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SOKOTO FIRST WHERE NEXT?
INTEROGATING THE BIGGER PICTURE.


By: A G Abunakar

When Donald Trump mooted the idea of coming into Nigeria to smoke out jihadists allegedly killing Christians, public reactions were as diverse as Nigerian society itself. And, when he followed through his threats by striking Jabo, a village in Sokoto state, with drones and missiles, the reactions haven’t been less diverse either. Not many people fathomed that Sokoto was going to be high on the pecking order of strike in view of the fact that the killings from the area on account of terrorism and insurgency are much lower than what obtain in the North East and North Central regions of the country. Others, welcomed the strike and maintained that after Sokoto, it can be extended accordingly.

Why did the US pull the trigger now? The answer lies in the alleged genocide against Christians and global geopolitics. As regards the alleged carnage, many perceived it as affecting both Christians and Muslims alike. Others, however, saw the killings as bearing distinct markings of genocide. The few who attempted to express concern for some of the Muslim communities impacted by the crises tended to blame them, for not speaking out forcefully enough about their plight.

They maintained that the Christian communities —genocide or not —have been able to voice out their concerns, which consequently got escalated to the global stage. From there it found receptive ears among evangelical groups in the United States and influential members of Congress. Following two fact-finding missions, Trump decided to make good his threat to strike Nigeria, from its Navy warship in the Gulf of Guinea and related operational base in Ghana. A total of sixteen GPS-guided precision munitions were reportedly pumped into Jabo village.

The build-up followed a familiar U.S. pre-strike pattern: ramp up verbal attacks, repeat accusations relentlessly, and deploy charged descriptors such as “disgrace,” “weak,” and “ineffectual.” This is usually followed by threats capped with ultimatums, before eventual military action. The host nation, usually the weaker partner, is informed as fait accompli out of courtesy and the need for cooperation should the need arises.

A few weeks ago, Trump reiterated his description of Nigeria as a disgrace, accusing the government of failing to halt killings within four weeks—violence that, in reality, has persisted for nearly two decades. While warnings and diplomatic engagements were ongoing, U.S. surveillance reportedly operated freely over Nigerian airspace as the country watched helplessly.

Meanwhile, at home, groups sympathetic to the genocide narrative mounted campaigns against a nonexistent Sokoto Caliphate, accusing it of perpetuating the alleged genocide For the record, the Sokoto Caliphate existed between 1804 and 1903. Its formal end came with the killing of Sultan Attahiru at Burmi while he sought refuge. Burmi is located in the present-day Gombe State in northeastern Nigeria. From that point onward, British colonial rule took over, and in 1960, Nigeria emerged as a sovereign constitutional state. The role of successive paramount rulers in Sokoto—styled as Sultans—has since been largely symbolic and ceremonial: a unifying figure for social and religious cohesion, devoid of executive authority.

Under the 1999 Constitution, traditional rulers possess no autonomous power. Their authority is subordinate even to local government chairmen—not governors. Emirs, Obas, Shehus, Ezes, Sultans, Tor Tivs, Kuthlis, Och’Idomas, and others must obtain concurrence from their local councils before moving outside their domains. That is how hamstrung traditional institutions have become. Indeed, the Nigerian Constitution provides no clear operational role for royal fathers.

Eventually, the United States struck targets in Sokoto, allegedly based on “credible intelligence” indicating that perpetrators of genocide were located in the region—and that genocide itself was taking place there. Trump announced:

“The United States launched a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS terrorist elements in northwest Nigeria who have been targeting and viciously killing primarily innocent Christians at levels not seen for many years, and even centuries.”

Notably, there was no direct reference to the Nigerian government. Any claim by Nigerian authorities that the strike was conducted under mutual arrangement appeared, at best, face-saving.

Indeed, it could hardly have been otherwise. Had Nigeria been in control, it would have directed the strikes where they mattered most—against Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Northeast or the murderous armed herdsmen in Benue and Plateau States. These two groups – and opportunists in between – have effectively torn the country apart, while successive governments have appeared too apprehensive to decisively confront them for fear of alienating either Christian or Muslim constituencies. In reality, Nigeria doesn’t have nationals. It has only Christians and Muslims, and that’s how they operate. Therefore, leadership, instead of managing citizens, ends up balancing sectarian relations at the expense of development.

