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OPINION. Violent Herdsmen and Our Collective Helplessness: Can the Fulani Elites Rise Up?
BY: A G Abubakar
Before examining the complex debate surrounding the Fulani and the farmer-herder conflict, it is important to establish the demographic context. Nigeria, with a population estimated at about 230 million people, is home to four major ethnic formations that account for a substantial proportion of its population: the Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulani. While estimates differ across sources, they collectively underscore the demographic significance of these groups. According to the Open Factbook/World Factbook, the Hausa constitute about 30 percent of Nigeria’s population, the Yoruba 15.5 percent, and the Igbo 15.2 percent.
The Fulani are estimated to constitute about 6 percent of the population, or roughly 14.5 million people. Other demographic sources, such as the Joshua Project, place the Yoruba at 23 percent, the Igbo at 18 percent, and the Fulani population at approximately 21 million. Although the exact figures remain contested—the dearth of reliable demographic data remains a major challenge in Nigeria—there is little dispute that the Fulani, at about 10 percent of the population, constitute one of Nigeria’s significant ethnic groups. These statistics provide a useful sense of proportion for social and sociological discussions.
Nigeria’s Fulani population should also be understood within the wider context of the global Fulani community. According to the American Journal of Human Genetics (2025), there are approximately 40 million Fulani spread across 17 countries in the Sahel and West Africa, making them one of the continent’s largest transnational ethnic groups. Of this population, an estimated seven million still practise nomadic pastoralism. Within Nigeria itself, the Fulani are broadly divided into two categories: the sedentary Fulani, who reside permanently in towns and villages and engage in diverse occupations, and the nomadic pastoralists, whose livelihoods depend on seasonal cattle migration. The latter are estimated to number about four million.
This distinction is crucial because, despite constituting only a relatively small segment of both Nigeria’s population and the global Fulani community, the nomadic pastoralist group has, over the years, become the focal point of recurring farmer-herder conflicts and, later, kidnappings, mass abductions, and the ransacking of settlements. Yet, hardly any other group of such relatively small size has generated as much emotand 2and sentiment as the Fulani herdsmen, even when part of them bear arms and terrorise fellow citizens.
On July 30, 2026, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) convened a workshop in Abuja to deliberate on grazing and the perennial farmer-herder conflict that has claimed thousands of lives, displaced countless communities, and deepened ethnic distrust across Nigeria. Given the gravity of the crisis, many Nigerians expected the gathering to produce frank reflections on the role of all stakeholders and practical pathways towards restoring peace.
Instead, public attention shifted to the remarks of the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammadu Sa’ad Abubakar III, who criticised those he said were unfairly linking the Fulani32 ethnic group with terrorism and violent crime. His intervention was undoubtedly intended to caution against ethnic stereotyping—a principle that every fair-minded person should uphold. Indeed, no ethnic group should be criminalised because of the actions of a few, and no responsible society should embrace collective guilt as a basis for justice.
Yet, moral clarity demands more than a rejection of stereotypes. It also requires the courage to confront uncomfortable realities. Across large swathes of the North-West and North-Central, the criminal networks responsible for kidnappings, mass abductions, violent banditry, and many of the deadly farmer-herder conflicts have repeatedly been linked to armed groups operating largely within Fulani pastoral communities. To hold a brief for the perpetrators on account of identity creates a problem in understanding the dynamics of the crisis.
This is where the Sultan’s intervention falls short. Whether intended or not, such a posture may provide criminal actors with a sense of accommodation while diminishing public confidence and trust in leadership.
The persistence of the crisis cannot be explained by a single factor. It is rooted in the collision between a centuries-old pastoral tradition and rapidly changing demographic, economic, and environmental realities. It has also been sustained by weak law enforcement, the proliferation of sophisticated weapons, the collapse of traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, and, in some instances, the silence or reluctance of respected community leaders to confront criminality with the clarity and consistency it deserves. Until these realities are honestly acknowledged, Nigeria will continue to treat the symptoms of insecurity while deflecting attention from its deeper causes. Leadership carries with it not only the privilege of representation but also the burden of accountability.
