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The Worsining Condition of Nigerians: Can it Ever Change.
By: A G Abubakar
A Nigeria that works for everyone is the dream of every citizen. However, the prospect of achieving such a noble vision has become more illusory by the day, as the material conditions of most Nigerians remain desperate. Change, it is often said, is the only permanent feature of human existence. Yet change, as a concept, is neither inherently good nor bad; it is essentially a neutral phenomenon whose meaning depends on its consequences, and what leadership makes of it.
Change can be social, political, economic, technological, or physical in nature. More importantly, it can be either constructive or destructive, depending on whose interests it advances or whose rights it undermines. In Nigeria – since the collapse of the first Republic – the odds have progressively been stuck against the citizens.
Governance, in its ideal form, exists to guarantee citizens opportunities for self-fulfilment, security, and the pursuit of happiness. The state is meant to create an enabling environment where individuals can pursue livelihoods, develop their talents, and contribute meaningfully to society in a sustainable manner. Scholars such as Charles Tilly and Samuel Huntington have provided lucid definitions of political change in relation to the people. Tilly (1978) sees political change as a people-driven phenomenon—a process in which social movements and collective action shape political outcomes. Huntington, on the other hand, views change largely as a result of institutional shifts (Huntington, 1968). In a country like Nigeria, where institutions have become compromised, the hope for meaningful change in material conditions and security may ultimately rest with the people themselves. They can replace underperforming leaders through the ballot box or the street. In such circumstances, the people themselves become the agents of change.
However, for citizens to effectively play this noble role, certain conditions must exist. Political scientists often argue that meaningful civic participation requires a minimum level of political awareness, education, and economic security. Citizens must be sufficiently enlightened to understand their rights and responsibilities. They must also possess the capacity to make independent political choices free from coercion or desperation, and to ensure that their votes count.
This is where the question of poverty becomes critical. In social science literature, poverty is commonly defined as the condition in which individuals lack the resources necessary to meet basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, and education. The World Bank describes extreme poverty as living below a minimum income threshold necessary for survival, while sociologists broaden the concept to include relative deprivation—a condition in which individuals lack the resources needed to participate meaningfully in the social and economic life of their society.
Poverty in Nigeria does more than limit material wellbeing; it also constrains agency. Individuals trapped in chronic poverty often prioritise immediate survival over long-term political considerations. Their vulnerability makes them susceptible to manipulation, patronage, and vote-buying. Many become unsure of themselves and begin to perceive their rights as favours rather than entitlements. As a consequence, they are easily mobilised through divide-and-rule tactics. Political choices therefore become transactional—Indomie, rice, cash inducement, and other primordial appeals—rather than ideological. Their immediate concern is survival, often described in local political parlance as “stomach infrastructure.”
In such circumstances, the poor rarely assert themselves as instruments of systemic change. Their energies are largely consumed by the daily struggle to survive. This reality raises a troubling question in the Nigerian context. If a significant proportion of the population is poor—various studies suggest that over 60 percent of Nigerians live in multidimensional poverty (133 million in 2021, 139 million in 2025), according to the World Bank’s October 2025 report—how can meaningful democratic change occur? If the poor lack the capacity to act as effective agents of transformation, where then does the impetus for change originate? Studies in political sociology and revolutionary theory offer an interesting insight: while poverty alone rarely produces organised change, anger often does.
Anger, from a psychological standpoint, is defined as an emotional response to perceived injustice, threat, or violation of rights and expectations. Social psychologists describe anger as a mobilising emotion—one capable of motivating individuals and groups toward action, particularly when they believe established systems have failed them.
In political contexts, anger becomes a powerful force when it combines with awareness, identity, and a sense of injustice. Unlike the chronically poor, who struggle primarily with survival, the angry citizen often possesses a clearer sense of rights and expectations. Anger frequently emerges when individuals or groups believe they are being denied opportunities, dignity, or fairness that they legitimately deserve.
