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Opinion: NIGERIA’S LABYRINTHIAN FUTURE AND THE POLITICS OF RESTRUCTURING

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BY: A G Abubakar

Nigeria has a long and complicated history of stepping back from the brink. From the constitutional conferences of the 1940s and 1950s that birthed the country, to the Western Region crisis dubbed “Operation Wetie” or “Wild Wild West,” which peaked in 1964, the military coup of 1966, and the devastating three-year civil war, the nation has repeatedly endured moments that threatened its continued existence.

The cycle did not end there. The fierce debates over Sharia during the 1979 constitutional process, the Maitatsine uprisings in Northern Nigeria in the early 80s, the proclamation of Shari’a law by 12 Northern states in 2000/2001, the recurring ethno-religious crises in the Middle Belt, the Niger Delta militancy, and the current insurgency and banditry ravaging large parts of the North have all tested the resilience of the Nigerian state. Yet, despite these storms, Nigeria somehow endured. A case of a cat with nine lives.

Today, however, the situation appears fundamentally different. The danger lies not merely in the complexity of the crisis, but in the perceived sincerity of the government in power. A government with a regional agenda inherited a vulnerable country confronted by deep political, economic, and social fractures, with its security architecture weaker than at any other point in recent history. Years of declining combat effectiveness, institutional decay, corruption, poor coordination, and political interference have significantly weakened both the military and paramilitary establishments. Across vast stretches of the country, citizens increasingly feel abandoned to terrorists, kidnappers, bandits, separatists, and violent criminal networks. This is as the government seemingly looks on helplessly.

What once appeared impossible now seems conceivable: maybe a welcome development for advocates of restructuring, and/or what separatist movements failed to achieve through decades of conferences, negotiations, constitutional advocacy, and political bargaining may now emerge naturally through the weakening of the federation itself. And maybe, too, a welcome opportunity for a national implosion for those who have been yearning for a nation of their own to have their way.

Since independence, Nigeria’s fragile unity has rested on the invisible hands of regional comparative advantage. The South, particularly the South West, dominated the economy, bureaucracy, commerce, and educational advancement, while the North — owing largely to its demographic strength and military influence — maintained some form of higher political visibility, aside from constituting a huge consumer base for industrial production mostly based in the South.

Whether that advantage was effectively utilised is another debate entirely. What remains undeniable is that it generated deep resentment in parts of Southern Nigeria. Over time, demands for restructuring, resource control, regional autonomy, and even outright secession became recurring political themes.

The agitation intensified dramatically after General Ibrahim Babangida annulled the June 12, 1993 presidential election widely believed to have been won by Chief MKO Abiola. From that moment onward, the campaign against what many perceived as “Northern domination” became more coordinated, ideological, and relentless. Successive political actors adopted different strategies to weaken the North’s traditional hold on national power.

President Olusegun Obasanjo arguably initiated the first major institutional attrition against the Northern political establishment. Under the guise of professionalising the military and preventing future coups, many senior Northern military officers with political influence were systematically retired or sidelined.

That process significantly weakened the military-political network that had historically sustained Northern influence within the federation. It was followed by economic reforms and policy shifts — whether deliberate or incidental — that contributed to the erosion of the North’s, and indeed the nation’s, agriculture and agro-industrial base. Textile industries collapsed. Rural poverty deepened. Unemployment exploded. Social frustration intensified. The consequences soon manifested in rising criminality, religious extremism, insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, and communal violence across Northern Nigeria.

President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, due to prolonged ill health, could not substantially reverse the trend. His successor, Goodluck Jonathan, spent much of his six years in office (2010–2015) struggling for political legitimacy after assuming office under the “Doctrine of Necessity.” Large portions of his tenure were devoted to balancing competing political interests through patronage and elite appeasement.

Then came Muhammadu Buhari — a man in whom many Northerners invested enormous hope. To millions, Buhari represented the possibility of restoring Northern political confidence, rebuilding institutional discipline, fighting corruption, and stabilising the economy. Instead, disappointment followed. Critics argue that Buhari lacked both the strategic vision and the competent support structure required for national transformation. Unlike his earlier military administration, where he worked alongside the highly disciplined and efficient Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, or his tenure as Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) chairman under General Sani Abacha, where technocrats such as Dr. Tayo Akpata provided administrative strength, Buhari’s civilian presidency appeared increasingly directionless.