Currently, no day passes in Nigeria without screaming newspaper headlines or viral social media clips alleging fresh atrocities by what has come to be known as killer herdsmen—a phrase often used as a subtle euphemism for armed nomadic Fulani. The motives ascribed to them vary widely depending on which side of Nigeria’s ethno-religious divide one stands. In predominantly Muslim areas of the North-West, they are seen largely as bandits exploiting a weak security architecture to terrorise, kidnap, and kill for ransom—or simply being trigger-happy.
In the minority communities of the Middle Belt, they are viewed as agents of ethnic or religious domination. Others see them as marauding land grabbers seeking to take over ancestral lands. Some interpret their actions as part of a plot to Islamise the country. Others even alleged genocide motives. Whatever the lens, the perception reflects long-standing, deeply rooted tensions among the region’s diverse groups; including placing a strain on the popular hybrid Hausa-Fulani identity, as Hausa and Fulani increasingly come to see each other in terms of “them and us.”
Though reliable data are scarce, estimates suggest that so-called killer herdsmen have been responsible for over 70% of deaths and kidnappings in the North-West and 4 Alongside Boko Haram/ISWAP and other armed groups, they have contributed to over 50,000 deaths and displaced more than three million people—figures that some sources place even higher.
The evidence against the armed Fulani is obvious, judging by the number and/or incidence of:
i. Those arrested by security agents.
ii. Those who have attended town hall meetings for peace agreements in Katsina, Kebbi, Zamfara, Kaduna, etc.
iii. Sheikh Gumi’s self-ascribed interlocutor role has been almost exclusively within the Fulani domain.
iv. The self-proclaimed leaders of the bandit groups have largely been persons of Fulani extraction. They include individuals such as Dogo Gide, Bello Turji, Kachalla Altii, Kachalla Maha, Sububu, Ado Aliero, Buhari Halidu, and Kachalla Damina, among others. They have been largely responsible for the banditry and kidnapping crisis in the North, outside the Boko Haram/ISWAP enclaves, and in parts of the South-West. Governor Soludo has exonerated them from the violence in Anambra, just as Governor Alia of Benue has acknowledged that some of the crises are perpetrated by indigenous armed militias such as Tsekaa Kyann and Felix Agbako.
Historically, herders and farmers—and the Fulani as a whole—coexisted peacefully for centuries. So, when did things fall apart? The friction began to intensify roughly four decades ago, escalating from low-level skirmishes into open warfare over the last two decades. Today, pastoralists have become ubiquitous across rural communities in Nigeria and much of West Africa, turning one of mankind’s oldest occupations into a subject of global concern as “modernity” threatened to bring the curtain down on a way of life that has endured for millennia.
The nomadic Fulani remain one of the world’s few surviving pastoralist groups, though now in increasingly precarious circumstances. To properly situate the current crisis by the group, it is important to revisit key sociological concepts such as nomadism, shepherdism, pastoralism, transhumance, ethnicity, and clan systems. These shape both the worldview of pastoralists and their interaction with wider communities.
Nomadism is a lifestyle defined by continual movement in search of water and pasture. It shapes social organisation, settlement patterns, and environmental adaptation. Pastoralism and shepherdism focus on the economic dimension—raising livestock for food, clothing, and income. These activities are structured by ethnic and clan (Bororoji, Deneji, Woɗaɓe, Dambazawa, Sulluɓawa, Genawa,etc) identities that guide seasonal migration routes and patterns of behaviour.
Globally, the Fulani are among the few remaining nomadic peoples, alongside the Sami (Scandinavia/Russia), the Romany, the Pokot (Kenya/Tanzania), the Nenets, the Karelians, the Bedouins, and the Maasai. All face the pressures of a rapidly changing world marked by environmental stress, population growth, expanding economic activities, and new technologies.