This relentless balancing of Christian-Muslim political interests has steadily defanged Nigerian governments, weakening them internally and diplomatically. A fractured home front translates into vulnerability abroad. Trump and other world leaders have perceived this weakness and exploited it through classic “divide and rule” tactics, manipulating mutual suspicion for strategic advantage. Even when external actors act high-handedly, the Nigerian government watches helplessly, trapped in the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

The strike on Sokoto may, therefore, have been strategic. First, to reinforce the perception that genocide is occurring and that the Islamic community—symbolised by the Sultanate—is complicit. Second, Sokoto may simply serve as a launch pad for deeper penetration toward the actual jihadist strongholds in the Northeast. Or perhaps it is merely a case of giving a dog a bad name in order to hang it.

It is also possible that the U.S. sought to test its new National Security Strategy, shaped around Trump’s “America First” vision, and rolled out in November 2025. The strategy describes U.S. foreign policy as “pragmatic without being pragmatist, realistic without being realist, principled without being idealist, muscular without being hawkish, and restrained without being dovish” It further claims to be guided by “flexible realism” and “offensive realism.” Perhaps only the architects of this Trump-inspired doctrine can fully explain why Sokoto became the testing ground for these abstractions—first in Africa.

Outside these explanations, logic dictates that any serious offensive against terrorism should have begun at the epicentres: Boko Haram and ISWAP enclaves in the Northeast, orNorth-Central killing fields. The hills of Mangu, Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Bassa, and Riyom in Plateau State; the forests of Yelwata, Gwer, Guma, and Akpa in Benue State; and areas such as Shiroro, Mokwa, and the Kainji axis in Niger State, as well as Baruten and Kaiama in Kwara State, where groups like Ansaru, Mamuda, and Lakurawa operate. The U.S. reconnaissance missions to these regions should have yielded sufficient actionable intelligence for pre-emptive strikes.

Killings in Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi, Katsina, and parts of Kaduna are largely products of terrorism-fuelled criminality exploiting weak law enforcement They are mostly Muslim-on-Muslim, or Hausa-Fulani-on-Fulani violence, driven by economic or criminal motives rather than ideology. The Lakurawa phenomenon has been a low-level insurgency that got foothold in the zone during Nigeria’s frosty relations with Niger Republic after the military toppled the latter’s civilian government. This sharply contrasts with Boko Haram and ISWAP, which are animated by Sharia-state ideology and territorial ambition.

Lakurawa in Sokoto axis is, in fact, a case of marriage gone sour. Years back, the local communities used to engage them for security and protection against livestock rustling in the absence of an orthodox government security system in the area. In return, the group was given unfettered access to the people for religious preaching and missioning until the cookie crumbled. A case of “those who ride on a tiger’s back may end up in its stomach.”

Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau was initially aligned with al-Qaeda. Tactical disagreements later produced a splinter faction—ISWAP—led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram’s founder ISWAP pledged allegiance to ISIS and became its West African franchise. Since then, rivalry between the two has been fierce, with ISWAP appearing to be gaining the upper hand.

ISWAP now controls strategic locations in the Lake Chad Basin—Damasak, Ngala, Malam Fatori—as well as parts of the Gwoza mountains and Sambisa Forest. It has grown increasingly sophisticated, deploying drones, high-calibre weapons, and effective social-media propaganda. A capacity that the Nigerian army is still grappling to match up, given its disastrous experience with deployment in Tudun Biri on the outskirts of Kaduna, Ran in Borno State and a village in Zamfara State.

The group has recently overrun military bases in Kukawa and Damboa (Borno State) and Buni Yadi (Yobe State). Key highways to Maiduguri-Damboa-Biu and Biu-Damaturu-Maiduguri—have remained unsafe. In fact, the Maiduguri/Damboa/Biu corridor has been closed down for years. And it was around this same axis that the military lost senior officers, including Col. Danladi Bako, Brig-Gen. Dzarma Zirkusu, and Brig-Gen. Musa Uba. The latter was reportedly executed in cold blood and filmed by the insurgents for propaganda purposes.

Against this backdrop, it is baffling that Sokoto was chosen for the first strike. Nigerian authorities claim that “structured security cooperation with international partners, including the United States,” led to “precision airstrikes on terrorist targets in the Northwest,” (MFA, December, 2025).