Over time, the administration became associated with weak leadership, policy inconsistency, growing insecurity, and allegations that powerful unelected interests had effectively taken control of governance. Meanwhile, corruption flourished across critical institutions. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL), the power sector, and even parts of the judiciary faced repeated allegations of financial recklessness and abuse of public trust. The economy deteriorated sharply. Inflation rose. Poverty deepened. Insecurity expanded.

By the time Buhari left office in 2023, many believed the North had emerged politically weaker, economically poorer, and socially more unstable than at any point in recent decades, when Obasanjo and Jonathan from the South, and Yar’Adua and Buhari, both of Northern extraction, were in charge at various times.

Into this environment stepped President Bola Ahmed Tinubu on May 29, 2023. But then, instead of using the opportunity to improve the dire national condition for the benefit of all, he may have chosen to see it as a historic opportunity to pursue a regional agenda. The restructuring advocacy that could not be secured through constitutional means might now be achieved through the political manipulation of the exhausted North; the very region and peoples that gave him over 60% of the votes that got him elected in 2023 became his first set of victims. And, like a shark that smelled blood, he went for the political kill in earnest. It was an opportunity handed to him literally on a platter of gold.

And the strategy? Simple. Set morality and a sense of proportion aside. After all, it is often asserted that there is no morality in politics; that in politics all is fair, just like in war or love. Wisdom, however, accepts this adage only up to a point, if the endgame is not to ultimately destroy the object or issue at stake. To achieve the objectives, certain areas have to be targeted to weaken the system as a whole. These include occupying the commanding positions of critical federal ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs), taking control of the nation’s security architecture, and applying national policy instruments in a self-serving fashion. After four or eight years in office, the perceived dominant region would have been reduced to a mere statistical base.

At the governance level, critical appointments across strategic ministries, agencies, and security institutions have gone to cronies. Key federal establishments — finance, security, revenue, customs, NNPC, etc. — are increasingly concentrated in the hands of individuals who are politically and ethnically aligned with the President.

Perhaps more dangerous than political appointments is the growing and encouraging posture of the powers that be to fragment the North itself, with far-reaching existential implications for the nation at large. Historically, Northern Nigeria maintained political relevance through collective bargaining and regional solidarity despite its internal ethnic and religious diversity. Today, however, old fault lines are re-emerging with alarming intensity. The embers of ethnic suspicion are being fanned among Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Tiv, Jukun, Nupe, Igala, Babur, and numerous other groups to see themselves as incompatible. Religious identities are increasingly being made to shape political interpretation. The Middle Belt and the far North are being influenced to peel apart. Old grievances — real and imaginary — are resurfacing and being harnessed for short-term political gains.

On the economic front, but for the putative possibility of working towards a self-serving goal, not all policies introduced by the Tinubu administration are fundamentally misguided. The removal of fuel subsidy was economically inevitable. The floating of the naira addressed long-standing distortions within the foreign exchange market. The system was thoroughly abused under Buhari through the existence of multiple poorly managed windows. Tax reforms are necessary in a country where public revenue remains dangerously low relative to population size. Tax evasion and avoidance have made the nation’s tax-to-GDP ratio one of the lowest globally.

The problem lies largely in implementation. Firstly, the composition of the reform teams has been too skewed to engender trust and public buy-in, which is critical in reform exercises. Secondly, major economic reforms require trust, social cushioning, and carefully designed transition mechanisms. Nigerians were asked to absorb severe economic pain without adequate safety nets. Food inflation skyrocketed. The government tried to address the situation through short-term massive imports, but without adequate consideration for their impact on domestic production.

In an economy heavily dependent on agriculture, many expected a fine balance to be simultaneously struck between massive importation and investments in food production, rural infrastructure, fertiliser access, irrigation, and agricultural security. It never was. Instead, large sections of the agrarian North feel neglected and economically uncared for.

Another gap in the Tinubu policy lies in the distribution of physical infrastructure. The lopsidedness has become politically contentious. It is estimated that about 60% of the nation’s budget is channelled to the South West. Projects such as the alleged N15 trillion Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway come to mind. Forget about the afterthought, the Lagos-Badagry-Sokoto corridor. Insecurity would not allow it to commence, at least not from the Sokoto end. Then there is the massive rehabilitation of Lagos ports and airports, along with the establishment and/or extension of a military academy in Osogbo and a police academy project in Ogun State. Many in the North believe the President is being driven by ethnic considerations.