Sociologically, nomadism shapes culture, behaviour, and value systems, filtered through universal human values and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Just as farming sociologically cultivates patience and attention to detail, and commerce nurtures negotiation and sociability, nomadism builds resourcefulness, bravery, cohesion, and mental toughness. The defence and protection of herds and territory have thus become intrinsic to nomadic identity.
At the same time, pastoralists cherish universal values of respect, kindness, honesty, and reliability. Like everyone else, they seek belonging, esteem, and self-actualisation. Their struggle to reconcile their occupational worldview with the demands of a rapidly changing society has fuelled much of the present conflict. As their traditional world shrinks and income streams collapse—without viable alternatives—confusion and aggression have grown.
Livestock accounts for up to 5% of agriculture’s 24.64% contribution to Nigeria’s GDP (NBS, 2024). The sub-sector provides over 40% of the nation’s dairy needs and about 80% of its meat supply. Yet, nomadism has prevented livestock production from reaching its full potential. Under ranching, for instance, a cow can produce 40–60 litres of milk per day; under nomadic conditions, it produces only 1–1.3 litres. Meat yield differs similarly: about 350 kg under ranching versus 150 kg under nomadic conditions. This huge productivity gap adds pressure to pastoral livelihoods and heightens frustrations.
The shrinking world of nomads has triggered violent clashes with farmers and host communities from Senegal to Cameroon. In Nigeria, the last decade has witnessed thousands of deaths and the devastation of local economies, driving poverty and widespread rural insecurity.
Across West and Central Africa, herder-farmer conflicts follow a similar pattern: in Chad between the Gambi and herders; in Mali between the Dogon and pastoral groups; in Burkina Faso between the Mossi and Fulani; in Ghana involving the Konkomba and Dagomba; in Senegal involving the Wolof, Serer, and Tukulor; and in Niger between the Buduma and pastoralists. Many of these conflicts have resulted in mass killings, reprisals, and displacement.
The deeper roots of the crisis lie in both local and global forces: the historic decline of nomadism due to technological change, industrial agriculture, climate change, and the disappearance of grazing routes within host communities. While ranching and improved animal health have addressed these challenges in many parts of the world, the story has been different in countries such as Nigeria. Here, transhumance has simply collapsed without viable alternatives. While successive governments failed to provide the change infrastructure, the pastoralists’ cultural resistance didn’t help matters. change has not helped matters either.
The way forward must, by necessity, be multi-pronged, encompassing reorientation, modernisation, institutionalisation, engagement, and justice.
ECOWAS has developed several frameworks to modernise pastoralism, such as PRAPS, free-movement protocols, and FAO-supported programmes. However, their impact has remained limited because of weak stakeholder engagement and poor enforcement.
The federal ranching initiative must be pursued vigorously, particularly in states willing to participate. The necessary institutional frameworks already exist: the Federal Ministry of Livestock Development, the National Livestock Transformation Plan, the National Cattle Ranching Programme, and the Office of the Special Adviser on Livestock Reform. What is missing is sustained sensitisation and genuine buy-in from herders, without which the entire vision will fail. Countries with far larger cattle populations—Brazil (238 million), Ethiopia (70.9 million), Pakistan (55.5 million), and Tanzania (37.9 million)—manage pastoralism with minimal conflict. Nigeria has no excuse.
The sedentary Fulani population must play its part by openly denouncing violence. Every group has its deviants; shared ethnicity is not an endorsement of wrongdoing. The reluctance of Fulani elites and ruling houses to confront the violent fringe mirrors the early complacency that allowed Boko Haram and IPOB to grow. The leadership of the more than 14 Fulani ruling dynasties in the North, should speak with one voice against criminal elements within their own ranks—and, indeed, against all forms of violence that threaten the nation. The Emir of Muri (Jalingo) did just that in the recent past, and his example should be emulated. Playing the victim or claiming victimhood should not be a licence to kill. Those who have been killed have suffered no less.