In reality, the decision was unmistakably American. Otherwise, Nigeria might have prioritised strikes on the Northeast or North-Central terror hubs to send a clearer message. Indeed, the very need for U.S. intervention is itself an indictment. Why should it take American drones and missiles to strike targets in Nigeria when ISWAP itself often deployed drones to dislodge Nigerian military bases. Whatever marginal benefits may arise from this so-called “structured cooperation,” they are temporary. Nations invite partners for international crises—not to resolve internal security failures.

Ultimately, the price of failure is national sovereignty. Sokoto may represent the opening chapter in Nigeria’s gradual devaluation. The same U.S. doctrines of “offensive realism” and “flexible realism” have left deep scars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya. Used and dumped. Nigeria must avoid joining that grim list.

The footprint of such “liberation” carries more blood than any diagram of peace.
Sokoto was struck not because it was the epicentre of terror; it was because Nigeria has lost the moral and strategic control of its own security narrative. When a sovereign state becomes unable to clearly define its enemies and acts accordingly, others will define them for it—and strike where symbolism matters more than substance. The first bomb did not merely hit a target; it exposed a vacuum of authority, coherence, and national will.

This is the danger of a country fragmented along ethno-religious lines and governed by permanent appeasement. In such a state, terrorism mutates, criminality flourishes, and foreign powers find justification to intervene under selectively moral banners. Once sovereignty is subcontracted, it is rarely returned intact.

If Nigeria does not urgently reclaim control of its internal security, intelligence architecture, and national narrative, it risks sliding from partner to project, from state to theatre. History shows that foreign “liberation” rarely ends in peace; it ends in prolonged instability, bloodshed, and regret. Nigeria, should be guided.
A. G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com

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Scholars Hail Late Sheik Kamalu-deen’s Legacies iN Education, Leadership

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Stephen Olufemi Oni, Ilorin

Nigeria, and the world at large, are in dire need of exemplary leaders like the late Founder of the Ansarul Islam Society of Nigeria, Sheik Muhammad Kamalu-deen al- Adabbiy.

This was the submission of various scholars at a media briefing in ilorin, the Kwara State capital, to usher in the Society’s week-long activities to commemorate the 100 years of the establishment of the Az-Zumratul Adabiyatul Kamaliyyah School of Arabic and Islamic Studies, in Okekere, Ilorin.

The school was fouded by the late Sheik Kamalu-deen in 1942.

Born in 1905, the late Sheik Kamalu-deen was one of Nigeria’s foremost Islamic scholars and educational piooneers who transformed deep Islamic religoius learning into education and also advocated the acquisition of western education .

He also served as a Councillor and Member of the Ilorin Native Authority Transition Committee between 1958 and 1961and was appointed as the first grand mufti of Ilorin by the Emir of Ilorin.

The late Kamalu-deen al- Adabbiy died in 2005 at the aged of 100 years, leaving behind impactful legacies in the propagation of Islamic religion, scholarship, education and leadership.

Addressing journalists at the ancient hall of the Az-Zumratul Adabiyatul Kamaliyyah School of Arabic and Islamic Studies in Okekere, Ilorin, the spokesperson, Prof Kamil Kamaldeen, said the late sheikh was “non discriminatory” in all his policies, a virtue he said was lacking in most leaders today.

“We are here to celebrate the legacies of the late Sheikh Muhammad Kamalu-deen al-Adabbiy not to tell his history, at a time when the world continues to need what he stood for. We are in a world today that we are looking for leaders who will serve without puting themselves first, no matter where we come from,” he said

The Registrar was flanked by the Vice Chancellor of the Muhammad Kamalu-deen University, Prof AbdulRasheed Jimoh, General Overseer of the Az-Zumratul school, Sheik Mustapha Kamalu-deen al- Adabby, Grand Khadi of the Kwara State Sharia Court of Appeal, Justice Abdulateef Kamaldeen, National Missioner of Ansarul Islam Society of Nigeria, Sheik Abdulmumini Ayara, retired Grand Khadi of the Kwara state Sharia Court of Appeal, Justice Idris Haroon and a foremost islamic Scholar, Sheik Sharafadeen Ajara .

Others included the President of Az-Zumratul alumni association, Ustaz Abdullahi Oni-Tolotolo, and the Principal of the School.

They noted that the late Sheikh Kamalu-deen had through his preachings, established educational structures and selfless leadership qualities, produced worthy ambassadors in all spheres of disciplines, urging leaders at all levels to invest heavily in education .

“No society loses from investing in education, it can only gain, no society loses when you build skills, you can only gain,” they added.