Such individuals are more likely to organise, protest, mobilise politically, or challenge authority. The angry citizen therefore differs from the poor in critical ways. Anger is often accompanied by awareness, a sense of dignity, and a vision worth defending. In this sense, anger can become a catalyst for political transformation. The 1993 NADECO-inspired protests against the annulment of the June 12 elections; the Arab Spring across North Africa and the Middle East (2010–2012); and the #EndSARS 2020 revolts in Nigeria all bore the hallmark of mobilised anger rather than the quiet resignation of the impoverished.
This distinction is important in understanding societies undergoing political strain. Nigeria today presents a peculiar situation where poverty is widespread while anger is steadily rising, alongside a government many perceive as more concerned with retaining power than responding to public sensibilities. Under such conditions, the potential agents of change may not necessarily emerge from the ranks of the poorest citizens but from the expanding Nigerian community of the aggrieved.
These include angry teachers and lecturers whose salaries and working conditions undermine their dignity; unemployed youths whose aspirations are trapped in an economy unable to absorb their talents; industrialists forced out of business by crippling access costs; farmers unable to access inputs or secure their harvests; politicians who believe electoral outcomes are manipulated; and even security personnel whose welfare is diverted into private pockets.
Other aggrieved groups include Berom farmers who cannot till their potato and acha farms, and Tiv yam farmers who are unable to cultivate their lands because of armed herdsmen. Rural dwellers in states such as Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Niger, Kogi, Kwara, Kaduna, and Kebbi often cannot go to their farms due to insecurity and are sometimes forced to pay taxes or levies to bandits and insurgents. The Boko Haram/ISWAP-terrorised communities of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa are equally angry. These crises have pushed an estimated 3.7 million people into IDP camps, aside from tens of thousands who have lost their lives (IOM, 2025).
The same frustration is felt by the ordinary traderv in the South-East who has been compelled to observe weekly sit-at-home orders enforced by IPOB. Likewise, communities in the oil-polluted environments of the Niger Delta continue to express deep resentment.
Beyond these growing pockets of anger are moral questions surrounding what many perceive as government insensitivity in national appointments. The rehabilitation of former critics—the Daniel Bwalas, Femi Fani-Kayodes, Reno Omokris, and others—and rewarding them with “plump” appointments sends a troubling signal that “verbal terrorism” pays. Such patronage ultimately erodes public trust in governance. There is nothing wrong in rehabilitating “repentant” foes in politics, but that should not qualify them for undue patronage.
It is okay to appreciate some of the related political wisdom out there, but with a caveat. One says, “you should keep your friends close, but your enemies closer.” Another maintains that “it is better to keep the enemy inside for him to direct his urination outside than to keep him outside for him to urinate inside.” Both adages are meant to facilitate closer monitoring and do not suggest that they should be given either access to the family wardrobe or the key to its safe.
The same concern arises in the case of individuals who are yet to clear serious allegations in court. The retention of the former governor of Zamfara State, now Minister of State for Defence, Bello Matawalle, is one example. More recently, the nomination of Hon. Jimoh Ibrahim as Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York has also generated controversy. Ibrahim has for years faced allegations involving corruption and commercial disputes, including unresolved claims reportedly running into tens of billions of naira involving AMCON. Some say to the tune of N69.4 billion!
Added to the growing pattern of perceived nepotistic federal appointments, such developments help explain why many citizens question the sincerity of the government’s reform agenda and its campaign against insecurity. The perception of ethnic bias in appointments continues to deepen public distrust. Even among many fair-minded South-Westerners, discomfort is growing over the extent to which the Presidency appears willing to pursue what critics describe as an ethnic agenda. Some argue that if earlier governments were criticised for similar tendencies, this administration had an opportunity to demonstrate a higher standard of national leadership.
Nigeria today is gradually producing a formidable population of angry citizens. They may not yet rival the size of the poor, but their numbers are growing steadily. History shows that when anger accumulates in societies without credible institutional outlets for redress, it often manifests in destabilising ways. Some citizens can bottle up their anger for a long while before venting them out. Others, however, resort to more dangerous paths. For those overwhelmed by frustration, criminality sometimes becomes both a form of protest and a desperate means of survival; a trend that could lead to a “state failure.”