There is nothing inherently wrong with expanding infrastructure in the South West. Every region deserves development. Yet, in a country as sensitive as Nigeria, federal balance matters enormously. Development experts generally agree that a balanced approach to development remains the best model.

In the words of Ragnar Nurkse, a famous 20th-century economist, et al., developing nations must make simultaneous, large-scale investments across various industries to break the vicious circle of poverty and spur faster and greater socioeconomic transformation. As a consequence, some of the institutions and projects should have gone to the South-South or the South-East, for that matter. The North should not complain because it housed most of the nation’s security outfits, so others could have them too in the name of equity.

However, if every region begins to view federal power as an opportunity for regional compensation or historical revenge, then the federation itself becomes unstable. If the South West is perceived as consolidating power today, the North may attempt retaliation tomorrow. If the South East eventually gains power after decades of political exclusion, it too may pursue accelerated regional balancing. The cycle would continue endlessly. That is the true danger seen in the current moment: not merely Tinubu’s presidency itself, but the precedent it may establish.

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu may ultimately complete both his first and second terms successfully. But unless mother luck smiles on the country, the federation may fall apart, as others may use their “turn” to lock others out too. Every cycle weakens the national fabric further through sowing more distrust, exclusion, bitterness, inequality, and the loss of shared national purpose, and maybe eventual dissolution.

Maybe as Plan B, the Odu’a Republic would have been perfected by then — a realisation of a long-held dream by many in the South West. Actually, many perceive the perennial agitation for sovereign national conferences as representing a crucial step towards the Odu’a aspiration. The same vision exists with IPOB, differing only in modus operandi. While the latter uses violence, the former adopts a non-violent approach.

One can only hope that the fears expressed by many Nigerians today ultimately prove unfounded. For if they do not, the country may be approaching one of the most dangerous crossroads in its history: a no-Nigeria era after the Tinubu presidency.

The call here, therefore, is for the President to come into the open and call for the organisation of a summit to pull Nigeria away from the current confusion and stagnation. Literally, no one is enjoying the state of affairs. People deserve a Nigeria that works.

Except for courage, in general, he has everything working in his favour. These include a conscience lacking even a modicum of proportionality; a puppet leadership in both chambers of the legislature; an injudicious judiciary dominated by homeboys; an ethnically skewed national security architecture; and a vision that generally does not go beyond ethnic horizons.

Since the President could not rise above his predecessors in terms of governance, the environment, therefore, is conducive to convening a restructuring process and/or a sovereign national conference. There are no serious encumbrances standing in the way. Restructuring a nation is too serious a business to be handled through manoeuvres and deception. He should set fear aside and do it in order to save the nation from some unintended outcomes.
A.G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com

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The changing face of Nasarawa at 30

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BY VICTORIA NGOZI IKEANO
 
victoriangozii@gmail.com 08033077519
 
Some 26 years after Nigeria’s Independence, a state named Nasarawa  in the old northern region now in north central zone of Nigeria was established by then Head of state, General Sani Abacha.  Nasarawa thus, shares same birth day as Nigeria, October 1. While Nigeria at 66 is a full, grown-up adult that is heading towards being an elder, Nasarawa state is now a young adult, well past adolescent age. The state itself is maturing gradually.  Recall that time was when Lafia  its state capital used to be referred to as a ‘one street capital’, defined by the very long stretch of Jos/Makurdi road.  Before the state came into being, Lafia, was a sleepy city renowned more as a transit stop for long distance travelers and as a food market (melon, rice, yam, etc.) for big-time traders from especially the eastern part of our country. Then on October 1, 1996 it suddenly found itself bestowed with the status of a state capital; the responsibility seemingly heavy for it’s apparently naïve shoulders then.   Findings showed that Akwanga which was considered more cosmopolitan at the time, was to be named the state capital but that General Sani Abacha brought his primordial links to bear in selecting Lafia for the prized crown.  Whatever it is, I think the choice of Lafia is not misplaced because there is more value-added when a virgin or semi virgin land is developed than one that is already on the development highway.
 