The Scholars also charged leaders to take a cue from the late Sheikh Kamalu-deen whom they said was always willing to collaborate with scholars and leaders of like minds in a bid to bring advancement and progress to his community, citing his link with Al-Ahhar University, Cairo, as beneficial in advancement of higher Islamic studies in Ilorin.

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The changing face of Nasarawa at 30

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BY VICTORIA NGOZI IKEANO
 
victoriangozii@gmail.com 08033077519
 
Some 26 years after Nigeria’s Independence, a state named Nasarawa  in the old northern region now in north central zone of Nigeria was established by then Head of state, General Sani Abacha.  Nasarawa thus, shares same birth day as Nigeria, October 1. While Nigeria at 66 is a full, grown-up adult that is heading towards being an elder, Nasarawa state is now a young adult, well past adolescent age. The state itself is maturing gradually.  Recall that time was when Lafia  its state capital used to be referred to as a ‘one street capital’, defined by the very long stretch of Jos/Makurdi road.  Before the state came into being, Lafia, was a sleepy city renowned more as a transit stop for long distance travelers and as a food market (melon, rice, yam, etc.) for big-time traders from especially the eastern part of our country. Then on October 1, 1996 it suddenly found itself bestowed with the status of a state capital; the responsibility seemingly heavy for it’s apparently naïve shoulders then.   Findings showed that Akwanga which was considered more cosmopolitan at the time, was to be named the state capital but that General Sani Abacha brought his primordial links to bear in selecting Lafia for the prized crown.  Whatever it is, I think the choice of Lafia is not misplaced because there is more value-added when a virgin or semi virgin land is developed than one that is already on the development highway.
 
Nasarawa state shares boundary with the Federal capital territory (FCT), Plateau, Benue, Kogi and Taraba states. It was carved out of Plateau state. Before then it was part of Benue-Plateau state.  It was one of the six states established by late General San Abacha from Nigeria’s six zones on that fateful day of October 1 ,1996 while delivering his 36th Independence Anniversary speech. Others are,  Ekiti (South West), Ebonyi  (South East), Bayelsa (South South), Gombe (North East) and Zamfara (North West). Wing Commander Abdullahi Ibrahim superintended over the new state in its early  years. On May29, 1999 Nasarawa  got its  first democratically elected governor in person of Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu, Turakin Keffi.   The sole administrator’s main task was setting up administrative machinery for the new state. Notable is his construction of the Government House on Shendam road. This was later completed by then Governor Adamu enabling him to depart the two bedrooms flat at the presidential lodge that had served as his office. Over the years Nasarawa’s Government House which serves as both residence and office of the governor has undergone some touches and additions by the various administrations on its expansive land. It now accommodates a 1000-capacity banquet hall named after its second civilian governor, late Aliyu Akwe Doma. There is also now a Press Centre mainly for correspondents covering Government House activities,  guest rooms, etc.
 
Each of the succeeding governments after the military administrator did the best as they could, adding their own unique building blocks to the now 30 year-old edifice called Nasarawa. Abdullahi Adamu  laid the foundation stone. His efforts are most noticeable in construction of rural roads and education sector. Some 30 years ago, Nasarawa state had no institution of higher learning save the College of Education, Akwanga, inherited from old Plateau state.  Alhaji Adamu (later Senator) established the  Nasarawa state Polytechnic (now Mustapha Agwai Polytechnic)  College of Health Technology, School of Nursing and of course, Nasarawa state University. There have been additional tertiary schools since then. Among them, the Federal Polytechnic (to be converted to Federal Institute of Mining Technology), Federal University, Lafia (FULAFIA). Federal University Teaching Hospital.  Unlike all other governors that completed two terms, late Alhaji Aliyu Akwe Doma who took over from Adamu spent only one term. Nevertheless, he made a mark with especially his Badakoshi  programme in which Nasarawa state was exporting yams to foreign lands, notably United Kingdom, thereby boosting the state’s agricultural sector.
 