The narrative that herder violence is driven primarily by neglect or a lack of infrastructure is simplistic and dishonest. Many nomadic communities have historically resisted settlement and formal schooling, even though government enlightenment campaigns and infrastructure provision have also been inadequate. All the same, blaming the whole crisis on them entirely is to misses the point. Just like blaming a child’s performance at school solely on the teachers. It does not encourage change.
What is needed is a workable roadmap to modernise pastoralism—anchored on ranching and regulated transhumance. Nomadic education (not lip service), along with ranching are good starting points. Hypocrisy on the part of both proponents and opponents has undermined progress.
Beyond domestic reforms, Nigeria should consider a global engagement framework for the nomadic Fulani—similar to the Arab League, but focused on pastoral cultures. A colloquium or international conference for genuine nomadic communities could help accelerate a peaceful transition. The United Nations could even be lobbied to declare a World Nomadic Day.
A.G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.comv
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The changing face of Nasarawa at 30
BY VICTORIA NGOZI IKEANO
victoriangozii@gmail.com 08033077519
Some 26 years after Nigeria’s Independence, a state named Nasarawa in the old northern region now in north central zone of Nigeria was established by then Head of state, General Sani Abacha. Nasarawa thus, shares same birth day as Nigeria, October 1. While Nigeria at 66 is a full, grown-up adult that is heading towards being an elder, Nasarawa state is now a young adult, well past adolescent age. The state itself is maturing gradually. Recall that time was when Lafia its state capital used to be referred to as a ‘one street capital’, defined by the very long stretch of Jos/Makurdi road. Before the state came into being, Lafia, was a sleepy city renowned more as a transit stop for long distance travelers and as a food market (melon, rice, yam, etc.) for big-time traders from especially the eastern part of our country. Then on October 1, 1996 it suddenly found itself bestowed with the status of a state capital; the responsibility seemingly heavy for it’s apparently naïve shoulders then. Findings showed that Akwanga which was considered more cosmopolitan at the time, was to be named the state capital but that General Sani Abacha brought his primordial links to bear in selecting Lafia for the prized crown. Whatever it is, I think the choice of Lafia is not misplaced because there is more value-added when a virgin or semi virgin land is developed than one that is already on the development highway.
Nasarawa state shares boundary with the Federal capital territory (FCT), Plateau, Benue, Kogi and Taraba states. It was carved out of Plateau state. Before then it was part of Benue-Plateau state. It was one of the six states established by late General San Abacha from Nigeria’s six zones on that fateful day of October 1 ,1996 while delivering his 36th Independence Anniversary speech. Others are, Ekiti (South West), Ebonyi (South East), Bayelsa (South South), Gombe (North East) and Zamfara (North West). Wing Commander Abdullahi Ibrahim superintended over the new state in its early years. On May29, 1999 Nasarawa got its first democratically elected governor in person of Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu, Turakin Keffi. The sole administrator’s main task was setting up administrative machinery for the new state. Notable is his construction of the Government House on Shendam road. This was later completed by then Governor Adamu enabling him to depart the two bedrooms flat at the presidential lodge that had served as his office. Over the years Nasarawa’s Government House which serves as both residence and office of the governor has undergone some touches and additions by the various administrations on its expansive land. It now accommodates a 1000-capacity banquet hall named after its second civilian governor, late Aliyu Akwe Doma. There is also now a Press Centre mainly for correspondents covering Government House activities, guest rooms, etc.
Each of the succeeding governments after the military administrator did the best as they could, adding their own unique building blocks to the now 30 year-old edifice called Nasarawa. Abdullahi Adamu laid the foundation stone. His efforts are most noticeable in construction of rural roads and education sector. Some 30 years ago, Nasarawa state had no institution of higher learning save the College of Education, Akwanga, inherited from old Plateau state. Alhaji Adamu (later Senator) established the Nasarawa state Polytechnic (now Mustapha Agwai Polytechnic) College of Health Technology, School of Nursing and of course, Nasarawa state University. There have been additional tertiary schools since then. Among them, the Federal Polytechnic (to be converted to Federal Institute of Mining Technology), Federal University, Lafia (FULAFIA). Federal University Teaching Hospital. Unlike all other governors that completed two terms, late Alhaji Aliyu Akwe Doma who took over from Adamu spent only one term. Nevertheless, he made a mark with especially his Badakoshi programme in which Nasarawa state was exporting yams to foreign lands, notably United Kingdom, thereby boosting the state’s agricultural sector.