Nasarawa state shares boundary with the Federal capital territory (FCT), Plateau, Benue, Kogi and Taraba states. It was carved out of Plateau state. Before then it was part of Benue-Plateau state.  It was one of the six states established by late General San Abacha from Nigeria’s six zones on that fateful day of October 1 ,1996 while delivering his 36th Independence Anniversary speech. Others are,  Ekiti (South West), Ebonyi  (South East), Bayelsa (South South), Gombe (North East) and Zamfara (North West). Wing Commander Abdullahi Ibrahim superintended over the new state in its early  years. On May29, 1999 Nasarawa  got its  first democratically elected governor in person of Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu, Turakin Keffi.   The sole administrator’s main task was setting up administrative machinery for the new state. Notable is his construction of the Government House on Shendam road. This was later completed by then Governor Adamu enabling him to depart the two bedrooms flat at the presidential lodge that had served as his office. Over the years Nasarawa’s Government House which serves as both residence and office of the governor has undergone some touches and additions by the various administrations on its expansive land. It now accommodates a 1000-capacity banquet hall named after its second civilian governor, late Aliyu Akwe Doma. There is also now a Press Centre mainly for correspondents covering Government House activities,  guest rooms, etc.
 
Each of the succeeding governments after the military administrator did the best as they could, adding their own unique building blocks to the now 30 year-old edifice called Nasarawa. Abdullahi Adamu  laid the foundation stone. His efforts are most noticeable in construction of rural roads and education sector. Some 30 years ago, Nasarawa state had no institution of higher learning save the College of Education, Akwanga, inherited from old Plateau state.  Alhaji Adamu (later Senator) established the  Nasarawa state Polytechnic (now Mustapha Agwai Polytechnic)  College of Health Technology, School of Nursing and of course, Nasarawa state University. There have been additional tertiary schools since then. Among them, the Federal Polytechnic (to be converted to Federal Institute of Mining Technology), Federal University, Lafia (FULAFIA). Federal University Teaching Hospital.  Unlike all other governors that completed two terms, late Alhaji Aliyu Akwe Doma who took over from Adamu spent only one term. Nevertheless, he made a mark with especially his Badakoshi  programme in which Nasarawa state was exporting yams to foreign lands, notably United Kingdom, thereby boosting the state’s agricultural sector.
 
Enter Governor Tanko Al-makura (later Senator) after Doma’s time.  Alhaji Al-makura opened up the state’s capital with infrastructure, especially roads,  giving Lafia a semblance of a capital city.  The modernization of Lafia started with him. Current governor, Engineer Abdullahi  Sule, a former managing director of Dangote Sugar company is taking Nasarawa state to the next level which is industrialization. In this connection he has attracted some industries to Nasarawa state, particularly in areas where the state has comparative advantage, namely agriculture.  As a state that is endowed also with solid minerals (from where it derives the name, ‘Home of Solid Minerals’) Governor Sule is now turning attention to this sector. His legacy project here is the lithium factory built by investor. It is said to be the biggest in Africa and is yielding the government humongous amount of money in revenue. Indeed solid minerals a.k.a. rare minerals, is the future ‘black gold’ that would replace oil which is now gradually losing its importance as nations seek for cleaner energy.  Lithium is used for the new technology of the 21st century as for example, chips of smart phones that are constantly evolving. Thus, states that are rich in various mineral deposits shall rank amongst the richest in future. Quite a number of states in northern Nigeria are so blessed. But the challenge is getting capable investors that would exploit these rare minerals for commercialization.  And Governor Sule has set a precedent in this direction with establishment of the first and biggest lithium factory in Africa. Nasarawa’s landscape is changing from a mainly civil service state to one that is becoming an industrial hub with accompanying hustle and bustle of a thriving state.

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OPINIONThe Disturbing Facts Behind the Economy’s Beautiful Statistics and the Path Forward.

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By: A G Abubakar

“Subsidy is gone!” So thundered Alhaji Bola Ahmed Tinubu at Eagle Square immediately after being sworn in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 29th May 2023. The terse declaration was intended to bring an end to one of the nation’s major cesspools of corruption. Months later came the unification of the various windows of foreign-exchange administration, where impunity, arbitrage and political patronage had held sway for years. That unification, in practical terms, meant the devaluation of the naira. About a year later, a new tax regime was introduced, ostensibly to expand the government’s fiscal space and strengthen its revenue base.