Political scientists describe a “failing state” as a country whose government has lost the capacity or struggles to maintain security, enforce laws, provide basic services, control corruption, and command the confidence of their citizens. When these conditions persist, the state gradually loses its monopoly on authority, and non-state actors—criminal gangs, militias, insurgents—begin to fill the vacuum.
Today, none of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones is entirely free of security flashpoints. Only a handful of the thirty-six states can confidently claim relative safety. The implication is clear: the state’s capacity to guarantee security and justice is being severely tested. This is precisely how states drift toward fragility.
Nigeria still has a window of opportunity to reverse course by restoring the rule of law, rebuilding public institutions, and expanding economic opportunity for all to calm the rising tide of frustration.
But that window will not remain open indefinitely. If those entrusted with power fail to act decisively, the growing nation of angry citizens may eventually impose change in ways that no one can predict or control. And when change comes in that manner, history shows that it rarely asks for permission. As for the poor, the hungry, and the angry in Nigeria, the task is to keep believing that “people’s power” resides within them—and that they can harness this collective strength to hold leaders at all levels accountable. Enough of endless lamentation; it is time to demand good governance.
A.G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com
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The changing face of Nasarawa at 30
BY VICTORIA NGOZI IKEANO
victoriangozii@gmail.com 08033077519
Some 26 years after Nigeria’s Independence, a state named Nasarawa in the old northern region now in north central zone of Nigeria was established by then Head of state, General Sani Abacha. Nasarawa thus, shares same birth day as Nigeria, October 1. While Nigeria at 66 is a full, grown-up adult that is heading towards being an elder, Nasarawa state is now a young adult, well past adolescent age. The state itself is maturing gradually. Recall that time was when Lafia its state capital used to be referred to as a ‘one street capital’, defined by the very long stretch of Jos/Makurdi road. Before the state came into being, Lafia, was a sleepy city renowned more as a transit stop for long distance travelers and as a food market (melon, rice, yam, etc.) for big-time traders from especially the eastern part of our country. Then on October 1, 1996 it suddenly found itself bestowed with the status of a state capital; the responsibility seemingly heavy for it’s apparently naïve shoulders then. Findings showed that Akwanga which was considered more cosmopolitan at the time, was to be named the state capital but that General Sani Abacha brought his primordial links to bear in selecting Lafia for the prized crown. Whatever it is, I think the choice of Lafia is not misplaced because there is more value-added when a virgin or semi virgin land is developed than one that is already on the development highway.
Nasarawa state shares boundary with the Federal capital territory (FCT), Plateau, Benue, Kogi and Taraba states. It was carved out of Plateau state. Before then it was part of Benue-Plateau state. It was one of the six states established by late General San Abacha from Nigeria’s six zones on that fateful day of October 1 ,1996 while delivering his 36th Independence Anniversary speech. Others are, Ekiti (South West), Ebonyi (South East), Bayelsa (South South), Gombe (North East) and Zamfara (North West). Wing Commander Abdullahi Ibrahim superintended over the new state in its early years. On May29, 1999 Nasarawa got its first democratically elected governor in person of Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu, Turakin Keffi. The sole administrator’s main task was setting up administrative machinery for the new state. Notable is his construction of the Government House on Shendam road. This was later completed by then Governor Adamu enabling him to depart the two bedrooms flat at the presidential lodge that had served as his office. Over the years Nasarawa’s Government House which serves as both residence and office of the governor has undergone some touches and additions by the various administrations on its expansive land. It now accommodates a 1000-capacity banquet hall named after its second civilian governor, late Aliyu Akwe Doma. There is also now a Press Centre mainly for correspondents covering Government House activities, guest rooms, etc.