Enter Governor Tanko Al-makura (later Senator) after Doma’s time. Alhaji Al-makura opened up the state’s capital with infrastructure, especially roads, giving Lafia a semblance of a capital city. The modernization of Lafia started with him. Current governor, Engineer Abdullahi Sule, a former managing director of Dangote Sugar company is taking Nasarawa state to the next level which is industrialization. In this connection he has attracted some industries to Nasarawa state, particularly in areas where the state has comparative advantage, namely agriculture. As a state that is endowed also with solid minerals (from where it derives the name, ‘Home of Solid Minerals’) Governor Sule is now turning attention to this sector. His legacy project here is the lithium factory built by investor. It is said to be the biggest in Africa and is yielding the government humongous amount of money in revenue. Indeed solid minerals a.k.a. rare minerals, is the future ‘black gold’ that would replace oil which is now gradually losing its importance as nations seek for cleaner energy. Lithium is used for the new technology of the 21st century as for example, chips of smart phones that are constantly evolving. Thus, states that are rich in various mineral deposits shall rank amongst the richest in future. Quite a number of states in northern Nigeria are so blessed. But the challenge is getting capable investors that would exploit these rare minerals for commercialization. And Governor Sule has set a precedent in this direction with establishment of the first and biggest lithium factory in Africa. Nasarawa’s landscape is changing from a mainly civil service state to one that is becoming an industrial hub with accompanying hustle and bustle of a thriving state.
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OPINIONThe Disturbing Facts Behind the Economy’s Beautiful Statistics and the Path Forward.
By: A G Abubakar
“Subsidy is gone!” So thundered Alhaji Bola Ahmed Tinubu at Eagle Square immediately after being sworn in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 29th May 2023. The terse declaration was intended to bring an end to one of the nation’s major cesspools of corruption. Months later came the unification of the various windows of foreign-exchange administration, where impunity, arbitrage and political patronage had held sway for years. That unification, in practical terms, meant the devaluation of the naira. About a year later, a new tax regime was introduced, ostensibly to expand the government’s fiscal space and strengthen its revenue base.
Taken individually and in principle, the three reforms are difficult to fault. They address deep structural distortions that have weakened Nigeria’s economy for decades and created enormous opportunities for rent-seeking, arbitrage and systemic corruption. But economic reforms, however necessary, are not self-executing miracles. Even sound reforms can produce severe and unintended consequences, particularly hyperinflation, joblessness and mass disillusionment, when they are poorly sequenced, inadequately cushioned or implemented without sufficient regard for the productive capacity and welfare of the population.
A reform process is like agriculture. Practitioners know that it is not enough to plant early-maturing, high-yielding seeds and expect a bumper harvest. The whole exercise has to be preceded by land preparation, the acquisition of the right fertiliser and chemicals, and a modicum of good luck—weather and rainfall—from Mother Nature. Otherwise, a potentially high-yielding seed planted in an unprepared field can still produce a disappointing harvest. The same principle applies to economic reform.
Removing subsidies, unifying the foreign-exchange market and expanding the tax base may correct serious distortions, but they do not, by themselves, create food, jobs, productive industries, affordable energy, secure livelihoods or purchasing power. Those outcomes require the productive economy to be strengthened alongside the reforms. Otherwise, the immediate burden of adjustment, such as galloping inflation, can become much heavier than the economy’s capacity to absorb it. Containing inflation and the effects of devaluation in a low-productivity economic environment is one of the hardest policy-management challenges in an economy.