Taken individually and in principle, the three reforms are difficult to fault. They address deep structural distortions that have weakened Nigeria’s economy for decades and created enormous opportunities for rent-seeking, arbitrage and systemic corruption. But economic reforms, however necessary, are not self-executing miracles. Even sound reforms can produce severe and unintended consequences, particularly hyperinflation, joblessness and mass disillusionment, when they are poorly sequenced, inadequately cushioned or implemented without sufficient regard for the productive capacity and welfare of the population.

A reform process is like agriculture. Practitioners know that it is not enough to plant early-maturing, high-yielding seeds and expect a bumper harvest. The whole exercise has to be preceded by land preparation, the acquisition of the right fertiliser and chemicals, and a modicum of good luck—weather and rainfall—from Mother Nature. Otherwise, a potentially high-yielding seed planted in an unprepared field can still produce a disappointing harvest. The same principle applies to economic reform.

Removing subsidies, unifying the foreign-exchange market and expanding the tax base may correct serious distortions, but they do not, by themselves, create food, jobs, productive industries, affordable energy, secure livelihoods or purchasing power. Those outcomes require the productive economy to be strengthened alongside the reforms. Otherwise, the immediate burden of adjustment, such as galloping inflation, can become much heavier than the economy’s capacity to absorb it. Containing inflation and the effects of devaluation in a low-productivity economic environment is one of the hardest policy-management challenges in an economy.

Inflation, in an economy already suffering from weak productive capacity, does not merely raise prices. It erodes purchasing power, destroys savings, increases the cost of survival and pushes millions of people closer to the economic precipice. The problem becomes even more severe when rising prices are accompanied by declining production, high energy costs, currency depreciation and weak household incomes.

The situation is then compounded when the authorities, in an attempt to contain inflation, tighten the money supply through higher interest rates. While such measures may be intended to moderate demand and stabilise prices, their immediate effect is to increase the cost of borrowing, making investment more expensive and, in some cases, virtually prohibitive. Businesses that would otherwise expand production are forced to scale back, postpone investment or close altogether. Productivity consequently suffers, employment opportunities shrink, and the economy becomes even less capable of producing the goods and services its growing population requires.

The usual temptation is to fill domestic production gaps through massive imports. But this, too, places even greater pressure on scarce foreign exchange while simultaneously making local production less competitive and less attractive. The vicious cycle is thereby reinforced: currency depreciation raises the cost of imported inputs and finished goods; high interest rates suppress investment; weak domestic production increases import dependence; import dependence intensifies demand for scarce foreign exchange; and the resulting pressure on the currency pushes prices even higher.

The economy consequently becomes trapped in a cycle in which the very measures intended to restore stability can, in the absence of corresponding increases in production, deepen the pressures facing households and businesses. When these forces are allowed to play out without restoring the critical balance, citizens’ well-being takes the greatest hit: food, transport, housing, healthcare and education become increasingly difficult to afford.

This calls for an elaborate blueprint for safety nets, which is literally the first law of reform. Metaphorically, tents are mounted before the rain starts falling. And the reasons are obvious: reforms usually throw up unintended consequences faster than the antidotes to contain them. On account of time lags, economies normally take time to absorb the shocks created by reforms.

The government has not acknowledged this reality sufficiently. Instead, it has developed a penchant for rolling out statistics to rebut any opinion to the contrary. Functionaries have been too eager to cite improved foreign reserves, rising GDP growth, falling food inflation, increased FAAC allocations to states and even access to NELFUND. And lately, the improved figure for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country. The truth is that these achievements have not been felt by ordinary citizens. And for some obvious reasons.

The increase in foreign reserves above $54 billion, the highest since 2008, has not been achieved through improved domestic productivity or exports. It has been driven largely by external borrowing and fortuitous developments in the oil market. Records from the DMO indicate that Nigeria’s external debt rose from $45.98 billion to $51.90 billion in 2026, a net increase of $5.92 billion. The war in Iran, too, has pushed oil prices above Nigeria’s budget benchmark of $64.85 per barrel to around $100. The positive difference represents a “windfall” that has improved Nigeria’s external reserves without a corresponding rise in non-oil production. It is like a lottery. Economies are never sustainably run on lotteries.

The GDP growth at 4.43% is equally impressive, but it could just be “paper growth” because it has not translated into a general improvement in citizens’ well-being. It is common to have “jobless growth”—a phenomenon in which growth is concentrated in high-tech sectors or services rather than in industrial production, manufacturing or agriculture. These productive sectors are the major drivers of sustainable economic growth. They provide job opportunities for millions, create wealth and boost exports. This has not been the case with Nigeria’s GDP growth.