Enter Governor Tanko Al-makura (later Senator) after Doma’s time.  Alhaji Al-makura opened up the state’s capital with infrastructure, especially roads,  giving Lafia a semblance of a capital city.  The modernization of Lafia started with him. Current governor, Engineer Abdullahi  Sule, a former managing director of Dangote Sugar company is taking Nasarawa state to the next level which is industrialization. In this connection he has attracted some industries to Nasarawa state, particularly in areas where the state has comparative advantage, namely agriculture.  As a state that is endowed also with solid minerals (from where it derives the name, ‘Home of Solid Minerals’) Governor Sule is now turning attention to this sector. His legacy project here is the lithium factory built by investor. It is said to be the biggest in Africa and is yielding the government humongous amount of money in revenue. Indeed solid minerals a.k.a. rare minerals, is the future ‘black gold’ that would replace oil which is now gradually losing its importance as nations seek for cleaner energy.  Lithium is used for the new technology of the 21st century as for example, chips of smart phones that are constantly evolving. Thus, states that are rich in various mineral deposits shall rank amongst the richest in future. Quite a number of states in northern Nigeria are so blessed. But the challenge is getting capable investors that would exploit these rare minerals for commercialization.  And Governor Sule has set a precedent in this direction with establishment of the first and biggest lithium factory in Africa. Nasarawa’s landscape is changing from a mainly civil service state to one that is becoming an industrial hub with accompanying hustle and bustle of a thriving state.

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OPINIONThe Disturbing Facts Behind the Economy’s Beautiful Statistics and the Path Forward.

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By: A G Abubakar

“Subsidy is gone!” So thundered Alhaji Bola Ahmed Tinubu at Eagle Square immediately after being sworn in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 29th May 2023. The terse declaration was intended to bring an end to one of the nation’s major cesspools of corruption. Months later came the unification of the various windows of foreign-exchange administration, where impunity, arbitrage and political patronage had held sway for years. That unification, in practical terms, meant the devaluation of the naira. About a year later, a new tax regime was introduced, ostensibly to expand the government’s fiscal space and strengthen its revenue base.

Taken individually and in principle, the three reforms are difficult to fault. They address deep structural distortions that have weakened Nigeria’s economy for decades and created enormous opportunities for rent-seeking, arbitrage and systemic corruption. But economic reforms, however necessary, are not self-executing miracles. Even sound reforms can produce severe and unintended consequences, particularly hyperinflation, joblessness and mass disillusionment, when they are poorly sequenced, inadequately cushioned or implemented without sufficient regard for the productive capacity and welfare of the population.

A reform process is like agriculture. Practitioners know that it is not enough to plant early-maturing, high-yielding seeds and expect a bumper harvest. The whole exercise has to be preceded by land preparation, the acquisition of the right fertiliser and chemicals, and a modicum of good luck—weather and rainfall—from Mother Nature. Otherwise, a potentially high-yielding seed planted in an unprepared field can still produce a disappointing harvest. The same principle applies to economic reform.

Removing subsidies, unifying the foreign-exchange market and expanding the tax base may correct serious distortions, but they do not, by themselves, create food, jobs, productive industries, affordable energy, secure livelihoods or purchasing power. Those outcomes require the productive economy to be strengthened alongside the reforms. Otherwise, the immediate burden of adjustment, such as galloping inflation, can become much heavier than the economy’s capacity to absorb it. Containing inflation and the effects of devaluation in a low-productivity economic environment is one of the hardest policy-management challenges in an economy.

Inflation, in an economy already suffering from weak productive capacity, does not merely raise prices. It erodes purchasing power, destroys savings, increases the cost of survival and pushes millions of people closer to the economic precipice. The problem becomes even more severe when rising prices are accompanied by declining production, high energy costs, currency depreciation and weak household incomes.

The situation is then compounded when the authorities, in an attempt to contain inflation, tighten the money supply through higher interest rates. While such measures may be intended to moderate demand and stabilise prices, their immediate effect is to increase the cost of borrowing, making investment more expensive and, in some cases, virtually prohibitive. Businesses that would otherwise expand production are forced to scale back, postpone investment or close altogether. Productivity consequently suffers, employment opportunities shrink, and the economy becomes even less capable of producing the goods and services its growing population requires.

The usual temptation is to fill domestic production gaps through massive imports. But this, too, places even greater pressure on scarce foreign exchange while simultaneously making local production less competitive and less attractive. The vicious cycle is thereby reinforced: currency depreciation raises the cost of imported inputs and finished goods; high interest rates suppress investment; weak domestic production increases import dependence; import dependence intensifies demand for scarce foreign exchange; and the resulting pressure on the currency pushes prices even higher.