Inflation, in an economy already suffering from weak productive capacity, does not merely raise prices. It erodes purchasing power, destroys savings, increases the cost of survival and pushes millions of people closer to the economic precipice. The problem becomes even more severe when rising prices are accompanied by declining production, high energy costs, currency depreciation and weak household incomes.
The situation is then compounded when the authorities, in an attempt to contain inflation, tighten the money supply through higher interest rates. While such measures may be intended to moderate demand and stabilise prices, their immediate effect is to increase the cost of borrowing, making investment more expensive and, in some cases, virtually prohibitive. Businesses that would otherwise expand production are forced to scale back, postpone investment or close altogether. Productivity consequently suffers, employment opportunities shrink, and the economy becomes even less capable of producing the goods and services its growing population requires.
The usual temptation is to fill domestic production gaps through massive imports. But this, too, places even greater pressure on scarce foreign exchange while simultaneously making local production less competitive and less attractive. The vicious cycle is thereby reinforced: currency depreciation raises the cost of imported inputs and finished goods; high interest rates suppress investment; weak domestic production increases import dependence; import dependence intensifies demand for scarce foreign exchange; and the resulting pressure on the currency pushes prices even higher.
The economy consequently becomes trapped in a cycle in which the very measures intended to restore stability can, in the absence of corresponding increases in production, deepen the pressures facing households and businesses. When these forces are allowed to play out without restoring the critical balance, citizens’ well-being takes the greatest hit: food, transport, housing, healthcare and education become increasingly difficult to afford.
This calls for an elaborate blueprint for safety nets, which is literally the first law of reform. Metaphorically, tents are mounted before the rain starts falling. And the reasons are obvious: reforms usually throw up unintended consequences faster than the antidotes to contain them. On account of time lags, economies normally take time to absorb the shocks created by reforms.
The government has not acknowledged this reality sufficiently. Instead, it has developed a penchant for rolling out statistics to rebut any opinion to the contrary. Functionaries have been too eager to cite improved foreign reserves, rising GDP growth, falling food inflation, increased FAAC allocations to states and even access to NELFUND. And lately, the improved figure for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country. The truth is that these achievements have not been felt by ordinary citizens. And for some obvious reasons.
The increase in foreign reserves above $54 billion, the highest since 2008, has not been achieved through improved domestic productivity or exports. It has been driven largely by external borrowing and fortuitous developments in the oil market. Records from the DMO indicate that Nigeria’s external debt rose from $45.98 billion to $51.90 billion in 2026, a net increase of $5.92 billion. The war in Iran, too, has pushed oil prices above Nigeria’s budget benchmark of $64.85 per barrel to around $100. The positive difference represents a “windfall” that has improved Nigeria’s external reserves without a corresponding rise in non-oil production. It is like a lottery. Economies are never sustainably run on lotteries.
The GDP growth at 4.43% is equally impressive, but it could just be “paper growth” because it has not translated into a general improvement in citizens’ well-being. It is common to have “jobless growth”—a phenomenon in which growth is concentrated in high-tech sectors or services rather than in industrial production, manufacturing or agriculture. These productive sectors are the major drivers of sustainable economic growth. They provide job opportunities for millions, create wealth and boost exports. This has not been the case with Nigeria’s GDP growth.
Falling food inflation is a welcome development at any time. It becomes a challenge when it is driven by imports. It is on record (CBN, NBS) that between 2024 and 2025, the government imported N6.58 trillion and N6.65 trillion, respectively, worth of food items, particularly grains. While the importation has forced prices down, it has inadvertently discouraged local production, the level of which was already down because of insecurity in most farming communities. This has triggered a fear of hunger, which Mr President had cause to say has been with us since before he was born.
The NELFUND is a good initiative in unqualified terms. The figure being bandied about—that more than a million students have benefited from the scheme—is impressive. But the finer details may indicate a different story. For communities dealing with low school enrolment, such as in the North, where about 16 million are out of school, or poor communities having to deal with poor educational performance, the immediate challenge may not be student loans. It is about putting education on the right footing. NELFUND, for now, could largely benefit the privileged who ordinarily could afford tuition.