Falling food inflation is a welcome development at any time. It becomes a challenge when it is driven by imports. It is on record (CBN, NBS) that between 2024 and 2025, the government imported N6.58 trillion and N6.65 trillion, respectively, worth of food items, particularly grains. While the importation has forced prices down, it has inadvertently discouraged local production, the level of which was already down because of insecurity in most farming communities. This has triggered a fear of hunger, which Mr President had cause to say has been with us since before he was born.

The NELFUND is a good initiative in unqualified terms. The figure being bandied about—that more than a million students have benefited from the scheme—is impressive. But the finer details may indicate a different story. For communities dealing with low school enrolment, such as in the North, where about 16 million are out of school, or poor communities having to deal with poor educational performance, the immediate challenge may not be student loans. It is about putting education on the right footing. NELFUND, for now, could largely benefit the privileged who ordinarily could afford tuition.

Then comes the issue of enhanced FAAC allocations to the states, which may have accrued from tax reforms, improved oil revenues, savings from subsidy removal and other measures. Great as these initiatives have been in improving the government’s fiscal health, the paradox is that inflation arising from currency devaluation has eaten away almost 70% of the value of what is being allocated.

To put it plainly, the naira has lost around 70% of its value against the dollar. State governments are, therefore, now paying multiple times what they used to pay for the same goods and services before the devaluation. The increased FAAC is like adding water to a soup to serve more guests, and still insisting that the taste has improved too.

As for FDI, Nigeria recorded an improved level in the first quarter of 2026, to the tune of $10.37 billion in capital importation. Unfortunately, more than 95%—over $9.85 billion—was portfolio investment. Records indicate that more than 98% of the said portfolio inflows went into money-market instruments, including Treasury bills and government bonds. While such inflows can provide foreign exchange and temporary liquidity, they are inherently more mobile than direct investment. Nigeria needs more foreign capital, but that which a greater proportion should be stable, and long-term to expand productive capacity, creates jobs and strengthens the real economy.

As things stand, the reforms actually call for further reforms to make their outcomes more impactful. The path forward should start by reviewing some of the prescriptions of the neoliberal Bretton Woods institutions (WB/IMF) that emphasise spreadsheet balance over public well-being. The next necessary actions include repossessing aspects of the energy sector, stepping up the war on corruption, optimising the reinvestment of subsidy savings into job creation, and providing sustainable support for the MSME sector.

The 2012 privatisation of aspects of Nigeria’s electricity sector has not worked well. Apart from its abysmally low transmission of about 5,000 MW for a population of over 230 million, the Nigerian power sector is structurally inefficient, operationally constrained and unnecessarily burdened by a maze of encumbering regulatory and institutional arrangements. The transmitted volume is actually less than that of some single cities, such as Beijing (China), Tokyo (Japan), Delhi (India) and the like.

First, the gap between the estimated 12,000 MW or more generation capacity and the roughly 5,000 MW wheeling volume means that more than half of the available generation capacity is either stranded, constrained or otherwise unavailable to consumers. Second, the TCN’s transmission loss factor (TLF), at 7.96%, exceeds NERC’s regulatory threshold of 7%. Third, and more troubling, is the DISCOs’ Aggregate Technical, Commercial and Collection (ATC&C) loss rate of 37.44%, more than twice the regulatory target of 16.92%.

These have inflicted enormous financial losses and severely diminished economic opportunities, with far-reaching consequences for the productive capacity of the economy and the acceleration of its deindustrialisation.

The institutional architecture itself adds another layer of complexity. The sector involves a cacophony of stakeholders and institutions—including the GenCos, TCN, NISO, DISCOs, NERC, NBET, NEMSA, the ECN, the Rural Electrification Agency (REA) and the Federal Ministry of Power (FMP). Their mandates tend to overlap. They should be streamlined to remove bottlenecks.

Energy is an indispensable factor in economic transformation. For instance, in the USA, only 13% of the economy can function without electricity. In general, it is believed that a 1% increase in electricity supply can stimulate between 1.5% and 3% growth in GDP. The government should, therefore, reclaim the distribution segment (DisCos) of the power ecosystem to fast-track national development, as the private-sector-led model has not delivered yet. This is without prejudice to the current Electricity Act, 2023, as amended.