The economy consequently becomes trapped in a cycle in which the very measures intended to restore stability can, in the absence of corresponding increases in production, deepen the pressures facing households and businesses. When these forces are allowed to play out without restoring the critical balance, citizens’ well-being takes the greatest hit: food, transport, housing, healthcare and education become increasingly difficult to afford.

This calls for an elaborate blueprint for safety nets, which is literally the first law of reform. Metaphorically, tents are mounted before the rain starts falling. And the reasons are obvious: reforms usually throw up unintended consequences faster than the antidotes to contain them. On account of time lags, economies normally take time to absorb the shocks created by reforms.

The government has not acknowledged this reality sufficiently. Instead, it has developed a penchant for rolling out statistics to rebut any opinion to the contrary. Functionaries have been too eager to cite improved foreign reserves, rising GDP growth, falling food inflation, increased FAAC allocations to states and even access to NELFUND. And lately, the improved figure for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country. The truth is that these achievements have not been felt by ordinary citizens. And for some obvious reasons.

The increase in foreign reserves above $54 billion, the highest since 2008, has not been achieved through improved domestic productivity or exports. It has been driven largely by external borrowing and fortuitous developments in the oil market. Records from the DMO indicate that Nigeria’s external debt rose from $45.98 billion to $51.90 billion in 2026, a net increase of $5.92 billion. The war in Iran, too, has pushed oil prices above Nigeria’s budget benchmark of $64.85 per barrel to around $100. The positive difference represents a “windfall” that has improved Nigeria’s external reserves without a corresponding rise in non-oil production. It is like a lottery. Economies are never sustainably run on lotteries.

The GDP growth at 4.43% is equally impressive, but it could just be “paper growth” because it has not translated into a general improvement in citizens’ well-being. It is common to have “jobless growth”—a phenomenon in which growth is concentrated in high-tech sectors or services rather than in industrial production, manufacturing or agriculture. These productive sectors are the major drivers of sustainable economic growth. They provide job opportunities for millions, create wealth and boost exports. This has not been the case with Nigeria’s GDP growth.

Falling food inflation is a welcome development at any time. It becomes a challenge when it is driven by imports. It is on record (CBN, NBS) that between 2024 and 2025, the government imported N6.58 trillion and N6.65 trillion, respectively, worth of food items, particularly grains. While the importation has forced prices down, it has inadvertently discouraged local production, the level of which was already down because of insecurity in most farming communities. This has triggered a fear of hunger, which Mr President had cause to say has been with us since before he was born.

The NELFUND is a good initiative in unqualified terms. The figure being bandied about—that more than a million students have benefited from the scheme—is impressive. But the finer details may indicate a different story. For communities dealing with low school enrolment, such as in the North, where about 16 million are out of school, or poor communities having to deal with poor educational performance, the immediate challenge may not be student loans. It is about putting education on the right footing. NELFUND, for now, could largely benefit the privileged who ordinarily could afford tuition.

Then comes the issue of enhanced FAAC allocations to the states, which may have accrued from tax reforms, improved oil revenues, savings from subsidy removal and other measures. Great as these initiatives have been in improving the government’s fiscal health, the paradox is that inflation arising from currency devaluation has eaten away almost 70% of the value of what is being allocated.

To put it plainly, the naira has lost around 70% of its value against the dollar. State governments are, therefore, now paying multiple times what they used to pay for the same goods and services before the devaluation. The increased FAAC is like adding water to a soup to serve more guests, and still insisting that the taste has improved too.

As for FDI, Nigeria recorded an improved level in the first quarter of 2026, to the tune of $10.37 billion in capital importation. Unfortunately, more than 95%—over $9.85 billion—was portfolio investment. Records indicate that more than 98% of the said portfolio inflows went into money-market instruments, including Treasury bills and government bonds. While such inflows can provide foreign exchange and temporary liquidity, they are inherently more mobile than direct investment. Nigeria needs more foreign capital, but that which a greater proportion should be stable, and long-term to expand productive capacity, creates jobs and strengthens the real economy.

As things stand, the reforms actually call for further reforms to make their outcomes more impactful. The path forward should start by reviewing some of the prescriptions of the neoliberal Bretton Woods institutions (WB/IMF) that emphasise spreadsheet balance over public well-being. The next necessary actions include repossessing aspects of the energy sector, stepping up the war on corruption, optimising the reinvestment of subsidy savings into job creation, and providing sustainable support for the MSME sector.