Then comes the issue of enhanced FAAC allocations to the states, which may have accrued from tax reforms, improved oil revenues, savings from subsidy removal and other measures. Great as these initiatives have been in improving the government’s fiscal health, the paradox is that inflation arising from currency devaluation has eaten away almost 70% of the value of what is being allocated.
To put it plainly, the naira has lost around 70% of its value against the dollar. State governments are, therefore, now paying multiple times what they used to pay for the same goods and services before the devaluation. The increased FAAC is like adding water to a soup to serve more guests, and still insisting that the taste has improved too.
As for FDI, Nigeria recorded an improved level in the first quarter of 2026, to the tune of $10.37 billion in capital importation. Unfortunately, more than 95%—over $9.85 billion—was portfolio investment. Records indicate that more than 98% of the said portfolio inflows went into money-market instruments, including Treasury bills and government bonds. While such inflows can provide foreign exchange and temporary liquidity, they are inherently more mobile than direct investment. Nigeria needs more foreign capital, but that which a greater proportion should be stable, and long-term to expand productive capacity, creates jobs and strengthens the real economy.
As things stand, the reforms actually call for further reforms to make their outcomes more impactful. The path forward should start by reviewing some of the prescriptions of the neoliberal Bretton Woods institutions (WB/IMF) that emphasise spreadsheet balance over public well-being. The next necessary actions include repossessing aspects of the energy sector, stepping up the war on corruption, optimising the reinvestment of subsidy savings into job creation, and providing sustainable support for the MSME sector.
The 2012 privatisation of aspects of Nigeria’s electricity sector has not worked well. Apart from its abysmally low transmission of about 5,000 MW for a population of over 230 million, the Nigerian power sector is structurally inefficient, operationally constrained and unnecessarily burdened by a maze of encumbering regulatory and institutional arrangements. The transmitted volume is actually less than that of some single cities, such as Beijing (China), Tokyo (Japan), Delhi (India) and the like.
First, the gap between the estimated 12,000 MW or more generation capacity and the roughly 5,000 MW wheeling volume means that more than half of the available generation capacity is either stranded, constrained or otherwise unavailable to consumers. Second, the TCN’s transmission loss factor (TLF), at 7.96%, exceeds NERC’s regulatory threshold of 7%. Third, and more troubling, is the DISCOs’ Aggregate Technical, Commercial and Collection (ATC&C) loss rate of 37.44%, more than twice the regulatory target of 16.92%.
These have inflicted enormous financial losses and severely diminished economic opportunities, with far-reaching consequences for the productive capacity of the economy and the acceleration of its deindustrialisation.
The institutional architecture itself adds another layer of complexity. The sector involves a cacophony of stakeholders and institutions—including the GenCos, TCN, NISO, DISCOs, NERC, NBET, NEMSA, the ECN, the Rural Electrification Agency (REA) and the Federal Ministry of Power (FMP). Their mandates tend to overlap. They should be streamlined to remove bottlenecks.
Energy is an indispensable factor in economic transformation. For instance, in the USA, only 13% of the economy can function without electricity. In general, it is believed that a 1% increase in electricity supply can stimulate between 1.5% and 3% growth in GDP. The government should, therefore, reclaim the distribution segment (DisCos) of the power ecosystem to fast-track national development, as the private-sector-led model has not delivered yet. This is without prejudice to the current Electricity Act, 2023, as amended.
Besides power, greater attention should be paid to agriculture through the provision of subsidies on inputs, chemicals and fertiliser. Agriculture remains a mainstay of the economy, contributing between 20% and 26% to national GDP and employing around 70% of the rural labour force (NBS, 2026). It has been a veritable source of agro-raw materials for both local and foreign industries. Agriculture should be made attractive.