Each of the succeeding governments after the military administrator did the best as they could, adding their own unique building blocks to the now 30 year-old edifice called Nasarawa. Abdullahi Adamu laid the foundation stone. His efforts are most noticeable in construction of rural roads and education sector. Some 30 years ago, Nasarawa state had no institution of higher learning save the College of Education, Akwanga, inherited from old Plateau state. Alhaji Adamu (later Senator) established the Nasarawa state Polytechnic (now Mustapha Agwai Polytechnic) College of Health Technology, School of Nursing and of course, Nasarawa state University. There have been additional tertiary schools since then. Among them, the Federal Polytechnic (to be converted to Federal Institute of Mining Technology), Federal University, Lafia (FULAFIA). Federal University Teaching Hospital. Unlike all other governors that completed two terms, late Alhaji Aliyu Akwe Doma who took over from Adamu spent only one term. Nevertheless, he made a mark with especially his Badakoshi programme in which Nasarawa state was exporting yams to foreign lands, notably United Kingdom, thereby boosting the state’s agricultural sector.
Enter Governor Tanko Al-makura (later Senator) after Doma’s time. Alhaji Al-makura opened up the state’s capital with infrastructure, especially roads, giving Lafia a semblance of a capital city. The modernization of Lafia started with him. Current governor, Engineer Abdullahi Sule, a former managing director of Dangote Sugar company is taking Nasarawa state to the next level which is industrialization. In this connection he has attracted some industries to Nasarawa state, particularly in areas where the state has comparative advantage, namely agriculture. As a state that is endowed also with solid minerals (from where it derives the name, ‘Home of Solid Minerals’) Governor Sule is now turning attention to this sector. His legacy project here is the lithium factory built by investor. It is said to be the biggest in Africa and is yielding the government humongous amount of money in revenue. Indeed solid minerals a.k.a. rare minerals, is the future ‘black gold’ that would replace oil which is now gradually losing its importance as nations seek for cleaner energy. Lithium is used for the new technology of the 21st century as for example, chips of smart phones that are constantly evolving. Thus, states that are rich in various mineral deposits shall rank amongst the richest in future. Quite a number of states in northern Nigeria are so blessed. But the challenge is getting capable investors that would exploit these rare minerals for commercialization. And Governor Sule has set a precedent in this direction with establishment of the first and biggest lithium factory in Africa. Nasarawa’s landscape is changing from a mainly civil service state to one that is becoming an industrial hub with accompanying hustle and bustle of a thriving state.
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OPINIONThe Disturbing Facts Behind the Economy’s Beautiful Statistics and the Path Forward.
By: A G Abubakar
“Subsidy is gone!” So thundered Alhaji Bola Ahmed Tinubu at Eagle Square immediately after being sworn in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 29th May 2023. The terse declaration was intended to bring an end to one of the nation’s major cesspools of corruption. Months later came the unification of the various windows of foreign-exchange administration, where impunity, arbitrage and political patronage had held sway for years. That unification, in practical terms, meant the devaluation of the naira. About a year later, a new tax regime was introduced, ostensibly to expand the government’s fiscal space and strengthen its revenue base.
Taken individually and in principle, the three reforms are difficult to fault. They address deep structural distortions that have weakened Nigeria’s economy for decades and created enormous opportunities for rent-seeking, arbitrage and systemic corruption. But economic reforms, however necessary, are not self-executing miracles. Even sound reforms can produce severe and unintended consequences, particularly hyperinflation, joblessness and mass disillusionment, when they are poorly sequenced, inadequately cushioned or implemented without sufficient regard for the productive capacity and welfare of the population.
A reform process is like agriculture. Practitioners know that it is not enough to plant early-maturing, high-yielding seeds and expect a bumper harvest. The whole exercise has to be preceded by land preparation, the acquisition of the right fertiliser and chemicals, and a modicum of good luck—weather and rainfall—from Mother Nature. Otherwise, a potentially high-yielding seed planted in an unprepared field can still produce a disappointing harvest. The same principle applies to economic reform.