The 2012 privatisation of aspects of Nigeria’s electricity sector has not worked well. Apart from its abysmally low transmission of about 5,000 MW for a population of over 230 million, the Nigerian power sector is structurally inefficient, operationally constrained and unnecessarily burdened by a maze of encumbering regulatory and institutional arrangements. The transmitted volume is actually less than that of some single cities, such as Beijing (China), Tokyo (Japan), Delhi (India) and the like.

First, the gap between the estimated 12,000 MW or more generation capacity and the roughly 5,000 MW wheeling volume means that more than half of the available generation capacity is either stranded, constrained or otherwise unavailable to consumers. Second, the TCN’s transmission loss factor (TLF), at 7.96%, exceeds NERC’s regulatory threshold of 7%. Third, and more troubling, is the DISCOs’ Aggregate Technical, Commercial and Collection (ATC&C) loss rate of 37.44%, more than twice the regulatory target of 16.92%.

These have inflicted enormous financial losses and severely diminished economic opportunities, with far-reaching consequences for the productive capacity of the economy and the acceleration of its deindustrialisation.

The institutional architecture itself adds another layer of complexity. The sector involves a cacophony of stakeholders and institutions—including the GenCos, TCN, NISO, DISCOs, NERC, NBET, NEMSA, the ECN, the Rural Electrification Agency (REA) and the Federal Ministry of Power (FMP). Their mandates tend to overlap. They should be streamlined to remove bottlenecks.

Energy is an indispensable factor in economic transformation. For instance, in the USA, only 13% of the economy can function without electricity. In general, it is believed that a 1% increase in electricity supply can stimulate between 1.5% and 3% growth in GDP. The government should, therefore, reclaim the distribution segment (DisCos) of the power ecosystem to fast-track national development, as the private-sector-led model has not delivered yet. This is without prejudice to the current Electricity Act, 2023, as amended.

Besides power, greater attention should be paid to agriculture through the provision of subsidies on inputs, chemicals and fertiliser. Agriculture remains a mainstay of the economy, contributing between 20% and 26% to national GDP and employing around 70% of the rural labour force (NBS, 2026). It has been a veritable source of agro-raw materials for both local and foreign industries. Agriculture should be made attractive.

Support for the MSME subsector should be a matter of urgency. It harbours over 40 million units and, according to NBS, constitutes over 90% of the nation’s enterprise stock. These enterprises play a huge role in wealth creation. Poor power supply and limited access to affordable credit have, however, not allowed the sector to thrive as it should.

Another critical priority area that deserves greater support is direct job creation. The concept has been a good complement to macroeconomic reforms the world over. It is an indispensable labour sponge for economies under serious stress, as pronounced by great scholars like Keynes and later modified by Friedman and others. The US government under Roosevelt used it to revive the economy during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Called the New Deal, it aimed to equip jobless youths with skills to undertake various types of economic activities outside government. A similar approach was adopted in the rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan (1948–1951).

Successive governments in Nigeria appreciated this dictum during periods of economic challenges and established agencies such as the NDE, NAPEP, SMEDAN, etc. However, over the years, some of their operations have lost steam when they are needed most. It is believed that, with proper support, the agencies could address the annual rate of 3 million youths discharged by the education system into the labour market, where only 10% are estimated to get formal employment.

The call for rejigging the existing agencies is not to downplay what is on the ground, such as the N75 billion BOI fund, the CBN’s development fund, SMEDAN’s ICSS and GROW Fund, etc., but rather to engender greater impact and reach. This is also without prejudice to existing schemes and/or programmes of NBTE, ITF and others. They should be made to work collaboratively, statutorily, along a national empowerment value chain that links skills development, entrepreneurship, funding and mentoring.

The resources to fund interventions are on the ground. They include redirecting the subsidy savings, a sustained reduction in corruption that currently takes 40% of the nation’s annual budget, and conventional allocations.

In the final analysis, reforms cannot be judged by the comfort of government balance sheets while citizens struggle to put food on their tables. Nigerians do not live on GDP growth, foreign reserves or impressive FAAC figures; they live on wages, jobs, affordable food, electricity, healthcare and purchasing power. The real challenge, therefore, is to move the reforms from the spreadsheets of government into the productive economy and the homes of ordinary Nigerians.

Until that happens, the government may continue to celebrate its numbers, but the people will continue to measure the reforms by the hardship they feel.
A. G. Abubakar
agbarewa@gmail.com

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