared the rightful governor despite not appearing on the ballot.

Still in Rivers State, in 2019, due to intractable internal leadership disputes and legal battles, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that barred the Rivers APC from fielding any candidates in the 2019 general elections. This cleared the path for Nyesom Wike (PDP) to secure an easy victory without major opposition.

iv) In the run-up to the 2015 governorship election in Kogi State, the APC candidate, Abubakar Audu, was leading comfortably in the polls but died suddenly before the results were fully collated and declared. Audu’s running mate, James Faleke, argued that he should automatically inherit the ticket and votes. The APC bypassed Faleke and substituted Audu with Yahaya Bello, who had finished second in the primaries. The case went to the Supreme Court, which upheld Bello’s election. Reaffirming the Rivers precedent, the court held that votes are cast for the political party, not the individual candidate, thereby authorising the APC to nominate Bello to conclude the election.

v) The 2019 Bayelsa gubernatorial election produced David Lyon of the APC as the winner. However, the PDP filed a lawsuit alleging that Lyon’s deputy governorship running mate, Biobarakuma Degi-Eremienyo, had submitted forged certificates and false information regarding his names and credentials to INEC.

On account of this, on February 13, 2020—less than 24 hours before Lyon was scheduled to be sworn in—the Supreme Court nullified the APC ticket. Because a governorship ticket is legally a “joint ticket”, the disqualification of the deputy automatically disqualified the governor-elect. The court awarded victory to the candidate with the next-highest number of valid votes. Consequently, Douye Diri of the PDP was sworn in as governor.

vi) In Osun State, Oyinlola (PDP) was declared the winner and assumed office as governor in 2007. Rauf Aregbesola of the Action Congress (AC) challenged the results, alleging widespread rigging, violence, and non-compliance with the Electoral Act in several local government areas. The court subsequently sacked Oyinlola and awarded the seat to Aregbesola, ordering his immediate swearing-in.

vii) A similar development took place in Ondo State, where Olusegun Agagu (PDP) was declared the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election. Olusegun Mimiko, contesting under the Labour Party (LP), filed a petition maintaining that he was the rightful winner based on the lawful votes cast. On February 23, 2009, the court agreed with Mimiko and removed Agagu. Mimiko was subsequently sworn in.

viii) Anambra provides a different variation of judicial intervention, focusing on the theft of mandates and the constitutional definition of tenure. Chris Ngige (PDP) was declared the winner in 2003. Peter Obi of APGA challenged the result. After nearly three years of litigation, the Court of Appeal, in March 2006, ruled that Ngige had not won the election and awarded the governorship to Obi.

In 2007, INEC conducted a fresh governorship election while Obi was still serving his term, and Andy Uba (PDP) was declared the winner and sworn in. Obi went to court, and Uba was sacked after just 17 days in office. The court ordered Obi to return and complete his constitutionally mandated term.

The active participants in this electoral mayhem are usually the contestants, INEC functionaries (including ad hoc staff and university dons serving as returning officers), security agents, and, later, the judiciary. Unfortunately, some university dons have actually been convicted of election-related corruption. The ordinary voter should be excused because voters are often used as pawns whose mindsets are shaped by their material conditions—an observation consistent with Karl Marx’s perspective.

The monetisation of politics has also remained a major challenge. It has made entry into politics prohibitive for ordinary people and has also fertilised the growth of the phenomenon of godfatherism. The godfathers usually fund campaign expenses, buy the loyalty of security agents, influence judicial officers, fund thugs, and facilitate the outright purchase of votes at polling stations. Their protégés, in return, are expected to pledge unalloyed loyalty and grant them unfettered access to public resources.

Unfortunately, the strategy often backfires. A few classic godfather-godson crises include Wike/Fubara, El-Rufai/Uba, Kwankwaso/Ganduje, Kwankwaso/Abba, Goje/Dankwambo, Goje/Yahaya, Bafarawa/Wamakko, Aliero/Nasamu, Tinubu/Aregbesola, etc. The phenomenon of godfatherism has not helped the parties involved. If anything, it has only succeeded in weakening democracy in the country.

Perhaps the most disturbing feature of Nigerian democracy is the growing disconnect between elected representatives and the people who elect them. The lifestyles, privileges, and access to public resources enjoyed by many politicians stand in stark contrast to the lives of socioeconomic deprivation experienced by their constituents. Ironically, some of the dramatis personae in the alleged democratic misfortunes of the nation since 1999 are the ones calling the shots today.

The overall effect of electoral rigmarole, violence, corruption, and godfatherism is the development of apathy among the electorate towards the very system intended to serve them. This erosion of interest may not be unconnected with the following feelings and perceptions:

Elections without meaningful choice.
Institutions without genuine independence.
Citizens without confidence or participation.
Political power without sufficient accountability.

Nigeria’s problem is no longer merely flawed elections; it is the slow erosion of democracy itself. Falling voter turnout is a warning that citizens are losing faith in a system where votes are bought, institutions are compromised, mandates are manipulated, and leaders often serve political patrons rather than the people. A democracy that cannot command the confidence of its citizens is already in serious danger.

Democracy rarely dies in a single dramatic event. It dies slowly—when elections become rituals, institutions become instruments of power, citizens become spectators, and accountability becomes an illusion. Nigeria may still hold elections, but the real question is whether it is preserving democracy or merely preserving the appearance of it.

The path forward should begin with education. More appropriate education. Then justice and a genuine war against systemic corruption. Democracy must be rescued
A. G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com