Removing subsidies, unifying the foreign-exchange market and expanding the tax base may correct serious distortions, but they do not, by themselves, create food, jobs, productive industries, affordable energy, secure livelihoods or purchasing power. Those outcomes require the productive economy to be strengthened alongside the reforms. Otherwise, the immediate burden of adjustment, such as galloping inflation, can become much heavier than the economy’s capacity to absorb it. Containing inflation and the effects of devaluation in a low-productivity economic environment is one of the hardest policy-management challenges in an economy.
Inflation, in an economy already suffering from weak productive capacity, does not merely raise prices. It erodes purchasing power, destroys savings, increases the cost of survival and pushes millions of people closer to the economic precipice. The problem becomes even more severe when rising prices are accompanied by declining production, high energy costs, currency depreciation and weak household incomes.
The situation is then compounded when the authorities, in an attempt to contain inflation, tighten the money supply through higher interest rates. While such measures may be intended to moderate demand and stabilise prices, their immediate effect is to increase the cost of borrowing, making investment more expensive and, in some cases, virtually prohibitive. Businesses that would otherwise expand production are forced to scale back, postpone investment or close altogether. Productivity consequently suffers, employment opportunities shrink, and the economy becomes even less capable of producing the goods and services its growing population requires.
The usual temptation is to fill domestic production gaps through massive imports. But this, too, places even greater pressure on scarce foreign exchange while simultaneously making local production less competitive and less attractive. The vicious cycle is thereby reinforced: currency depreciation raises the cost of imported inputs and finished goods; high interest rates suppress investment; weak domestic production increases import dependence; import dependence intensifies demand for scarce foreign exchange; and the resulting pressure on the currency pushes prices even higher.
The economy consequently becomes trapped in a cycle in which the very measures intended to restore stability can, in the absence of corresponding increases in production, deepen the pressures facing households and businesses. When these forces are allowed to play out without restoring the critical balance, citizens’ well-being takes the greatest hit: food, transport, housing, healthcare and education become increasingly difficult to afford.
This calls for an elaborate blueprint for safety nets, which is literally the first law of reform. Metaphorically, tents are mounted before the rain starts falling. And the reasons are obvious: reforms usually throw up unintended consequences faster than the antidotes to contain them. On account of time lags, economies normally take time to absorb the shocks created by reforms.
The government has not acknowledged this reality sufficiently. Instead, it has developed a penchant for rolling out statistics to rebut any opinion to the contrary. Functionaries have been too eager to cite improved foreign reserves, rising GDP growth, falling food inflation, increased FAAC allocations to states and even access to NELFUND. And lately, the improved figure for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country. The truth is that these achievements have not been felt by ordinary citizens. And for some obvious reasons.
The increase in foreign reserves above $54 billion, the highest since 2008, has not been achieved through improved domestic productivity or exports. It has been driven largely by external borrowing and fortuitous developments in the oil market. Records from the DMO indicate that Nigeria’s external debt rose from $45.98 billion to $51.90 billion in 2026, a net increase of $5.92 billion. The war in Iran, too, has pushed oil prices above Nigeria’s budget benchmark of $64.85 per barrel to around $100. The positive difference represents a “windfall” that has improved Nigeria’s external reserves without a corresponding rise in non-oil production. It is like a lottery. Economies are never sustainably run on lotteries.
The GDP growth at 4.43% is equally impressive, but it could just be “paper growth” because it has not translated into a general improvement in citizens’ well-being. It is common to have “jobless growth”—a phenomenon in which growth is concentrated in high-tech sectors or services rather than in industrial production, manufacturing or agriculture. These productive sectors are the major drivers of sustainable economic growth. They provide job opportunities for millions, create wealth and boost exports. This has not been the case with Nigeria’s GDP growth.
Falling food inflation is a welcome development at any time. It becomes a challenge when it is driven by imports. It is on record (CBN, NBS) that between 2024 and 2025, the government imported N6.58 trillion and N6.65 trillion, respectively, worth of food items, particularly grains. While the importation has forced prices down, it has inadvertently discouraged local production, the level of which was already down because of insecurity in most farming communities. This has triggered a fear of hunger, which Mr President had cause to say has been with us since before he was born.