Besides power, greater attention should be paid to agriculture through the provision of subsidies on inputs, chemicals and fertiliser. Agriculture remains a mainstay of the economy, contributing between 20% and 26% to national GDP and employing around 70% of the rural labour force (NBS, 2026). It has been a veritable source of agro-raw materials for both local and foreign industries. Agriculture should be made attractive.

Support for the MSME subsector should be a matter of urgency. It harbours over 40 million units and, according to NBS, constitutes over 90% of the nation’s enterprise stock. These enterprises play a huge role in wealth creation. Poor power supply and limited access to affordable credit have, however, not allowed the sector to thrive as it should.

Another critical priority area that deserves greater support is direct job creation. The concept has been a good complement to macroeconomic reforms the world over. It is an indispensable labour sponge for economies under serious stress, as pronounced by great scholars like Keynes and later modified by Friedman and others. The US government under Roosevelt used it to revive the economy during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Called the New Deal, it aimed to equip jobless youths with skills to undertake various types of economic activities outside government. A similar approach was adopted in the rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan (1948–1951).

Successive governments in Nigeria appreciated this dictum during periods of economic challenges and established agencies such as the NDE, NAPEP, SMEDAN, etc. However, over the years, some of their operations have lost steam when they are needed most. It is believed that, with proper support, the agencies could address the annual rate of 3 million youths discharged by the education system into the labour market, where only 10% are estimated to get formal employment.

The call for rejigging the existing agencies is not to downplay what is on the ground, such as the N75 billion BOI fund, the CBN’s development fund, SMEDAN’s ICSS and GROW Fund, etc., but rather to engender greater impact and reach. This is also without prejudice to existing schemes and/or programmes of NBTE, ITF and others. They should be made to work collaboratively, statutorily, along a national empowerment value chain that links skills development, entrepreneurship, funding and mentoring.

The resources to fund interventions are on the ground. They include redirecting the subsidy savings, a sustained reduction in corruption that currently takes 40% of the nation’s annual budget, and conventional allocations.

In the final analysis, reforms cannot be judged by the comfort of government balance sheets while citizens struggle to put food on their tables. Nigerians do not live on GDP growth, foreign reserves or impressive FAAC figures; they live on wages, jobs, affordable food, electricity, healthcare and purchasing power. The real challenge, therefore, is to move the reforms from the spreadsheets of government into the productive economy and the homes of ordinary Nigerians.

Until that happens, the government may continue to celebrate its numbers, but the people will continue to measure the reforms by the hardship they feel.
A. G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com

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Police Recover Two AK-47 Rifles From Commercial Vehicle In Kwara

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Stephen Olufemi Oni, Ilorin

The Kwara State Police Command has recovered two AK-47 rifles, three magazines and 42 rounds of live ammunition from a commercial vehicle in Ilorin, leading to the discovery of a suspected gun-running network.

The weapons were intercepted during a stop-and-search operation along the Alapa–Okolowo axis of Ilorin, where police operatives reportedly found a bag containing the firearms and ammunition inside the passenger vehicle.

The police said a 30-year-old suspect, identified as Umaru M., initially denied ownership of the bag but later admitted to conveying the firearms and ammunition during interrogation.

According to the Command, the suspect’s statement provided a major breakthrough in the investigation, as he allegedly linked the weapons to another suspected member of the gun-running network, identified as Dan Yarubawa.

Umaru reportedly told investigators that Yarubawa handed the firearms to him for onward delivery to another individual, identified as Dahiru, outside Kwara State.

The Police Public Relations Officer, SP Adetoun Ejire-Adeyemi, in a statement issued on Monday, said efforts have been intensified to apprehend the other suspects and unravel the full extent of the alleged gun-running network.

The development, she said, was in line with the strategic policing vision of the Inspector-General of Police, IGP Olatunji Rilwan Disu, particularly the emphasis on proactive policing, intelligence-led operations and sustained efforts to disrupt criminal activities.

The Commissioner of Police, Kwara State Command, CP Adekimi Ojo, assured residents that the Command would continue to take proactive measures to identify and neutralise threats to public safety.

Ojo urged members of the public to support the police by providing credible and timely information, stressing that the Command remained committed to protecting lives and property across the state.

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