Support for the MSME subsector should be a matter of urgency. It harbours over 40 million units and, according to NBS, constitutes over 90% of the nation’s enterprise stock. These enterprises play a huge role in wealth creation. Poor power supply and limited access to affordable credit have, however, not allowed the sector to thrive as it should.
Another critical priority area that deserves greater support is direct job creation. The concept has been a good complement to macroeconomic reforms the world over. It is an indispensable labour sponge for economies under serious stress, as pronounced by great scholars like Keynes and later modified by Friedman and others. The US government under Roosevelt used it to revive the economy during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Called the New Deal, it aimed to equip jobless youths with skills to undertake various types of economic activities outside government. A similar approach was adopted in the rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan (1948–1951).
Successive governments in Nigeria appreciated this dictum during periods of economic challenges and established agencies such as the NDE, NAPEP, SMEDAN, etc. However, over the years, some of their operations have lost steam when they are needed most. It is believed that, with proper support, the agencies could address the annual rate of 3 million youths discharged by the education system into the labour market, where only 10% are estimated to get formal employment.
The call for rejigging the existing agencies is not to downplay what is on the ground, such as the N75 billion BOI fund, the CBN’s development fund, SMEDAN’s ICSS and GROW Fund, etc., but rather to engender greater impact and reach. This is also without prejudice to existing schemes and/or programmes of NBTE, ITF and others. They should be made to work collaboratively, statutorily, along a national empowerment value chain that links skills development, entrepreneurship, funding and mentoring.
The resources to fund interventions are on the ground. They include redirecting the subsidy savings, a sustained reduction in corruption that currently takes 40% of the nation’s annual budget, and conventional allocations.
In the final analysis, reforms cannot be judged by the comfort of government balance sheets while citizens struggle to put food on their tables. Nigerians do not live on GDP growth, foreign reserves or impressive FAAC figures; they live on wages, jobs, affordable food, electricity, healthcare and purchasing power. The real challenge, therefore, is to move the reforms from the spreadsheets of government into the productive economy and the homes of ordinary Nigerians.
Until that happens, the government may continue to celebrate its numbers, but the people will continue to measure the reforms by the hardship they feel.
A. G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com
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Police Recover Two AK-47 Rifles From Commercial Vehicle In Kwara
Stephen Olufemi Oni, Ilorin
The Kwara State Police Command has recovered two AK-47 rifles, three magazines and 42 rounds of live ammunition from a commercial vehicle in Ilorin, leading to the discovery of a suspected gun-running network.
The weapons were intercepted during a stop-and-search operation along the Alapa–Okolowo axis of Ilorin, where police operatives reportedly found a bag containing the firearms and ammunition inside the passenger vehicle.
The police said a 30-year-old suspect, identified as Umaru M., initially denied ownership of the bag but later admitted to conveying the firearms and ammunition during interrogation.
According to the Command, the suspect’s statement provided a major breakthrough in the investigation, as he allegedly linked the weapons to another suspected member of the gun-running network, identified as Dan Yarubawa.
Umaru reportedly told investigators that Yarubawa handed the firearms to him for onward delivery to another individual, identified as Dahiru, outside Kwara State.
The Police Public Relations Officer, SP Adetoun Ejire-Adeyemi, in a statement issued on Monday, said efforts have been intensified to apprehend the other suspects and unravel the full extent of the alleged gun-running network.
The development, she said, was in line with the strategic policing vision of the Inspector-General of Police, IGP Olatunji Rilwan Disu, particularly the emphasis on proactive policing, intelligence-led operations and sustained efforts to disrupt criminal activities.
The Commissioner of Police, Kwara State Command, CP Adekimi Ojo, assured residents that the Command would continue to take proactive measures to identify and neutralise threats to public safety.
Ojo urged members of the public to support the police by providing credible and timely information, stressing that the Command remained committed to protecting lives and property across the state.
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Technology5 years ago
Online job placement company headhunts women
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Headlines10 years agoBorno Dep Gov Abducts Another Church Leader