The NELFUND is a good initiative in unqualified terms. The figure being bandied about—that more than a million students have benefited from the scheme—is impressive. But the finer details may indicate a different story. For communities dealing with low school enrolment, such as in the North, where about 16 million are out of school, or poor communities having to deal with poor educational performance, the immediate challenge may not be student loans. It is about putting education on the right footing. NELFUND, for now, could largely benefit the privileged who ordinarily could afford tuition.
Then comes the issue of enhanced FAAC allocations to the states, which may have accrued from tax reforms, improved oil revenues, savings from subsidy removal and other measures. Great as these initiatives have been in improving the government’s fiscal health, the paradox is that inflation arising from currency devaluation has eaten away almost 70% of the value of what is being allocated.
To put it plainly, the naira has lost around 70% of its value against the dollar. State governments are, therefore, now paying multiple times what they used to pay for the same goods and services before the devaluation. The increased FAAC is like adding water to a soup to serve more guests, and still insisting that the taste has improved too.
As for FDI, Nigeria recorded an improved level in the first quarter of 2026, to the tune of $10.37 billion in capital importation. Unfortunately, more than 95%—over $9.85 billion—was portfolio investment. Records indicate that more than 98% of the said portfolio inflows went into money-market instruments, including Treasury bills and government bonds. While such inflows can provide foreign exchange and temporary liquidity, they are inherently more mobile than direct investment. Nigeria needs more foreign capital, but that which a greater proportion should be stable, and long-term to expand productive capacity, creates jobs and strengthens the real economy.
As things stand, the reforms actually call for further reforms to make their outcomes more impactful. The path forward should start by reviewing some of the prescriptions of the neoliberal Bretton Woods institutions (WB/IMF) that emphasise spreadsheet balance over public well-being. The next necessary actions include repossessing aspects of the energy sector, stepping up the war on corruption, optimising the reinvestment of subsidy savings into job creation, and providing sustainable support for the MSME sector.
The 2012 privatisation of aspects of Nigeria’s electricity sector has not worked well. Apart from its abysmally low transmission of about 5,000 MW for a population of over 230 million, the Nigerian power sector is structurally inefficient, operationally constrained and unnecessarily burdened by a maze of encumbering regulatory and institutional arrangements. The transmitted volume is actually less than that of some single cities, such as Beijing (China), Tokyo (Japan), Delhi (India) and the like.
First, the gap between the estimated 12,000 MW or more generation capacity and the roughly 5,000 MW wheeling volume means that more than half of the available generation capacity is either stranded, constrained or otherwise unavailable to consumers. Second, the TCN’s transmission loss factor (TLF), at 7.96%, exceeds NERC’s regulatory threshold of 7%. Third, and more troubling, is the DISCOs’ Aggregate Technical, Commercial and Collection (ATC&C) loss rate of 37.44%, more than twice the regulatory target of 16.92%.
These have inflicted enormous financial losses and severely diminished economic opportunities, with far-reaching consequences for the productive capacity of the economy and the acceleration of its deindustrialisation.
The institutional architecture itself adds another layer of complexity. The sector involves a cacophony of stakeholders and institutions—including the GenCos, TCN, NISO, DISCOs, NERC, NBET, NEMSA, the ECN, the Rural Electrification Agency (REA) and the Federal Ministry of Power (FMP). Their mandates tend to overlap. They should be streamlined to remove bottlenecks.
Energy is an indispensable factor in economic transformation. For instance, in the USA, only 13% of the economy can function without electricity. In general, it is believed that a 1% increase in electricity supply can stimulate between 1.5% and 3% growth in GDP. The government should, therefore, reclaim the distribution segment (DisCos) of the power ecosystem to fast-track national development, as the private-sector-led model has not delivered yet. This is without prejudice to the current Electricity Act, 2023, as amended.
Besides power, greater attention should be paid to agriculture through the provision of subsidies on inputs, chemicals and fertiliser. Agriculture remains a mainstay of the economy, contributing between 20% and 26% to national GDP and employing around 70% of the rural labour force (NBS, 2026). It has been a veritable source of agro-raw materials for both local and foreign industries. Agriculture should be made attractive.
Support for the MSME subsector should be a matter of urgency. It harbours over 40 million units and, according to NBS, constitutes over 90% of the nation’s enterprise stock. These enterprises play a huge role in wealth creation. Poor power supply and limited access to affordable credit have, however, not allowed the sector to thrive as it should.
Another critical priority area that deserves greater support is direct job creation. The concept has been a good complement to macroeconomic reforms the world over. It is an indispensable labour sponge for economies under serious stress, as pronounced by great scholars like Keynes and later modified by Friedman and others. The US government under Roosevelt used it to revive the economy during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Called the New Deal, it aimed to equip jobless youths with skills to undertake various types of economic activities outside government. A similar approach was adopted in the rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan (1948–1951).
Successive governments in Nigeria appreciated this dictum during periods of economic challenges and established agencies such as the NDE, NAPEP, SMEDAN, etc. However, over the years, some of their operations have lost steam when they are needed most. It is believed that, with proper support, the agencies could address the annual rate of 3 million youths discharged by the education system into the labour market, where only 10% are estimated to get formal employment.
The call for rejigging the existing agencies is not to downplay what is on the ground, such as the N75 billion BOI fund, the CBN’s development fund, SMEDAN’s ICSS and GROW Fund, etc., but rather to engender greater impact and reach. This is also without prejudice to existing schemes and/or programmes of NBTE, ITF and others. They should be made to work collaboratively, statutorily, along a national empowerment value chain that links skills development, entrepreneurship, funding and mentoring.
The resources to fund interventions are on the ground. They include redirecting the subsidy savings, a sustained reduction in corruption that currently takes 40% of the nation’s annual budget, and conventional allocations.
In the final analysis, reforms cannot be judged by the comfort of government balance sheets while citizens struggle to put food on their tables. Nigerians do not live on GDP growth, foreign reserves or impressive FAAC figures; they live on wages, jobs, affordable food, electricity, healthcare and purchasing power. The real challenge, therefore, is to move the reforms from the spreadsheets of government into the productive economy and the homes of ordinary Nigerians.
Until that happens, the government may continue to celebrate its numbers, but the people will continue to measure the reforms by the hardship they feel.
A. G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com
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Police Recover Two AK-47 Rifles From Commercial Vehicle In Kwara
Stephen Olufemi Oni, Ilorin
The Kwara State Police Command has recovered two AK-47 rifles, three magazines and 42 rounds of live ammunition from a commercial vehicle in Ilorin, leading to the discovery of a suspected gun-running network.
The weapons were intercepted during a stop-and-search operation along the Alapa–Okolowo axis of Ilorin, where police operatives reportedly found a bag containing the firearms and ammunition inside the passenger vehicle.
The police said a 30-year-old suspect, identified as Umaru M., initially denied ownership of the bag but later admitted to conveying the firearms and ammunition during interrogation.
According to the Command, the suspect’s statement provided a major breakthrough in the investigation, as he allegedly linked the weapons to another suspected member of the gun-running network, identified as Dan Yarubawa.
Umaru reportedly told investigators that Yarubawa handed the firearms to him for onward delivery to another individual, identified as Dahiru, outside Kwara State.
The Police Public Relations Officer, SP Adetoun Ejire-Adeyemi, in a statement issued on Monday, said efforts have been intensified to apprehend the other suspects and unravel the full extent of the alleged gun-running network.
The development, she said, was in line with the strategic policing vision of the Inspector-General of Police, IGP Olatunji Rilwan Disu, particularly the emphasis on proactive policing, intelligence-led operations and sustained efforts to disrupt criminal activities.
The Commissioner of Police, Kwara State Command, CP Adekimi Ojo, assured residents that the Command would continue to take proactive measures to identify and neutralise threats to public safety.
Ojo urged members of the public to support the police by providing credible and timely information, stressing that the Command remained committed to protecting lives and property across the state.
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